临近大选，无数人密集发声。有的是明星，有的是政客和家人，有的是默默无闻的众人。凉爽了一周，南风从墨西哥湾区吹回来，得克萨斯又回到夏天，太阳一晒，游泳池水都是热的。跟朋友去林中徒步十英里，回来打个盹，看看新闻，第一次听Tim Walz太太Gwen Whipple演讲，她是中学英语老师。她的语言像她的经历一样朴实，但传递的信息却是最宝贵的：America is a country of opportunities for all Americans。正是这一点让这个国家经历了248年跌宕起伏，仍然是世界上最有吸引力的国家，成为无数移民的家，包括我自己。

前天，旅行作家和节目主持人Rick Steves发声，说出他今年大选的抉择，让世界听到我们人性中的“良善天使”的声音。多年前，看他的节目曾经激励我去走世界，现在我成了半个traveler，仍然受他道德力量的感召。我们各自的精神底色决定了周围的人怎么看我们，我们的孩子怎么看我们。

我们听别人说话，头脑接受言语传递的信息。好的信息让我们意识到自己天性中好的一面，就是林肯说的我们天性中的“善良天使”（“the better angels”）。坏的信息激发我们天性中见不得人的那一面，就像川普、万斯和拥趸宣扬的怨恨、排外、霸凌。基于人生经验：你想做一个什么样的人，你想生活在一个什么样的国家，决定了你去接受什么样的信息，而你接受什么样的信息决定了你成为一个什么样的人。

为什么那些能激发我们天性中“善良天使”的信息是我们的精神食粮？作为一个正常人，我们多少要对自己有点自豪感吧；如果有孩子，我们想让孩子为我们的言行感到自豪，在他们的同学面前为自己的父母感到自豪。这都需要好的信息“激活”我们天性中好的一面，去影响我们的孩子天性中好的一面。从反面讲，这也是我厌恶川普和拥趸的主要原因——他们传递的信息激发人性中见不得人的那一面。

有人为川普辩护，说即使目标是好的，也是要穿越地狱才能到达。但是，如果连善良都没有，就已经是在地狱里面了，谈不上“穿越地狱”。即使用“穿越地狱”这种说辞，也得先有个良善的目标，才不至于陷到地狱出不来。川普这伙人的问题就出在这个地方。而且，美国已经穿越了奴隶制、禁止女性投票、禁止有色人种自由婚恋、禁止华人小孩跟白人小孩同校等地狱，用不着再回头“穿越”一遍。更扯蛋的是，川普这伙人正在制造剥夺女性堕胎权等地狱。概念跟历史和现实对不上号的时候，肯定不是历史和现实错了。

在美国历史上，林肯是最讲“政治现实主义”的总统之一，但他的政治遗产之所以宝贵，不是因为他打内战——是南方挑起内战，作为总统他不得不打——而是因为他即使在不得不经历生灵涂炭的致暗时刻，也始终不放弃天性中的“善良天使”。这是理解美国历史遗产的一条关键线索。这也是美国主流历史观跟极右历史观的一个重要区别，也是正常美国选民（包括投共和党票的正常美国选民）跟川普及MAGA川粉的区别。中文川粉没有自己的历史观，只是些捡美国MAGA川粉垃圾的bottom feeders。

美国不少史学家、理论家，甚至神学家，像莱因霍尔德·尼布尔，都不厌其烦地讲解过林肯这种坚守人性中善良天使的“政治现实主义”。用中文世界劳动人民能听懂的语言讲，就是政治从业人员要面对现实，但不能是个没心没肺的杂种。MAGA川粉的问题不在于政治观点，而在于他们崇拜的是这种“没心没肺的政治杂种”。这不是美国政治的主流传统，一点都不American, 而是anti-American。

这几年，一直在想为什么那么多中文知识分子整体上在这半个多世纪政治上没干多少好事，不是自高奋勇当帮凶，就是半推半就当帮闲，当完山寨布尔什维克帮凶-帮闲，一转脸又成了有法西斯色彩的极右势力帮凶-帮闲。当知识分子，哪怕专业技能差点，但至少头脑应该清楚一些吧。比如说，像文革，它跟ISIS是同一种玩意儿，就是一种自相残杀的歇斯底里，有些中文知识分子竟然能说那是“理想主义”、理想是好的，只是手段不对，都是“激进主义”的错。这些活宝再去用他们的奇葩认知去套美国的两党政治，为美国指明方向。

中国的灾难很大程度上是中文知识分子的灾难，说的更具体一点，就是很多中文知识分子的政治智力灾难。

漫画《如果我消失了》细腻地描绘了克拉拉和周围朋友的生活群像，反映了当代青年女性普遍的生存困境。就和在父权社会中生存的每一个普通女性一样，克拉拉尽力地维持着工作和社交，过着简单且重复的日子。一切看起来都那么正常，然而克拉拉却感到自己的内心正无可避免地一寸寸解体、破碎、甚至消失......

“我半闭的双眼无法睁开，我的眼泪像一条小溪，无可避免地向下流淌。我是一枚小小的躯壳，正一点点破碎，内里逐渐消失......”

在抑郁的日子里，克拉拉在日记本中写下了这段话。

透过克拉拉的内心世界，我们看见了一个个平凡女性的绝望和无奈：辛苦乏味的工作、勉强糊口的工资、擅长PUA的男上司、艰苦的住房条件、如影随形的社交压力、被性侵性骚扰留下的创伤，以及来自父权社会的种种打压和规训...这些郁结于心的伤痛一点点吞噬我们的快乐、蚕食我们的希望，让我们逐渐失去了爱和被爱的能力和勇气。当我们每天含泪带笑、疲于奔命时，或许每个人都有想过，“如果我消失了会怎样？”

据世界卫生组织统计，女性患抑郁症的概率是男性的1.2至2倍。而这其中，职场青年女性的心理健康问题常常会被低估和忽视。研究表明，自2020年 2 月以来，职业女性的抑郁情绪水平增加了83%，比职业男性高出47%。在经济下行的时代，为了维持资本的运作，男权社会全方位地挤占职场女性的生存空间，意图榨干她们的精力和时间。然而，当我们感到窒息想要呼救的时候，却只换来冰冷的漠视和嘲讽：“女人就是多愁善感”......

在效率和理性至上的父权制资本主义社会，生产力成为了衡量一个人价值的重要标准。如今盛行的“强女叙事”不断强调着“大女人一切靠自己”，却无时无刻不在拥护着男权社会的“恐弱”思想，对不够坚强的女人口诛笔伐。公共空间里没有了“软弱之人”的一席之地，向她人展露自己的脆弱也变成了一件可耻的事情。我们就如同书中的克拉拉，每天像陀螺一样机械性地辗转于家、公司和各种聚会场合的三点一线，戴着“微笑面具”扮演起温柔和善的“好好小姐”。

作为父权社会中的“廉价劳工”，女性既因职场性别歧视而受到排挤和边缘化，又要服从传统性别规训、为整个社会提供无偿的情绪劳动——微笑着回应不讲道理的老板、耐心地安慰倒苦水的同事、在不熟悉的“朋友聚会”中强颜欢笑.....不知从何时开始，悲痛、愤怒、恐惧、厌倦、无助这些再常见不过的情绪被贴上了“负面”的标签，平静、乐观、贴心、松弛感、共情力强成为了“合格女性”的标准。父权社会贪得无厌地索取着女性的情绪价值，以不平等的资源和低廉的回报要挟她们源源不断地为他人供血，却丝毫不关心她们的能量是否已经消耗殆尽。

其实，克拉拉不是没有求救过，然而另一个残酷的现实却摆在眼前：我们根本没有为自己疗伤的资本！统计数据显示，2023年中国职场女性平均月薪为8689元/月（以一线城市为主），比男性低了约13%。而国内单次心理咨询的价格通常在400-2000元之间，这样的高消费对于需要长期接受心理治疗的女性来说无异于天方夜谭。

实际上，爱和关怀（care）早已被父权制资本主义打造成了一种“产业”，它们被垄断、打包、出售，变成了高位者把控的奢侈品——一种被不平均分配的稀缺资源。父权社会剥夺了女性的权力和资本，以低廉的报酬换取她们日复一日的辛苦付出，而女性能得到的“补偿”却只有心理咨询室里的倒计时钟和收款单上的天文数字。

在享受了男权社会的资源倾斜和女性无偿提供的情绪价值之后，蛤蟆先生*尚且有充足的时间和财力去看病，而被全方压位榨的“蛤蟆小姐”却根本看不起心理医生。当关怀和疗愈变成了明码标价的商品，“治愈创伤”也随之成为了普通女性不敢奢望的特权......

*蛤蟆先生是心理学著作《蛤蟆先生去看心理医生》的主人公。该书以男性视角描绘当代青年人的心理问题并广受好评。

在书的结尾，不堪重负的克拉拉终于在朋友面前情绪失控、崩溃大哭，她袒露了内心深处那道早已溃烂的创伤，开始直面自己难以启齿的伤痛。这一次，朋友们为克拉拉提供了“免费”的关怀，她们谈话、喝茶、平复心情，排毒和疗愈过后，克拉拉终于感到自己的心舒展了一些。

然而，在世界的每个角落、每一个沉寂的夜晚，还有数不尽的“克拉拉”在抑郁的深渊里痛苦挣扎，艰难求生。那么，我们要如何自救呢？

尽管父权社会试图垄断“关怀”的供给，却无法割断女性之间深厚绵长的连结和情感共振。我们要做的不仅仅是觉醒与抗争，更要凝聚在一起创造一个互相关心、彼此疗愈的支持网络——希望在这里，终有一天，脆弱将不再难以启齿，爱也因充盈而枝繁叶茂，关怀和包容会像阳光、空气和水一样源源不断地流向世界的每个角落。

Spies in Albany

Peter Mattis is the president of The Jamestown Foundation, served on the House CCP Select Committee, and co-authored “Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer.”

Today, Peter is here to discuss last week’s arrest of Albany operator Linda Sun.

[Linda] Sun in the Gears: The Unknown Casualties of Influence

On September 4, the US Department of Justice unveiled a criminal indictment of former New York state government staffer Linda Sun and her husband Chris Hu. The couple was indicted for acting as unregistered agents of a foreign power, fraud, money laundering, and other offenses stemming from Sun’s relationship with PRC officials at the New York consulate. If Sun and Hu are found guilty, the authorities will make public the details, methods, and consequences of their activities. As the debate about how to address Beijing’s interference in democratic societies reignites, such information is essential for gauging the appropriate response to this aspect of the China challenge.

The indictment describes numerous incidents in which Sun stripped out mention of Taiwan or prevented state officials from participating in Taiwan-related events. In one particularly egregious breach of trust, she also forged the governor’s signature in support of a visa application for visiting PRC officials coming to the United States. In appreciation of her efforts, Hu’s business received several contracts with PRC entities. The money “earned” from those ventures allowed the couple to purchase a 2024 Ferrari and multi-million dollar properties in Long Island and Hawaii. (To put that in perspective, Beijing paid General Lo Hsien-chi 罗贤哲 — the head of telecommunications and electronic information for the Taiwanese army — only six figures for classified information on Taiwan’s military and attempts to block US arms sales to Taiwan.)

Indictments and other court documents preceding a trial never tell the full story. The Sun indictment contains only the minimum information required to show that Sun had taken actions — sometimes on her own, sometimes at the urging of PRC officials — to further Beijing’s interests.

The millions of dollars in benefits that accrued to Sun and Hu, however, suggest that her impact went beyond changing a few lines in a speech or keeping the governor of New York away from Taiwanese officials.

If Sun was willing to scrub references to Taiwan and Uyghurs from a speech or block meetings with Taiwanese officials, what might she have done if a Taiwanese business reached out to the governor’s office? Would she have blocked potential investment in New York? Or, given recent cases where Chinese-American activists were spying for Beijing, how would Sun have handled complaints or concerns expressed by Chinese diaspora communities about CCP harassment and intimidation? Those communications could be buried just as easily as words could be struck from a speech. The distrust that has stemmed from local authorities’ lack of responsiveness to such harassment may, in fact, be a deliberate byproduct of the Party’s influence through proxies like Sun.

The view we have into Sun’s activities is limited by the scope of the federal charges against her — here, that she was acting as an agent, receiving and acting upon foreign direction. But Sun has a fifteen-year history of working in New York politics. With her experience, connections, and — as is evident from the indictment — awareness of her potential influence, Sun is likely to have informally advised others in New York politics outside of her official duties.

These activities almost certainly will not be a part of the trial — but uncovering the full story will be necessary to assess the extent of the damage.

Learning the full truth about Sun’s activities would require a long forensic investigation of Sun’s files, communications, and activities with the public, with companies, and with other New York officials. Such an investigation would also probably necessitate federal involvement — because the limited resources and potential embarrassment of New York may prevent the state from effectively conducting its own investigation. The rub, of course, is that the DOJ is investigating thousands of other cases involving Beijing’s espionage, technology theft, influence, and transnational repression — the DOJ doesn’t need to investigate Sun’s activities any more than is necessary to gain a conviction.

But identifying consequences is an important exercise for the authorities. The consequences of Linda Sun’s influence are still unknown as of yet. New York Governor Kathy Hochul called Sun’s activities “a betrayal of trust”; there may be others, especially in Chinese-American communities, who also had their trust in their state government betrayed. They need an opportunity for their stories to be included in our understanding of the case.

The debate rages on — how should the US counter Beijing’s foreign influence activities and diaspora policies? How can we ensure the crackdown is consistent with democratic values and doesn’t stoop to racial profiling?

This is not a simple challenge. Investigations are hard. Resources and qualified people are rarer than one would think. And in a democratic society, law enforcement should stay focused on illegality, not poking into every potential entanglement with the Party. 

But knowing the real cost of Sun’s activities will be incredibly valuable — the facts of this case will frame our options for response. Beijing is engaging in a campaign of covert, corrupting, and coercive interference in our democratic society. Without a concrete impact assessment, it will be impossible to determine what kind of efforts are needed to counter this activity, and how aggressive those efforts should be.

We did a show a few years back on Peter’s book on Chinese spies with his coauthor. Have a listen!

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Tech Chokepoint History: China and Ballpoint Pens

The following is a cross-post from Mary Hui’s excellent a/symmetric Substack.

The idea of technological “chokepoints” lurched to the forefront of the Chinese collective imagination half a decade ago when Washington slapped sanctions on two Chinese tech giants, cutting their access to US technology overnight.

The “ZTE incident” and “Huawei incident,” as the 2018 and 2019 episodes are known, forced a reckoning across Chinese industry and government: dependence on a geopolitical rival had grown so acute that a flick of a pen from halfway around the world could, at least temporarily, cripple two domestic technological crown jewels.

China has gone into overdrive to uncover and dismantle latent chokepoints and prevent new ones from forming. Beijing set up a national technology security system to better protect its high-tech firms. The government’s main science funding body launched an emergency project to study and solve the “chokepoint problem.” And state media published a list of 35 chokepoint technologies on which China urgently needed to reduce its foreign dependence.

Ballpoints and chokepoints

The humble ballpoint pen is a cautionary tale.

There is what’s regarded in China as a “classic” question of manufacturing: why can’t China make a ballpoint pen?

As it turns out, the ballpoint of the ballpoint pen — a tiny metal ball bearing that “mimics the action of roll-on deodorant,” rotating freely in a small socket to dispense a smooth stream of ink — is fiendishly difficult to make, requiring super precise machinery and high-quality steel made to very specific standards.

While China claimed a breakthrough in 2017, manufacturing a ballpoint pen all by itself and “ending a long-term reliance on imported [ballpoint pen tips],” as of 2021 the country was still reportedly 80% dependent on imported pens.

In fact, Chinese imports of ballpoints pens (comprising the ballpoint and ink reservoir) have more than doubled since 2017, from US$12 million to nearly $28 million last year.

As Lin Xueping 林雪萍, an expert on manufacturing technology, wrote in an article last year, it was one thing for a single Chinese company to make a technical breakthrough, and another to get the rest of the market to adopt it.

“Taiyuan Iron & Steel [太钢] finally decided to overcome the difficulties and finally made steel ball materials,” Lin wrote, referring to the Chinese steelmaker that made the pen tip breakthrough. “But domestic ballpoint pen manufacturers are unwilling to use it at all.”

There’s a larger point to all of this: China’s struggles with the ballpoint run in tandem with its efforts to make high-end machine tools.

Machine tools: a technical challenge or an economic one?

Machine tools are machines that make other machines. China is a leading producer of machine tools, accounting for about 31% the world’s output in 2021 (p.10, fig. 12) — ahead of Germany (13%), Japan (12%), the US (9%), and Italy (8%). But China is heavily reliant on foreign technology for high-end machine tools: in 2021, it was 91% dependent on foreign firms for the most advanced machine tools.

That’s in spite of a national-level initiative, dubbed “Special Project 04,” launched in 2009 to boost China’s capabilities in high-end machine tools. But still China has not quite cracked it.

Perhaps the problem is less technical and more economic. That’s the assessment from Lin, the manufacturing expert who’s also affiliated with a think tank run by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

Top-notch machine tool beds, Lin reckons, demand very specific kinds of cast iron, with strict requirements for things like smelting method, casting temperature, and presence of trace elements. The problem is that demand from Chinese machine tool makers for this kind of cast iron is too small to make economic sense for iron foundries to work on developing the specialized materials.

“Made in China has two weaknesses: one is ‘can’t be made,’ which is a real technical chokehold; the other is ‘can’t be used,’ which is often stuck on non-technical barriers,” Lin wrote. “Ballpoint pens and cast-iron machine beds — both have stumbled for this reason.”

Implications for industrial policy

What lessons can we draw from China’s ballpoint pen travails?

Perhaps one is that just as the free market alone can’t solve certain problems — industrial policy may be more suited for tackling certain challenges than others.

In the case of China, it seems that its brand of top-down industrial policy has worked well for electric vehicles, batteries, critical minerals, shipbuilding, high-speed rail, and solar panels — but less so for semiconductors, machine tools, and ballpoint pens. One hypothesis is that the latter group of technologies requires a far more complex coordination of the industrial ecosystem. As such, the sheer force of the state’s will is more likely to run up against the fundamentals of market economics.

The upshot, for the US and the West, is not to parrot Chinese industrial policy, but to play to existing strengths. That means using government intervention to shape incentives, trigger certain behavior, and target market failures and distortions — but then stepping back to let the market solve for things.

China has long been dependent on imports of the tiny steel ball bearings that dispense ink from pen to paper. Beijing didn’t like that. In 2011, its science and technology ministry launched a national research project aimed at developing and industrializing “key materials and preparation technologies for the pen manufacturing industry.”

State-owned steelmaker Taiyuan Iron and Steel (TISCO) got the memo and got to work. Five years and 60 million yuan in state funding later, it declared success. Domestically made 2.3mm ballpoint pen tips began rolling off factory lines. TISCO’s shares jumped nearly 30%.

Chokepoint unblocked and chokehold broken? Not quite.

Today, China is still reportedly 80% dependent on imported ballpoints. Though TISCO did notch a technical breakthrough, domestic ballpoint pen manufacturers were reluctant to use the China-made ballpoint pen tips. The new steel balls didn’t work well with existing Swiss precision machine tools. They were not readily compatible with imported Japanese and German ink. And it made little economic sense for domestic steel mills to set up a new production line for such a tiny output of ballpoint tips.

In short, China made an isolated technical breakthrough on ballpoint tips that was of little use to the broader Chinese industrial system.

Pinpointing a systemic problem

Semantically, chokepoint implies a single point of dependence and failure.

But as the ballpoint pen story above illustrates, fixing a chokepoint requires far more than making a single breakthrough. Any solution has to be congruent with the existing network of suppliers and manufacturers, and their incentives, cost structures, and business models.

“The chokepoint problem involves the intersection of multiple supply chains and multiple nodes. It is extremely difficult to exhaust the problems simply from one industry or one industrial category,” writes Lin in his book, Supply Chain Attack and Defense 供应链攻防战.

“To tackle the problem, it is far from enough to just list the chokepoints,” he adds. “Chokepoint products are just the tip of the iceberg. Their underlying related factors below water can only be detected if there is a systemic understanding.”

There’s a larger industrial policy lesson here. Certain strategic and emerging industries require government prodding to kickstart, attain viability, or retain. But there are also lots of technologies where the market will always know far more than technocrats; just look at China’s wasteful ballpoint pen foray. The first step to breaking chokeholds is sorting out the real ones from the fake outs.

Chinese vs. Western Horror Movies

A translation from our friends at Weibo Doom Scroll.

A discussion on the difference between Chinese horror and western horror:

Western horror: You come home to see that your three-year-old son is dead, his guts are all over the floor, and your cat is licking up the blood. Chinese horror: You come home to find your cat is dead, its guts are all over the floor, and your 3-year-old son is meowing.

When you mention Chinese horror, the first thought that comes to mind is Grave Robbers’ Chronicles 盗墓笔记, where Wu Xie 吴邪 was in the cave, and he found Lao Yang’s 老痒 corpse and photo ID. But Lao Yang is outside the cave staring at him.

One is a sensory shock, one is a psychological shock. Chinese horror is better at leaving you with PTSD. Here’s an example. Western horror is like: you walk into a pizza store in a bad part of town, and just as you’re about to pay, you find the owner has a knife in hand, with a bloody piece of pizza in his mouth, staring at you with a furious expression before he leaps at you. You run and hide and finally manage to escape from him. Are you going to be scared of pizza stores from now on? Sure. But you’ll stop and check outside the store to see if the owner is a tiny, cute girl or a muscular guy before you decide whether or not you go in.

Chinese horror is more like: you go buy bread, and a kind old grandma hands you the bread and tells you with a smile, “Go on and eat it.”

You don’t think anything of it in the moment, but when you return to the street, everyone on the street turns to look at you with the exact same smile and tells you, “Go on and eat it.”

When you get home, your parents stare at you, smile, and say, “Go on and eat it.”

You’re freaked out and go to the bathroom to wash your face, and the you in the mirror smiles at you and says, “Go on and eat it.”

Even if nothing happens in the end, I think you’ll never go buy bread again, whether it’s a cute little girl selling it or an old grandma.

It’s really simple. Western horror makes sense, and Chinese horror is all about things not making sense. When things don’t make sense, you get a strong sense of dissonance and feel uneasy.

Here’s an example. Five people enter a haunted house and get attacked by a ghost. In the end, three people survive and get out, and two people die.

That’s very logical: go into a haunted house → get attacked → two people die → three people survive is a very complete line of logic. Everything makes sense, and it’s how Western horror stories work.

But if five people go into a haunted house and get attacked by a ghost, and six people walk out in the end, and everyone is really happy that they all survived and skip on toward home — that’s Chinese horror.

Right? Isn’t that freaky?

Because it doesn’t make sense.

It doesn’t make any sense that five people walked in and six people walked out.

Why does Chinese horror feel oppressive? Because your imagination goes wild when things don’t make sense. It’s basically you scaring yourself.

Does the movie director know what scares you? Probably not. But if you’re in charge of scaring yourself, of course you’re gonna get scared, because you know exactly what you’re afraid of.

Your imagination goes to your precise fears and you get freaked out.

Have you seen the classic horror movie Nightmare on Elm Street? Freddy kills people in their dreams, and people die when they are killed.

That’s very logical. Whether you have money or not, you die if you’re cut into pieces with a chainsaw.

It’s very bloody, but it’s not that freaky.

But in the classic Chinese horror movie A Wicked Ghost 山村老尸, does Aunt Mei 楚人美 walk around with a chainsaw? Does she cackle in people’s ear?

No.

They even play a piece of Yue Opera at the end, and that high-pitched singing sets your hair on end.

But as a piece of traditional Chinese opera, why would Yue Opera make you feel so freaked out? Why would it cover you in goosebumps?

Because it doesn’t make any sense.

When a lot of things that don’t make any sense come together, the conflict in logic makes you doubt yourself. And when you start scaring yourself, Chinese horror has won.

I saw a ghost story once that there’s a superstition that you can’t leave your shoes pointing at the bed, or ghosts will crawl into bed using the shoes. One night, the wife couldn’t sleep late at night, and while the husband got up to go to the bathroom, she kicked his shoes all over the room and then waited to see how he would react. But after the husband was done, he came back and started wandering around the bed muttering, “Where did the bed go?” When I read that, I literally felt a chill go down my spine.

A single line in Chinese horror can give me goosebumps for half a month. I remember a short story where a girl came home to find the power was out and the elevator wasn’t working, so she called her mom to come downstairs with a flashlight and help her up the stairs. Along the way, she chatted with her mom about her day at school like normal, and when they reached her door, her mom suddenly smiled at her and asked, “Do I look that similar to your mom?”

Alexa Pan — Chinese Song of the Week

This week’s song is Goalkeeper 守门员, by Chinese Football.

Chinese Football is a habit that’s hard to kick. Formed in 2011, the band tends to make light of their origin: guitarists Xu Bo 徐波 and Wang Bo 王博 met as fellow fans in Wuhan when there was “still a bit of punk feeling left” in the city. Their band name is as much a tribute to Illinois indie rockers American Football as it is a silly publicity stunt.

Self-described as “emo,” their style evokes equal parts nostalgia, apprehension, and hope. (For those who see music: sunlight dancing off shattered glass and dew.) The emotional songs come playfully packaged: the soccer motif pervades their first, eponymous, album, while later works borrow video game aesthetics and metaphors.

“Goalkeeper” hails from the first album. In a way, the song is as straightforward as the goalkeeper’s job, opening with a two-chord progression, melodies running back and forth in the penalty box. The guitars weave a net of sound, both more orderly and elastic than the typical wall, catching every kick of the drum. The lyrics, rich with soccer allegory and puns pairing Pelé (贝利) with paradox (悖理), describe a goalkeeper lost on the field, eventually leaving their post and moving forward. One could interpret this story as the band’s own: they’ve long aspired to “break out of Asia, step into the world, give it our all, leaving nothing behind.”

If you liked this song, catch Chinese Football on their upcoming North American tour.

ChinaTalk Editor Lily brings us a debate roundup from the Chinese internet.

The first US presidential debate went viral on the Chinese internet. China’s censors had to shut down the ensuing conversation about Biden’s age due to the striking parallels with Xi Jinping.

Now that Biden has stepped down, Chinese state media has updated their talking points faster than the GOP! Here’s what official and popular independent outlets have to say about the debate between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump.

No Winners Here! — State-Sponsored Cope and Russian Collusion

The official narrative on the debate is that both candidates are liars, and America’s democratic process is entertaining, unrepresentative, and unserious.

The central government news platform, CCTV 央视, went with the headline, “90 Minutes Chock Full of Lies, Complaints, and Abuse — The Debate Between Trump and Harris Had No Winner.” Xinhua news reported the same angle, with a montage of Harris and Trump accusing each other of lying.

The most diligent reporting of this narrative comes from Zhou Deyu 周德宇, who has a PhD in political science from the University of Pittsburg. Writing for nationalist-adjacent news outlet Guancha 观察者网:

Both sides performed as expected, and nothing surprising happened.

After this debate, there may be some fluctuations in the polls, but these fluctuations will most likely be chewed up and forgotten by the time the election happens.

Most of the time, the US election debates are just a formality, providing voters with some tasty soundbites [literally: “electronic pickled veggies” 电子榨菜1], which will not have much impact on the election results. It doesn’t matter what the two sides say, anyway — both will talk big game 满嘴跑火车, both will spin tales promising bread they can’t deliver 画下实现不了的大饼, both will accuse the other side of lying and incompetence…

Due to the unique electoral system in the United States, the results of the entire election are actually determined by a few swing states rather than the entire country, so specific local conditions can override the national trend. …

Therefore, what ultimately decides the election is still how many people the candidates can mobilize in the swing states to actually cast a vote on the election day. Everything before that, whether it is polls or news, is just a reference and not a conclusion; all advantages before that are only theoretical, and will not be a decisive victory. Small fluctuations such as changes in voter turnout caused by bad weather in a swing state on election day may become the factor that tips the scale.

Really? Nothing surprising happened?

Guancha also called in reinforcements from Russia, amplifying quotes from Maria Zakharova, the mouthpiece of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

But if the winner of the debate is irrelevant, Russia Today certainly didn’t get the memo. RT’s China office has been working overtime to churn out Mandarin translations of pro-Trump Kremlin talking points — for example, that Harris used Bluetooth earrings to cheat, that Harris is a Marxist, and, hilariously, that Tim Walz is a Chinese sleeper agent.

These stories were all torn apart in the comments. Note: “The hairy ones” 毛子 is a derogatory term for Russians.

Trump got thrashed this time around. All I can say is, there’s a rock for every scissor.
这把特朗普被对方控场了，只能说一物降一物

😂 The hairy Russians are really cutting deep. 毛子真是犀利啊

The hairy ones are like, “everything’s fine, nothing to see here!” 毛子：都得完！[doge]

Simultaneously arguing that no one won the debate and that Harris won by cheating epitomizes a classic tactic used in Russian propaganda: for any issue, respond with several overlapping narratives. It’s actually good if the different layers contradict, because that helps cultivate the feeling that truth does not actually exist.

Put simply, throw everything at the wall and see what sticks.2

Such tactics are not standard for Chinese propaganda, though — which perhaps explains why RT has taken matters into its own hands and opened a Mandarin translation office. We’ll see if critical responses to Russia’s propaganda are allowed to stay up.

Those Who Love to Laugh Won’t Have Bad Luck 爱笑的人运气不会太差

Regular Chinese internet users were largely impressed with Harris’s debate performance and endeared by her facial reactions to Trump’s lunacy. Here’s the top comment from the top video on Bilibili about the debate:

Big Sister Ha-Ha-Harris 哈哈姐 came well-prepared this time. She gave strong statements on core Democratic issues like healthcare, abortion, Israel-Palestine, small businesses, and tax cuts for low-income groups. She even had a rebuttal for Trump’s question about why the border-security policy wasn’t passed. On the other hand, Trump didn’t have much new to say regarding NATO allies, and when it came to healthcare, he slipped up and admitted he didn’t have a plan.

The Chinese internet loves to bestow nicknames. The debate performance has earned Harris some titles like Big Sister Ha-ha, Ha-Ha-Harris 哈哈哈哈里斯, and Laughin’ Lady 笑婆 (which comes from a Chinese parable about staying positive and looking at the bright side of life).

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Nicknames aside, the way of writing Harris’s actual name in Chinese has become an easy way to spot nationalist affiliation.

In Chinese, the names of American politicians are usually written phonetically with nonsense characters — Obama becomes 奥巴马 Àobāmǎ, which sounds close enough but uses characters that mean something like “obscure clinging horse.”

But Kamala Harris has an authentic Chinese name, 贺锦丽, pronounced Hè Jǐnlì in Mandarin or Ho Gam-lai in Cantonese. The literal meaning of the characters is something like “celebrated intricate embroidery,” and there’s a phonetic similarity to “Kamala” in Cantonese as well.

Who bestowed this name on Kamala Harris? When Harris was campaigning for district attorney, ballots in San Francisco were available in English, Spanish, and Chinese. Harris’s longtime friend Julie D. Soo 蘇榮麗 thought that an authentic Chinese name would give Harris a competitive edge at the ballot box, and asked her father to give Harris a suitable name. Harris even reportedly learned how to introduce herself in Cantonese.

Chinese critics of Harris, on the other hand, usually choose not to use her Chinese name, arguing that it’s a cheap tactic to pull votes from Asian Americans. Instead, they use a meaningless phonetic transcription of her name, 哈里斯 Hālǐsī.

But to be fair, the phonetic transcription lends itself to nicknames more easily.

Kamala Harris, Pro China? 贺锦丽亲华？

Harris did well in the debate. Why are the wolf warriors disappointed?

Before Biden stepped down, Chinese media didn’t often report on Harris. What little academic commentary there was portrayed VP Harris as being in lockstep with President Biden. For example, in a 2021 article on Biden’s China policy, Song Jing 宋静, associate professor at Shanxi University of Finance, and Lora Saalman wrote:

Vice President Kamala D. Harris (Chinese name “He Jinli”) is of Indian descent and represents the interests of Indian technology giants in Silicon Valley. She once supported the passage of the “S.386 Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act” with obvious anti-Chinese tendencies.

With the improvement of India’s national strength and strategic position, Indian scholars have gained more voice in the US strategic community.

But again, there was very little coverage of Kamala Harris before Biden stepped down. The day after Harris began her campaign, typing her Chinese name into Baidu auto-filled “Kamala Harris Pro-China,” followed by “Kamala Harris Modi.”

Evidently, people were eager to know whether having a Chinese name meant Harris would deviate from Biden’s tough-on-China foreign policy positions.

But it seems the debate has dashed those hopes. It’s no wonder they called in the Russians.

Quick Notes from Jordan on the Debate

Right at the top of the debate we had a really interesting exchange that touched on tariffs, industrial policy, and export controls.

DAVID MUIR: … Do you believe Americans can afford higher prices because of tariffs?

FORMER PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: They aren’t gonna have higher prices — what’s gonna have and who’s gonna have higher prices is China and all of the countries that have been ripping us off for years. I charge, I was the only president ever — China was paying us hundreds of billions of dollars, and so were other countries, and you know, if she doesn’t like ‘em, they should have gone out and they should have immediately cut the tariffs — but those tariffs are there three and a half years now under their administration … [goes on inflation riff].

DAVID MUIR: Vice President Harris, I do want to ask for your response, and you heard what the president said there — because the Biden administration did keep a number of the Trump tariffs in place, so how do you respond?

VICE PRESIDENT KAMALA HARRIS: Well, let’s be clear that the Trump administration resulted in a trade deficit, one of the highest we’ve ever seen in the history of America. He invited trade wars — you wanna talk about his deal with China. what he ended up doing is, under Donald Trump’s presidency he ended up selling American chips to China to help them improve and modernize their military, basically sold us out when a policy about China should be in making sure the United States of America wins the competition for the 21st century. Which means focusing on the details of what that requires, focusing on relationships with our allies, focusing on investing in American based technology so that we win the race on AI and quantum computing, focusing on what we need to do to support America’s workforce, so that we don’t end up having the on the short end of the stick in terms of workers’ rights. But what Donald Trump did — let’s talk about this with COVID, is he actually thanked President Xi for what he did during COVID. Look at his tweet. “Thank you, President Xi,” exclamation point — when we know that XI was responsible for lacking and not giving us transparency about the origins of COVID.

DAVID MUIR: President Trump, I’ll let you respond.

FORMER PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: First of all, they bought their chips from Taiwan. We hardly make chips anymore because of philosophies like they have and policies like they have. I don’t say her because she has no policy. Everything that she believed three years ago and four years ago is out the window. She’s going to my philosophy now. In fact, I was going to send her a MAGA hat. She’s gone to my philosophy. But if she ever got elected, she’d change it. And it will be the end of our country. She’s a Marxist. Everybody knows she’s a Marxist. Her father’s a Marxist professor in economics. And he taught her well …[goes on immigration riff].

A few quick thoughts:

1. I did not have semiconductor export controls as a Kamala attack line on my bingo card.

2. Trump has a point that a lot of the Biden China policy is a continuation of what he began from a tariff, export control, and even industrial policy standpoint (the CHIPS Act can trace its origins back to the late Trump administration). It’s an odd attack line to begin with as you’re basically praising your opponent’s policy, then saying trying to double back and say “by the way she’s actually a Marxist even though she’s just doing what I would’ve done anyway” doesn’t land at all.

3. Though it may have been a smart thing tactically to keep Trump’s blood up by not giving him credit for anything, the more intellectually honest Kamala answer would’ve started by acknowledging that a broken clock is right twice a day and then saying, “even though his instincts weren’t totally off on this one he was blinded by flattery.”

4. Overall, Kamala’s China vision about how technology is central to what may turn into a century-long competition sounds a whole lot like what we preach about here every week.

In the midst of Trump’s dogs-and cats-riff, he detoured for a sentence into how a Harris Administration would kick off WWIII:

FORMER PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: First let me respond as to the rallies. She said people start leaving. People don’t go to her rallies. There’s no reason to go. And the people that do go, she’s busing them in and paying them to be there. And then showing them in a different light. So, she can’t talk about that. People don’t leave my rallies. We have the biggest rallies, the most incredible rallies in the history of politics. That’s because people want to take their country back. Our country is being lost. We’re a failing nation. And it happened three and a half years ago. And what, what’s going on here — you’re going to end up in World War III, just to go into another subject. What they have done to our country by allowing these millions and millions of people to come into our country. And look at what’s happening to the towns all over the United States. And a lot of towns don’t want to talk — not going to be Aurora or Springfield. A lot of towns don’t want to talk about it because they’re so embarrassed by it. In Springfield, they’re eating the dogs…

Trump then came back to the theme during his Ukraine answer:

And in fact, when I saw Putin after I left — unfortunately left because our country has gone to hell — but after I left when I saw him building up soldiers, he did it after I left, I said oh, he must be negotiating. It must be a good strong point of negotiation. Well, it wasn’t, because Biden had no idea how to talk to him. He had no idea how to stop it. And now you have millions of people dead. and it’s only getting worse and it could lead to World War III. Don’t kid yourself, David. We’re playing with World War III.

Peter Harrell and I have written an op-ed on which candidates’ policies are more likely to lead to great power war, and we’re looking for somewhere to run it. If you edit an op-ed page, just respond to this email to see a draft.

Caleb Harding is a senior studying CS and Chinese at BYU. He previously interned at the US Embassy in Jakarta and Doublethink Lab in Taiwan. This summer, he and ChinaTalk’s resident mathematician Lily Ottinger ran the numbers on China’s power production. Here’s what they discovered.

AI development is facing an imminent electricity bottleneck. Data centers collectively make up 3% of total US electricity demand, and some predictions indicate they could consume up to 8% of electricity demand by 2030.1 And already, energy-consumption concerns have stalled some US data-center construction.

This leaves companies in a tough spot: if they can’t get enough energy to train their models, they will fall behind.

In response, some companies have quietly walked back promises of carbon neutrality, pivoting away from renewables and burning fossil fuels to pick up the slack. Meanwhile, Amazon has purchased a data center right next to a nuclear power plant to ensure an adequate supply of green energy.

China is staring down the same bottleneck. Today, we’re exploring China’s plan to unlock green energy abundance on the journey to become a world leader in AI.

Your firm should be sponsoring this post! Respond to this email, and I’ll send over a media deck — we’d love to explore how to partner.

China’s Plan: Eastern Data, Western Compute

Back in 2020, China started a national initiative to deal with the energy demands of computing.2

The plan, called “East Data, West Compute” (EDWC) 东数西算, aims to build out a network of eight computing hubs in western China and ten data clusters in eastern China. Western computing hubs draw on the region’s plentiful renewable resources to store and process less frequent-access data, while eastern computing hubs are free to focus on data with high network requirements.

EDWC has been hailed as the solution to the energy bottleneck. The plan has two key goals: make data centers green and make them efficient.

Let’s see if either goal is realistic.

Make It Green 

Chinese data centers used 130 billion kWh of electricity in 2022, and they are expected to use 380 billion kWh per year by 2030. To avoid breaking the carbon budget, the Chinese government’s set policy goal is to power new data centers with 80% green energy by 2025.

That’s a gargantuan shift from the status quo — 70% of the electricity currently consumed by China’s data centers is supplied by coal. Non-fossil-fuel energy sources are reportedly still prone to outages. From Huawei’s Data Center report:

Still, the utilization of green energy is unpredictable and cannot provide a long-term stable power supply, which may lead to fluctuations or even collapses in the power system. (pg. 43)

然而，绿色能源的利用具有不可预测性，不能长时间持续稳定的供电，可能会导致电力系统的波动甚至崩溃。

The problem: solar and wind are intermittent.

Thus far, the strategy for powering data centers with renewables has been two-pronged:

1. Expand the overall build-out of green energy in the grid generally, thereby indirectly raising the proportion of green energy used by data centers. 

2. Directly wire renewable-energy capacity into the power systems of the data centers, so that computation can draw from renewable generation when the power is available. A pilot project in Horinger New District, Inner Mongolia, for instance, has achieved a green electricity substitution rate of 43% by using this method.

Even so, neither of these strategies can conquer the intermittency problem. The guaranteed source of fallback power is still the broader coal-dominated energy grid.

So how can intermittency be defeated? Huawei’s 2023 report boldly proclaims that data centers will be 100% green-energy-powered by 2030. The report champions wind energy as the best solution, pointing to a data center Huawei built in the ultra-windy Inner Mongolian city of Ulanqab in 2013.

The Huawei report is far less optimistic about the potential of solar energy, which is currently limited to powering auxiliary systems in data centers, such as lights, elevators, and the coffee machine in the break room.

The authors are quick to clarify, however, that more storage capacity — ie. batteries — and grid support would allow solar to play a critical role.

So, can brute-force battery deployment overcome intermittency?

Let’s do the math.

Assume the goal is to power data centers with 100% renewable, intermittent energy, as Huawei recommends. And from the projections above, assume China’s data centers will require 380 billion kWh per year by 2030.

That means data centers will require 43.4 GW of continuous output.3 Assuming each day contains 12 hours of all-you-can-store sunshine and 12 hours with no sunshine,4 and assuming that batteries have 10% energy loss, China would need 573 GWh of battery capacity to cover daily solar fluctuations. 

For reference, one gigawatt of electricity is enough to power roughly 650,000 American homes for a year.5

And remember, these are just back-of-the-envelope calculations. In reality, wind energy could provide some nighttime power, but you need battery support to deal with wind inconsistency, too.

Disclaimers in mind, is this level of battery deployment possible? Well … never say never. China manufactured 904.5 GWh of total battery capacity in 2023. Today, Chinese battery producers face staggering overcapacity and an increasingly unfriendly export environment. Those leftover batteries have to go somewhere.

Even if battery deployment is not an insurmountable obstacle, effectively developing grid architecture to integrate this much battery storage will pose an even greater challenge.6

To be sure, in addition to solar and wind, Huawei’s list also mentions hydropower, which is enticing for its ability to provide large amounts of consistent electricity. A recent study found that untapped hydropower could provide as much as 30% of China’s energy needs, and the first zero-emission data center in China (三峡集团东岳庙数据中心) is powered by electricity from the Three Gorges Dam. Beijing has plans to build a mega dam in Tibet’s Medog county, upstream from India — if successful, the electricity generated by this project would be three times that of the Three Gorges Dam.

But even hydropower’s potential is complicated: despite increasing hydropower capacity by 18% over the last five years, China’s hydroelectric power generation has fallen by 1% due to severe drought. That’s putting aside the geopolitical headaches caused by damming up rivers that flow into neighboring countries.

The energy solution that must not be named

The public EDWC plans do not mention nuclear energy at all, which is suspicious. For decades, Beijing has been aggressively expanding its fleet of nuclear reactors, including plans for a bunch of inland reactors that appear to be in the middle of nowhere. And just the other day, on August 19, China’s State Council approved eleven new reactors in a single day.

Unlike renewables, nuclear power doesn’t suffer from intermittency problems. However, conventional nuclear power plants rely on water for cooling, which isn’t ideal for generating power in China’s desolate desert interior.

But this is by no means a dealbreaker. China leads the world in cutting-edge next-generation nuclear technologies that require no water. China has built successful pilot projects for cutting-edge reactor designs, including sodium-cooled fast-neutron reactors, liquid-salt/gas-cooled thorium reactors, and small modular reactors (SMRs).

Among the new projects approved on August 19th is the Xuwei 徐圩 Phase I reactor, which will be the world’s first commercial-scale high-temperature gas-cooled pebble-bed reactor.7 China’s research on this reactor design began with the explicit intent of eventually building a fleet of nuclear plants in water-scarce interior regions.

Taken together, these innovations indicate that nuclear power could be a dark horse in China’s green compute race.

So why has nuclear power been excluded from the data center discussion?

One possibility is public sentiment. In the late 2000s, anti-pollution protests swept across China. The 2011 Fukushima meltdown made nuclear energy a target and energized protests into a perfect storm — 50,000 environmental protests broke out across China in 2012 alone.

After Fukushima, China’s central government placed a moratorium on approvals of new nuclear plants, and the party spent a year debating whether nuclear power was safe. Provincial officials in the dry, tectonically active western regions did not want nuclear reactors built in their backyards.

Even after the moratorium was lifted, mass protests succeeded in shutting down a uranium fuel plant in Guangdong (2013) and a waste reprocessing facility in Jiangsu (2016).

Inland reactor construction never resumed. The flagship Xianning nuclear power plant 咸宁核电站 was heralded as China’s first commercial inland reactor, cooled by water from the Fushui River. It’s been listed as “planned” since 2010 (and appears on the Bloomberg map above), but there’s no evidence that construction ever began. As of 2024, the reactor site appears to have been transformed into a solar farm.

Thus, nuclear could be included in the “other” (等) sources of green power (风电、光伏、水电等可再生能源).

But if that’s the case, the government prefers not to advertise it.8

Perhaps the contributions of nuclear power are already priced in. Even if Beijing can’t build inland reactors for some time, adding conventional nuclear power plants near the coast makes the whole power grid greener. Computing from China’s western regions draws power from the broader grid, so even the distant conventional reactors will help fuel the power-hungry data centers.

But there’s another explanation for excluding nuclear power: maybe China isn’t actually serious about making data centers green.

That would be majorly bad news for the climate, and ChinaTalk will be reporting more on that possibility in the future.

Make It Efficient

To manage the energy demands of data centers, the second key component is increasing efficiency. Due to US sanctions, advanced chips like Nvidia’s Blackwell may be out of reach for China.

Data centers, however, have plenty of cuttable energy overhead.

A primary measurement for evaluating data center efficiency is power usage effectiveness, or PUE — the ratio of the overall energy used by a center to the energy used by the compute resources. The ideal ratio is 1.0; the lower the PUE, the more efficient the data center is.

At the end of 2022, China had 153 “green data centers,” with an average PUE of 1.27. However, 85% of China’s data centers have a PUE between 1.5 and 2. (For reference, Google’s data centers average 1.10.)

The Chinese government has set a standard for new large-scale data centers: achieve a PUE of 1.3 or less — otherwise, they will face elimination (不达标的数据中心将面临淘汰).

Potential avenues to improve PUE include opting for stripped-down “hyperscale” data centers, assigning compute tasks more efficiently, optimizing site selection, and halting model training early. But China is also exploring the commercialization of relatively new and yet unproven technologies like submerged chips.

Broader Criticism

Chinese commentators have questioned not only the technical feasibility of building green data centers, but also the underlying economics. In April 2022, Chen Gen 陈根, a guest lecturer at Peking University, argued that the government-led buildout of high-efficiency data centers ahead of demand would artificially decrease prices and lower profits, thereby hurting tech companies.

Another Chinese researcher, Wang Yuanzhuo 王元卓, argued in a March 2022 piece that the initiative should focus on demand-driven applications:

From past experience, the high social interest and economic benefits of national-level projects easily produces “bandwagoning” and “blind construction and investment,” as seen in new energy vehicles and chip manufacturing, resulting in unfinished projects and even harm to local economic development.

从过去的经验来看，国家级工程因为社会热度高、经济效益好，很容易出现各地“一哄而上”“盲目建设投资”的情况，新能源汽车、芯片制造都出现过这样的情况，最后出现了烂尾甚至影响到地方经济的发展。

These fears are not unfounded. When rolling out new computing initiatives in 2021, one of the government’s stated goals was to increase the utilization of western data centers from 30 percent to more than 50 percent — which indicates a lack of commercial demand for the data centers already built in the west. Adding additional capacity without making those data centers more commercially desirable is unlikely to accomplish much.

The Push Continues

Solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear energy all face significant challenges as Beijing seeks to build a unified national computing network (全国一体化算力网). Just as in the US, China has no easy answer to the impending bottleneck — hence the highly public conferences held in June and August of 2024 dedicated to brainstorming solutions to this juggernaut of a problem.9

3

See below:

跟不少读者的印象不同，在美国大选中，总统候选人电视辩论一般不会改变选民的投票意向。7月份拜登那次直接导致他退出竞选的辩论是个例外，不是美国总统候选人电视辩论的常态。

每位总统候选人的口才和风格不同，驾驭场面的能力也不同。如果一位候选人口才好、风格灼灼逼人、喜欢发惊人之语，支持他的选民自然会寄予厚望——民调领先的情况下，希望他能摧枯拉朽，一举获胜；民调落后的情况下，希望他能扭转局面，反败为胜。但电视辩论对改变民意和投票结果的影响真有那么大么？

哈佛大学商学院的研究结果表明，跟人们的印象不同，电视辩论对改变选民的投票意向几乎没有影响。不仅在美国大选中如此，而且在英国、加拿大和德国的大选中也是如此。这项研究调查了17万2千名不同国家的选民，比较了他们在电视辩论前的投票意向和最后的投票结果，发现72%的选民在离投票两个月前已经决定把票投给哪位候选人，只有15%的选民在大选前的两个月内决定，而且观看电视辩论对他们投票意向的影响微乎其微。哈佛商学院的研究人员称，电视辩论与其说是一个影响投票结果的竞选事件，不如说是一个媒体事件。

NBC电视网在研究了1992年-2012年的6次总统竞选辩论和投票结果后，得出跟哈佛商学院的研究同样的结论：候选人的辩论对改变选民的投票意向和最后投票结果没有实质影响。具体讲，辩论之前民调领先的候选人，辩论之后民调仍然领先，在选举中得到的选民票数也仍然领先。

因为美国独特的选举人制度，有必要区分选民的投票结果和选举结果。投票结果是选民一人一票决定的，选举结果是选举人票决定的。哈佛商学院和NBC的报告都是研究电视辩论与投票结果的关系，不是总结候选人在电视辩论中的表现与选举输赢的规律。

在美国大选中，最后决定选举结果的是选举人票，而不是选民的投票。2000年大选，艾尔伯特·戈尔（Albert Gore）在辩论前后民调领先——电视辩论没有改变民调，也没有改变选民投票结果：戈尔得到的选票多于小布什，大体与民调相符，却输了选举人票。类似情况在2016年大选中重演：希拉里在电视辩论前民调领先，电视辩论后民调仍然领先，最后得到的选民票也比特朗普多287万张，但因为输了选举人票而败选。2016年的大选跟NBC对此前六次大选的研究结论是一致的，即辩论没有实际性影响选民的投票意向和投票结果。

虽然大选辩论对选民的投票意向起不到决定作用，但一般而言，参加电视辩论对于选民不太熟悉的候选人更有利一些。1960年，美国第一次向全国电视转播大选辩论，候选人肯尼迪崭露头角，口才和活力令选民耳目一新，而竞选对手尼克松已经做了八年副总统，大部分选民对他已经相当熟悉，电视辩论加分不多。

在历次电视辩论中，候选人出现口误和举止失当的情况屡见不鲜。比如，1976年大选，格拉德·福特总统在跟吉米·卡特的辩论中，说苏联并不控制东欧；1992年大选，老布什总统跟克林顿辩论时，不耐烦地看表；2000年大选辩论，戈尔摇头叹息。候选人在辩论中一旦出现口误或举止失当，就会成为街谈巷议的话题。但选民议论候选人的口误和举止是一会事儿，是否因为候选人口误或举止不当就改变投票意向是另外一回事。哈佛商学院和NBC的研究结果表明，大选辩论中的各种口误和举止不当对辩论前后的民调结果没有实质影响。

在历届总统大选中，电视辩论前后民调变化比较大的一次是1980年，里根对卡特总统在辩论中明显占上风。他的辩才和机智给人留下深刻印象，尤其是围绕卡特任期内的经济萧条和伊朗人质事件提出一系列质问，被后来的政治评论家广为传颂：“扪心自问：你的处境是不是现在比四年前更好了？出门购物是不是比四年前更容易了？全国的失业率是比四年前高了还是低了？美国是不是还像以前那样受到尊重？”总统候选人辩论结束后，民调结果显示，里根从辩论前领先2%上升到领先5%。不过，这种变化幅度仍然在统计的误差范围之内。

大选辩论是重大媒体事件，媒体会尽量渲染它的影响力和重要性，进行大量报导，邀请各方面专家做大量分析评论。一些专家会在评论中有意无意夸大辩论对投票结果的影响。

总统竞选从党内初选开始到大选投票日，是一个漫长的过程。这个过程受到无计其数的因素影响，大部分因素不在候选人的控制之内，比如说经济状况、国内外突发事件、本党议员或官员的丑闻等。候选人倡导各种施政目标，不但要照顾本党的传统、基本盘的倾向，还要尽量向中间选民的政策喜好靠拢——没有多数中间选民的支持，候选人赢不了大选。所以，在竞选过程中，表面看起来候选人有很大的主动权，但实际上能完全控制的事务并不多。一个候选人能做的就是尽量不犯错误，尤其是在电视辩论中避免犯低级错误。

因为语言障碍和文化隔阂，中文世界对大选辩论的方式和效果存在比美国民众更多的误解。不少人甚至把候选人电视辩论想象成随意狡辩，谁嗓门大、伶牙俐齿，谁威武获胜。这种想象跟现实相去甚远。实际上，总统候选人的电视辩论是一种戴着镣铐跳舞的游戏，主持人提出问题，由两位候选人分别回答和应答，对发言规则有严格规定，而且必须得到辩论双方预先同意。

在大选辩论中，主动攻击对手是民调落后的候选人被迫采用的策略。但这种做法副作用较大，因为中间选民一般不愿投票给言论过于负面的候选人。到了大选辩论时段，候选人真正要说服的是为数不多的还没确定把票投给谁的中间选民。这个群体是候选人辩论时针对的最重要的目标观众。候选人各自的选民基本盘雷打不动，即便候选人在台上裸奔，他们都会投他一票。但电视辩论可以说是投票前候选人争取中间选民的最后机会，尤其是争取摇摆州的中间选民，他们的每一票都可能是决定投票结果的关键一票。

川普善于激发观众热情，喜欢语出惊人，常用街头语言攻击对手。不过，面对全国观众与竞选对手同台辩论，跟开群众大会向热情的支持者发表演说不同：有不同的受众、不同的氛围、不同的目标，而且有主持人掌握提问、时间和节奏。到了辩论时段，尚未确定投票意向的中间选民本来已经不多，争取他们的选票更不容易。中间选民之所以是中间选民，一个重要原因在于他们比两党的基本盘思考的更多，更能理性地看候选人的政策主张和性格。

选举是一场竞赛。人们看选举，就像看其他竞赛一样，盼望出现戏剧性场面。看拳击比赛，观众盼着自己喜欢的选手打出致命一拳，对手倒地不起，结束比赛。但现实世界中，大部分拳击赛都打满12个回合，靠计点算胜负。在中文世界的政治语境中，人们尤其爱好戏剧性，喜欢把政治斗争武侠化，盼望自己支持的候选人在辩论会场出奇制胜，一锤定音。但想象是一回事，现实是另一回事。

昨晚的电视辩论贺锦丽明显占上风，这一点连很多支持川普的共和党人和媒体人都承认，双方表现差距太大，不在见仁见智的合理范围，没什么好争论的。但是不是像有些媒体人评论的那样，贺锦丽给了川普“致命一击”？不是。

【和放学以后永不失联】订阅放学以后的Newsletter，每周三收到我们发出的信号：afterschool2021.substack.com 点击链接输入自己的邮箱即可（订阅后如果收不到注意查看垃圾邮箱）。如需查看往期内容，打开任一期你收到的邮件，选择右上角open online，就可以回溯放学以后之前发的所有邮件，或谷歌搜索afterschool2021substack查看。

截至目前，放学以后Newsletter专题系列如下：“在世界游荡的女性”系列、“女性解放指南”系列、“女性浪漫，往复信笺”系列、莫不谷游荡口袋书《做一个蓄意的游荡者》系列、“莫胡说”系列”《创作者手册：从播客开始说起》,播客系列和日常更新等。

本期放学以后信号塔由莫不谷和曾经在《想要自在如风，就得狠狠发疯》中投稿“小疯，中疯，和大疯”的朋友共同轮值。当初被这位朋友沛然莫之能御的脱口秀才华打动，因为当时是匿名投稿，我希望我能以后都识别出这位有才华，有幽默感，且敢于发疯勇于愤怒的女性朋友，我就在我们的邮箱里给她备注了昵称：脱口秀姐妹。

收到这脱口秀姐妹这封来信已经是一两个月前，我也终于知道了她希望被称呼的名字是CC.彼时我还在世界游荡的旅途中。现在我已经回到了荷兰，经历了艰辛的找房，前几天终于完成了搬家，在新的城市注册和安顿，修复手机重装系统，生活以一种终于四角齐全的方式展开。如今我也终于可以平静地打开这封来信。而“平静”似乎只能是我的心理准备。因为谁真的阅读这封来信时都无法心绪平定。

即使让人心绪不宁，也依然要放这封来信是因为，这是一位真正拥有主体性和力量的女性来信。“痛苦却不改变，受苦却还要心存怨念地奉献”，这样的叙事总是出现在主流社会，出现在我们的“母辈”，在我们上一代女性的身上流连忘返。

而我们这一代，决定不这么做了，这恰恰是解放和希望所在。母辈的痛苦和挣扎，我们不再接棒。让这些父权社会加诸给我们的痛苦，就此断代无后。我们的肉身，精神，心理，不再给加害者当病毒培养皿。

这个社会有无数好女人的标准，每一个都让人作呕。

今天我想创造一个新标准：做一个好女人，首先让自己从不吃父权社会的苦开始。既不吃爹一手造就的苦，也不吃母辈和其它女性运输的二手传递的苦。

接下来请查收来自一个“好女人”CC的来信以及我（莫不谷）这个好女人的回信，和一个崭新关于【活在历史的垃圾时间，我们如何度过时代的乱纪元】的征稿。

《放学以后》的三位主播和听众朋友们：

大家好，我是CC，今天来分享我和妈妈的故事。

我妈先是经历了悲惨的婚姻，被我爸吸血，离开了这个无底洞之后，又经历了被自己的亲哥哥们吸血。

因为我妈是家里唯一的女儿，先后照顾并且送走了我的姥姥和姥爷，养儿防老嘛，但照顾者大都是女性，要么女儿要么儿媳，老话都是屁话的一个佐证罢了。

我姥姥得了癌症治好又复发了，姥爷是得了脑梗，两个人去世之前都有一年多的卧床时期。如果说照顾姥姥是女儿比较合适，那照顾姥爷的时候，儿子们都死哪儿去了，反正理所当然的应当我妈来。

经常卧床就会肠道不蠕动，姥爷经常便秘很难受，我妈得给他掏屎，literally掏屎，不是探入大肠啊那叫手术，就是在边缘徘徊，具体的就不说了。掏屎得戴上好几层医用橡胶一次性手套，我在网上买的，我妈每次都让我留好购买截图，这些钱从我姥爷存款里出。可千万别说她多拿了钱，虽然护工的收费大概是？不不，那毕竟是女人应该做的嘛。

姥爷去世后的几天，那些儿子们终于频繁出现，骨灰不重要，遗嘱才重要。我看着那个金黄色的布包着的骨灰盒就在地上搁着，可我也没有余力去管。因为那些舅舅们在和我妈吵架，他们不认这个遗嘱。

其实遗嘱涉及我妈的，也不过就是这个房子，这个把姥姥姥爷都送走的房子、这个本来就是我妈出钱的房子。但是由于手续不全，证明不够，导致是一个上了法庭也比较难推进的情况。

中间经历了被他们砸监控、他们把门从外面封住等等情况，也有call 这个police叔叔，大都是和稀泥说几句就结束了，因为这个叫做“家务事”。如果你有关注的话，会发现“家务事”的范围，还真的蛮广泛的嘞。

比起说是拉锯战，不如说是速战速决，被决的是我们。不到10天我和我妈就被迫从自己的家里搬出来了，非常临时租的房子。那天晚上和我妈躺在只铺了床单的床板上，她说：怎么也没想到自己几个哥哥会做到这个地步，否则她之前绝对不会不好意思，那些手续绝对要弄好。比如有个证明需要我姥姥姥爷录个视频。

对“一家人”明算账的不好意思，对“一家人”的不够防备，最后落到了这个地步。

其实一切早有许多征兆，比如更早之前，一次因为我妈说的某句话没有像平时一样“顺从”，一个舅舅正在坐着突然抄起旁边的擀面杖夯在我妈胳膊上，那块胳膊青紫色、肿的很高。那次也是以“家务事”归类，青天大老爷说几句调解的话就走了。我妈让我留存证据，拍了好多张不同角度的照片，都储存在她的百度网盘里，证据却从来没能用上过。

但是在这次之后，我妈还是去参加了这个舅舅女儿的婚礼，那天她去之前，我拦在门口手里拿把刀，说：你要是去我就割腕。

我妈还是去了。

她挺了解我，我是不可能下得了手的，因为我晕血。

所以直到那个时候，她还是觉得“毕竟一家人嘛”。“一家人都怎么”“婚姻都怎么”“什么年龄都怎么”，这种老话都是屁话的第二个佐证。

直到后来把她的观念真正打碎，她才明白，一家人不该是你的前提条件，得是你的结论。

那这一切，是活该还是在劫难逃呢？

她总后知后觉反省自己太听母亲的话了，母亲让她给哥哥白干活，她听话；母亲劝她原谅，说毕竟一家人，她听话。

在很累的时候，她也问过自己的母亲，凭什么呢？

回答只有一句：因为她是你哥。

所以呢？

我想起来综艺《是女儿是妈妈》里，赵小棠的妈妈因为赵小棠擅自把头发剪短气到不行，原因是自己有个公主梦，旁边的嘉宾追问了一句，她的回答也是：因为我是她妈。

所以呢？

这个混乱的逻辑，甭说10个追问了，连续两个追问都是扛不住的。大家更应该训练的不是克己复礼、公序良俗的能力，而是打辩论赛的能力。但更早的年代，没有奇葩说和华语辩论老友赛，她们怎么办呢？

伤害和爱是夹杂的，但比例是差距很多的，爱的定义是有问题的，清晰的讲理是不被教育、不被鼓励的，是冷血是白眼狼是会被孤立。那个年代被孤立、不合群、不集体主义的代价可能是惨重的。

如果我是我妈的经历，我会更早预料和警惕吗？我会更觉醒吗？我会更早保护自己吗？

真不好说。

不是“自讨苦吃”不是“活该”，大部分都是在劫难逃。

我觉得遗憾的只是，必须要摔得头破血流才能打破固有的观念吗、必须到最惨烈的一步才能有行动的动力和决心吗？

哪怕提前一点点可不可以？对自己的伤害就会小一点，我也不确定这个是否成立，至少在那个年代。

但在现在这个时代，我还是看到很多女性，在等“摔得头破血流”的那一刻，仿佛只有被动的等待，而忘了自己主动选择的可能。

你可能确实被灌输了太多有毒的观念，你可能有许多缠绕你的执念，但你仍有巨大的能动性，请再提前一点点，不要等待那个最惨烈的时刻。

我觉得，真相就在那里，让我们早点承认它，面对它。

而在我妈经历这几个关键节点的时候，我在干嘛。

在她被擀面杖打的那天，是暑假的某一天下午，我大学的第一年。那天我和朋友们在一起聚会，吃了好吃的东西，还转战到一个下午茶餐厅，用拍立得拍了好几张美照，用手机照了一堆鬼脸照片。那天我穿一个吊带背心，毛绒的亮黄色，那天我们玩到晚上9点多，接到我妈催我回家的电话还有点不耐烦，然后我妈有点发脾气说：快点回来吧！今天出了点事，警察都来了！

我非常吃惊，同时特别愧疚。后来就总在想，我不应该出来，我应该怎么怎么保护我妈，我该怎么为她出气，我那个下午好像太开心了，我穿的有点暴露也让我愧疚。

而在被赶出自己家的那个阶段，我刚刚大学毕业，我在考研，我没有考上，正准备开始人生第一份全职工作。

我每天晚上都很愧疚，为什么没有能力保护我妈。

我甚至懊恼自己没有拳击选手的体格，也想着怎么没有一个黑社会的男朋友。同时很怨恨她，为什么让我经历这样的事情，为什么不早点预料到。

那段时间她总说：唉，我没有保护好你。

我总是不接话，因为我觉得她说得对。

可这是我的错吗？

我不出去聚会就能保护她吗？

我考上研就能不被赶出家了吗？

我必须非常能打才能保护我妈吗？

我必须依靠黑社会才能对付黑社会吗？

这也不是我妈的错。这是她需要解决的问题，不是她的错。

错的另有其人，我们都是父权社会的受害者。

不能只靠个人的反击能力，这里面少了一环又一环。

而我觉得这就是逻辑和理论的意义，当你认清真正的敌人和真正的问题，就不是一句迷信的“我的命”可以糊弄的。

每一个劫难，都清清楚楚看到敌人在哪里、敌人的来龙去脉。认命会困在麻木和迷茫里，看清问题会得到力量。

而接下来，愧疚感降低就是自然而然的事情。

蒋方舟在看理想app做过一个音频节目叫：母亲与女儿系列书单。

讲杜拉斯那期说到：母亲的子女可能因为要安慰她而被她吞噬，因为她的失败已经密密麻麻地连成了一张网，牵一发而动全身。

其实与其说她的失败，不如说是她的创伤。

我妈的创伤的触发机制太多了，很多时候我都在不停地挑选并且判断，这个不会让她想到什么吧、那个应该可以提吧。

但她又闪回了，后来我才意识到，在那件事之后的好几年，我妈都处于受到很大刺激之后的爆发状态。不是会被什么触发，而是还在爆炸的过程中，你仍处在这件事的漩涡里面。创伤严重的时候，眼睛是苦难的，所以看世界的镜头是线索的一端，牵一发而动全身。

母亲说她最受刺激的时候，看所有人都是贱人、都是要害人的、都是在针对自己、都觉得恶心。

有时候我会有点害怕这种所谓不太正常的状态，但我知道那不是疯狂，而是痛苦。心理咨询师张春她说：在一个扭曲的环境里，你抑郁说明你是正常人，你不是麻木的，你的自我保护机制启动了。

所以对暴击当下的战斗不是最残酷的，之后日复一日水滴石穿的对抗，才最燃烧武器。

不止是我妈这种经历了比较明显的极端事件的，更多的母亲或女儿的经历更幽微、更隐形。但杀伤力也够大，她们也很崩溃，甚至都不清楚崩溃的原因。

电影《热辣滚烫》，心理咨询师张春看完之后在微博上发：电影内外，乐莹们的境遇本质相同，但大部分人都遇不到像电影里那么”好”的坏人。她们大都会在那种吓人的“我一无所有的”猜测里、打个巴掌给个枣的惊疑里、威逼利诱的撕扯里，消磨大半生。

微博上另一个博主荞麦，前几天评论一个女儿和母亲的帖子，她说：妈妈需要看心理医生。妈妈是在施虐，是在孩子身上发泄。妈妈在施虐是因为她也被某些东西虐待着或者虐待过。

更多的，我们是在和被父权压迫导致生病的人相处，同时还在和时代的病人相处。

每次回家都是，24小时乘以天数。

当女儿成为母亲大量的情绪宣泄出口的时候，要直接喊停。你对母亲的情绪价值可以提供，但划一个区间、一个底线。并且注意这个底线不是主流标榜的、这个底线也不能过低。而超过了这个底线就叫停，或保持距离、或转移注意力。

保有余力的去战斗。

否则很容易受害者之间情绪崩溃，缠进一次次重复矛盾中，模糊了真正的敌人。

当女儿被母亲迁怒导致伤害的时候，女儿们，不要双标。

我发现当女儿感受到母亲的伤害时，总会说算了，好像毕竟是母亲，不原谅就是不孝顺了，必须原谅。

而当女儿感受到母亲的爱的时候，比如感受到了10分爱，好像马上触发了一个愧疚机制。我必须马上回报、马上回报100分的爱、必须马上让她过上好日子，要不就内疚的不行，好像自己欠了母亲特别多。

而不双标就是，如果在意，就都在意。爱是真的，伤害也是真的。你伤害我好多，你也为我做了好多，其中有一些其实我并不需要。你有你的局限性，你尽力了，我也真的挺不容易的。让我们，一码归一码。你给的爱和伤害，是不能互相抵扣的。给的糖枣不能抵消巴掌。

而如果不在意的话，就都别在意了。

但极有可能的是，你们双方，都没有自己想象的，那么需要对方、和被对方需要。

可能你们的生活习惯、社交习惯、解决问题的方式，都是有一套自己的哲学的。

上个月我回家，我妈因为楼上卫生间漏水在维权，又过了一段时间她发来微信，事情解决了，小城市，更加丛林一些，她找来了自己最会骂街的姐妹，两个人爆骂一下午，果然比礼貌体面地沟通好用多了。

那我维权的话呢，都是一路投诉上去或者在网上发帖子，曾经还买过水军去某个公司官方账号下面刷评论。

可能还是因为我不够会骂街吧。

我妈在我成长的过程中总说，没有给我一个完整的家，让我缺少了父爱。还说也想让我是富二代，没有赚钱的压力，但自己能力有限。

富二代这个太逗了，暂且不讨论。

爹的缺席这件事，尤其近几年对比自己和身边人，越来越觉得这是我成长过程的大幸运。我那种惯性地不在乎，那种更加自由，让我在破除有毒观念时也更容易。

尤其稍微接触了别人的完整家庭，哪怕是友好爹，认知天花板就在那里，时不时规训的枷锁，多一个爹味的目光，会让我特别明显地感觉到被束缚。

虽然我妈的生活艰难会让她迁怒于我，有时候对我真挺残酷的。但她非常正义，也尤其讨厌传统里尊卑、会来事这种腐朽的东西。

而不管在什么环境下长大，作为女性、作为母亲、作为女儿，我们都会有自己的在劫难逃。

只能用Erica在播客《嘎里嘎气gagaland》里提到的：凡事发生必有利于我，掘地三尺找这个利。

无数次在《放学以后》的播客里、文章里、投稿里、评论里被真诚打动，获得力量。

我的故事说完了，希望大家更少被击中创伤，更多获得力量。

像莫不谷说的，要记仇。暴击？我感谢你个毛？

同时请掘地三尺找利吧。

来自莫不谷的回信

父权社会的痛不仅是父女的，母女的，姐弟的，甚至连无数人艳羡的“兄妹”也是大型的吸血陷阱。只要你买主流叙事的单，人就在无往而不利的陷阱中打转。因为这个主流叙事并不是女性当家做主，拥有选举权和被选举权，拥有正当的话语权所构建的叙事。

甚至即使脱离性别的角度，在我们自上而下的话语里，也是一个人不吃苦，天诛地灭的语境。

王小波写过一段话讲述这个困境：“在我们的文化里，只认为生命是好的，却没把快乐啦、幸福啦、生存状态之类的事定义在内：故而就认为，只要大家都能活着就好，不管他们活得多么糟糕。由此导致了一种古怪的生存竞争，和风力、水力比赛推动磨盘，和牲口比赛运输——而且是比赛一种负面的能力，比赛谁更不知劳苦，更不贪图安逸！”

也就是说，即使你脱离了“女性不该吃苦，牺牲，风险”的课题，“人就不应该为别人吃苦，牺牲，风险”的课题依然纠缠着一颗中国人的灵魂（这里就不把日韩扯进来共沉沦了，人家没那么爱吃苦，韩国中秋节都可以选择连休9天，在中国你只能接受调休。各种中国人说韩国人把中秋节偷走了，人家偷了人家真用啊！发明节日却不让人使用节日，那这真是秦始皇的新衣：从古至今地骗人！）。

以及从秦始皇开始的“秦制两千年”，到现在丁点没改变。我们在2024年，还在为当权者不把百姓当人（如矿物油事件）的事情愤怒。一个事如果几十年，几千年仍在愤怒，而不改变，只会让人厌倦。

A mistake repeated more than once is a decision.

希望并祝福，我们这一代女性，不再为同样的事情愤怒。这一切都源于我们做出如下的决定：我们不再吃父权社会和极权社会的苦。 也放弃拯救任何人。一个飞机乘客的责任是：如有事故，优先拯救自己。身为女性的责任也是如此。

相关阅读：

莫不谷原创小说：“屠龙总是在春天”

https://afdian.com/item/c418e048b3c111ecb25652540025c377

女性浪漫，往复信笺

写信是一种非常old school且浪漫的方式，而女性之间的信笺往来，让“浪漫”这个词不再被异性恋所霸占，也不再被性缘关系所束缚。萍水相逢的女性之间，也可以通过信笺的连接，达成这样独属于女性，无关于性缘的浪漫。

所以这是放学以后Newsletter的一个崭新的专题，倘若你也有话和故事对女性说 （不必是我们），欢迎你的来信📨，放学以后邮箱afterschool2021@126.com。

这是放学以后run and rebel系列第四期的征稿。

不再是逃离某个地域疆域，父权制和极权统治，这一次，我们策划一起逃离这个时代的低点，逃离乱纪元，逃离历史的垃圾时间。

“历史的垃圾时间”，这个被官方强烈批判且否认存在的名词，得到了普通人的无限共鸣和认可。下行的趋势，即使是眼盲心盲装盲的人，此刻也能感受到。凛冬在过去几年从来不是将至未至，它已经明目张胆地在场。在接下来的数年或者数十年，可能还会无期限地攻城掠地。

全球加剧变暖，生活加速凛寒。

我们这些时代的普通人，如何在不知拐点何时到来的历史低点，应对时代的风暴，安放自我的恐惧，绝望和不知如何度过每一天的空茫？

欢迎来稿分享你在这个历史垃圾时间的感受，想法，应对的策略和计划。

Do not go gentle into that good night

不要温和地走入那个良夜

让我们在夜幕低垂时一起点灯，秉烛夜游。

特别说明：由于本期主题敏感，我们将仅在国内外三个平台上线：spotify，放学以后的newsletter，和爱发电，并设置付费门槛，来保障投稿者和我们自身的人身安全。基于收费所得，我们也将会给每个被采用的投稿者，发去88元的红包，作为“ 逃离乱纪元”的基金。

投稿截止时间:2024年11月11号

【投稿方式】时长5分钟左右为宜，手机录音即可，录制时可将手机垫高，与嘴平齐，收音更清晰。音频请发送至afterschool2021@126.com.（提示注意避免距离手机太近容易喷麦，或背景声音嘈杂收音不清晰，以及请保护好个人信息，避免透露个人ID，如有昵称可以用昵称投稿）

【温馨提示】请投稿发送前谨慎思考，如需变声处理也可提前处理好。如非人身安全或隐私威胁等重大原因，一般在已经录制上线后无法予以撤稿，敬请理解。

【放学以后文章&书籍&其它】

解锁放学以后《创作者手册：从播客开始说起》：https://afdian.com/item/ffcd59481b9411ee882652540025c377

解锁莫不谷《做一个“蓄意”的游荡者》口袋书：
爱发电：https://afdian.com/item/62244492ae8611ee91185254001e7c00微信公众号：《放学以后After school》（提示安卓用户可下载“爱发电”app，苹果用户可把爱发电主页添加至手机桌面来使用，目前爱发电未上线苹果商店）

Newsletter订阅链接：https://afterschool2021.substack.com/（需科学/上 网）

联系邮箱：afterschool2021@126.com （投稿来信及合作洽谈）

为全球华人游荡者提供解决方案的平台：游荡者（www.youdangzhe.com）

小红书：游荡者的日常

同名YouTube：https://www.youtube.com/@afterschool2021

同名微信公众号：放学以后after school

欢迎并感谢大家在爱发电平台为我们的创作发电：https://afdian.com/a/afterschool

播客收听平台：【国内】苹果播客（请科学/上网）、爱发电、汽水儿、荔枝、网易云、小宇宙、喜马拉雅、、QQ音乐；
【海外】Spotify、Apple podcast、Google podcast、Snipd、Overcast、Castbox、Amazon Music、Pocket Casts、Stitcher、Radio Public、Wordpress