We’ve got a guest column by the great . His personal blog is The Scholar’s Stage and he also runs the excellent Center for Strategic Translation. This article was originally published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute on October 29, 2024.

Last week, the Wall Street Journal editorial board asked Donald Trump why China would not invade Taiwan on his watch. Trump told the Journal that the Chinese would not dare to invade. As Trump put it: “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.”

One must pity the Chinese analyst asked to predict what a second Trump administration will mean for U.S.-Chinese relations. Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic; he clearly believes that the less predictable he is to the Chinese, the better off America will be. Though China occupies a central place in Trump’s campaign rhetoric, his campaign has not published or endorsed any detailed China policy proposals. The actions of the last Trump administration do not provide a better guide. Divided by infighting, its China policy was not consistent. At times, Trump’s foreign policy swung wildly as specific individuals rose or fell from his favor. Things do not get much easier if one looks at the views of the politicians and policy wonks that Trump would call on in a second administration. Their views are varied. Among Trump’s closest allies, we find fundamental disagreements on the proper ends and proper means of American strategy toward China.

Given these hurdles. I will not try to predict the path a second Trump administration might tread. It seems more useful to lay out a few observations on the different schools of thought now contending for leadership of that policy. My observations are shaped by the dozens of interviews I have conducted over the last two months with Republican staffers, think tankers, and former officials. A longer and more thorough report of my findings will be published by FPRI later this year. This is a pre-election preview.

The questions that divided Republicans in 2017 are not the questions that will divide them in 2025. Trump’s election shattered a policy consensus shared by the leaders of both parties for the better part of four decades. Many of the architects of this consensus were still influential during Trump’s first years in office. On the other hand, many who rejected “engagement” with China had spent years exiled from power. Others were completely new to service in the executive branch. This was a diverse group who did not all reject engagement for the same reasons. These differences were not initially apparent, as their objections were too marginal to the pre-Trump policy debates for much scrutiny to be given to them. Nor was it immediately apparent to these officials where the new bounds of public opinion or presidential approval lay. Thrust into power quite suddenly, they were forced to improvise as they went—and improvise again as the Chinese reaction to Trump’s trade war changed the context in which they worked. All of these factors gave China policy under Trump 1.0 an unusually chaotic flavor.

None of these conditions hold this election season. The architects of engagement are no longer relevant. A tough line on China is now taken as a starting point for all factions involved. Over the last eight years, a new ecosystem of conservative think tanks, policy journals, and Congressional offices has sprouted up to provide Trumpism with the intellectual coherence it lacked in 2017. Policy proposals are now numerous and detailed. Out of power, former Trump officials have had the time to carefully lay out their vision for American strategy in Asia. They have done this in speeches, policy reports, and full-length books. Disagreements between their different schools of thought are formally debated on both panels and podcasts.

Points of Consensus and Conflict in Trump World

Amid these debates, one finds several points of consensus. The disputing intellectuals, wonks, and politicians all agree that China is the most significant foreign policy problem the United States now faces. They describe China as a challenge that must be met in many dimensions: military, economic, and technological (some would add “ideological” to this list, but that is a point of debate, not consensus). Republicans agree that the U.S. armed forces are poorly structured and lack the resources needed to counter the military challenge posed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). They agree that America’s commercial and financial relationship with China underwrote the rise of a powerful rival while undermining America’s own industrial base. They believe that China has taken advantage of the traditional American commitment to globalization and free markets, and that doubling down on this commitment is foolish. To level the playing field, some mix of tariffs, export controls, capital controls, and industrial policy is necessary. They agree that the Biden administration’s China policy—while an improvement on that of the Obama administration—has nonetheless been feckless. They believe that the Biden administration articulates geopolitical goals that it has not resourced, cares too much about perceptions of amity, cares too little about perceptions of strength, and has not sold the American people on its foreign policy priorities.   

But behind this consensus lie many fundamental disagreements.

The debates about China policy can be largely sifted into two buckets: economics and geopolitics. It is common for individuals to be closely allied in the economic sphere but not in the geopolitical sphere, or vice versa. For example, senators Marco Rubio and J.D. Vance are close allies on the economic front; there are few meaningful distinctions between the economic strategy each endorses. Their respective takes on the geopolitical problem posed by China are much harder to reconcile. 

In theory, one’s position on the CHIPS Act or tariff rates might influence one’s position on military commitments to Taiwan or military aid to Ukraine. In practice, this is rarely so. The economic and geopolitical debates occur on different planes.

One way to represent the core principles at play in the geopolitical debate is with a classic two-by-two matrix (popularized on the internet as a “political compass”).

Optimism vs. Pessimism

 On the x axis I place the single most important difference between the various schools of thought: assessments of American power and state capacity. Where one falls in many of the most prominent debates—such as “Can the United States can afford to support both Ukraine and Taiwan?” or “Should the ultimate goal of our China policy be victory over the Communist Party of China, or should it be détente?”—has less to do with one’s assessment of China and more to do with one’s assessment of the United States. What resources can we muster for competition with China? Just how large are our stores of money, talent, and political will?

Those on the right quadrants of my diagram provide pessimistic answers to these questions. They buttress their case with measurables: steel produced, ships at sea, interest paid on the federal deficit, or the percentage of an ally’s gross domestic product spent on defense. Against these numbers are placed fearsome statistics of Chinese industrial capacity and PLA power. Changes in technology, which favor shore-based precision munitions at the expense of more costly planes and ships, further erode the American position. This is a new and uncomfortable circumstance. The last time the United States waged war without overwhelming material superiority was in 1812.

To those who see American power through this frame, there is only one logical response: the United States must limit its ambitions. This means either radically reprioritizing defense commitments to focus on China or retreating from conflict with China altogether.

Those on the left two quadrants see things differently. Where the pessimists see settled facts, the optimists see possibilities. The optimists recognize many of the same trends as the pessimists, but view them as self-inflicted mistakes that can, and should, be reversed. An inadequate defense budget is not a law of the universe but a political choice. If Trump wins, he will choose otherwise. Implicit in the optimist view is a longer time horizon—there is still time to turn things around. But this window will not be open forever. Optimists fear that pessimistic assessments erode the political will needed to make changes while change is still possible.

The arguments between pessimists and optimists could be reframed as a matter of risk. The pessimists are most worried about the downside risks of a crisis with China in the near future (c. 2025–28). The optimists balance that possibility against the longer-term risks America will face as it withdraws from other regions of the world or abandons defense capabilities that are not needed in the Pacific theater. Optimists believe this second class of risks is large, and that the United States should not court them. Even an America in desperate need of defense reform has some capacity to “walk and chew gum at the same time.” This issue is at the crux of their arguments on Ukraine: in material terms, aid to Ukraine is not coming at Taiwan’s expense. It is relatively cheap. What stops America from helping both beleaguered nations?

 The pessimists do not view that question purely in material terms. In their debates, the pessimists are quick to highlight the few weapons systems being shipped across the Atlantic that might be used in the Pacific, but their critique reaches higher than this. The costs of the war in Ukraine (and the Middle East) are measured not just in bullets, but in attention and effort: There are only so many minutes the National Security Council may meet. Washington can only have a few items on its agenda at any given time. The executive branch is stodgy, slow, and captive to bureaucratic interests; the legislative branch is rancorous, partisan, and captive to public opinion; the American public does not care a whit about the world abroad. Accomplishing anything meaningful in the United States—much less the drastic defense reforms both sides of the debate agree are necessary—requires singular attention and will. 

If this seems like a pessimistic take on the American system—well, it is one. It is common for people in the optimistic quadrants to argue that the People’s Republic of China is riddled with internal contradictions. In a long-term competition between the two systems, they are confident that these contradictions will eat China from the inside out, and that America’s free and democratic order will eventually emerge victorious. None of the pessimists I interview make similar predictions. If they have anything to say about internal contradictions, it is American contradictions they focus on.  

Power-Based vs. Values-Based Perspectives

So much for the optimist-pessimist divide. What of the y axis?

I think of this as a pole, with “power-based” perspectives on one hand and “values-based” perspectives on the other.

Republicans in the top two quadrants ground their arguments in cold calculations of realpolitik. From this perspective, international politics is first and foremost a competition for power. States seek power. The prosperity, freedom, and happiness of any nation depend on how much power its government can wield on the world stage. While states might compete for power in many domains, military power is the most important. A state frustrated by a trade war might escalate to a real war, but a state locked in deadly combat has no outside recourse. The buck stops with the bullet.

From the power-based perspective, then, the goal of American strategy must be the maximization of American power, with military force as the ultimate arbiter of that power. This force does not need to be realized in combat—ideally, its deterrent power will be strong enough that it is never actively used. The ideal means of American strategy is a military posture and alliance system strong enough to deter the Chinese from resorting to war.

The left and right quadrants of this perspective disagree on the best way to build that sort of power. The upper right quadrant—the prioritizers—do not believe America will ever possess power sufficient to compel China into submission; a stable détente between the two countries is the best outcome that America can attain. Even this modest aim will only be possible if the United States prioritizes the threat posed by China above all others.

Those who argue from the upper left quadrant—the primacists—also speak the language of realpolitik. They maintain, however, that the sacrifices the prioritizers propose will weaken American power. They believe that the existing American alliance system contributes to America’s strength today and will contribute to America’s potential strength in the future. Instead of limiting American aims, the primacists are more concerned with expanding American means. They are confident this can be done if the American people have the confidence to do so.

The lower two quadrants, whose arguments I label “values-based,” operate under a different frame. The people in these quadrants believe that American foreign policy should not be evaluated by a single variable. They see connections between what America does abroad and what America is like at home. They have strong values-based commitments to specific ways of life that are expressed in their vision for American strategy.

I have labelled those in the bottom left quadrant “internationalists” because of how often they invoke the phrase “liberal international order.” This group believes that America and its allies are knit together not only by shared security interests, but also by shared values. In fact, the values shared by the liberal bloc explain why these countries share security interests in the first place. China is an authoritarian power whose influence operations threaten the integrity of democracies across the world. Many internationalists view this political-ideological threat as the most dangerous that China poses. Those in this quadrant are especially skeptical of détente; they do not believe permanent compromise with China is possible. They attribute Chinese belligerence to the communist political system that governs the country. For them, tensions in U.S.-Chinese relations are less the expected clashes between a rising power and the ruling hegemon than a battle between two incompatible social systems. Pointing to the close cooperation that ties Iran, North Korea, Russia, and China together, the internationalists argue (contra the prioritizers) that the world is gripped in a general contest between liberal order and resurgent authoritarianism whose different parts cannot be disentangled from each other.

Those in the bottom right quadrant—the restrainers—also think about foreign affairs through a regime lens, but the belligerent regime in question is their own. Republican restrainers link the liberal international order to the free trade agreements all Trumpists despise and the administrative “deep state” all Trumpists distrust. They see the liberal international order as an international extension of the progressive order they are trying to tear down at home.

There are echoes of the 1960s New Left in the restrainer argument. Both the new left of yesterday and the new right of today are rebellions against “the establishment.” Both reject the pieties of their day; both see a bloated national security state as a symbol of the dehumanizing values they reject. Both groups correctly point out that there is no natural limit to the quest for primacy. Both argue that a totalizing foreign policy will lead to the bureaucratization of American life.   

Only the most radical restrainers are ready for a 21^st-century march on the Pentagon. Most aim for an easier target: a relatively modest foreign policy. Instead of defending an entire international order, it is enough to defend America. Instead of deterring authoritarianism, it is enough to deter China. China does not need to be defeated—it is enough to convince the Chinese to accept some sort of détente.

This is all pretty similar to the ends sought by the prioritizers. Little wonder so many of the primacists and internationalists I interviewed believed the prioritizers were restrainers in disguise! Again and again I heard this accusation made: prioritizer arguments are just an attempt to make isolationism sexy. The prioritizers do not actually believe in realpolitik—realpolitik is just a respectable way to attack the existing international order they despise.

There is an irony to this critique. Just as primacists and internationalists condemn the false face of the prioritizers, so the prioritizers and the restrainers condemn the false face of the primacists! Many of those I interviewed insisted that their primacist opponents made such-and-such argument not for the realpolitik reasons they professed, but because of their (hidden) commitment to liberal ideals. Ideals that cannot be defended on their own merits had to be prettied up with talk of hard power.

All of these suspicions of subterfuge are overblown. Both primacists and prioritizers believe the arguments they make. Yet their suspicions are revealing! All sides clearly believe there is political advantage in couching one’s arguments in realpolitik logic. That fact alone tells us something about the likely contours of a Trump presidency—and perhaps the beliefs of Trump himself.

写在前面：

本期放学以后信号塔由金钟罩轮值。

很多人从欧洲回来之后都产生了戒断反应，我反而没有。相比较而言，国内的工作也没有显得更不堪，反而在我心中变得更无所谓了一些，很多事情没那么烦心了，也没有对欧洲产生更多的思念，因为我知道我终将会再次抵达那里。在回来的一周内，我三次梦到欧洲，两次在大海上漂流，一次在天空中滑翔，每次醒来都带着满满的满足，觉得自己赚翻了。之前上线的做梦那一期播客，片尾我许的愿多次实现，梦里壮阔的欧洲，斑斓的欧洲，自由的欧洲都是那么真实，我将多次穿过那个世界，有时候在梦里，有时候在脚下。

正文：

2024年10月去了法国，那是我第一次抵达欧洲。写下这句话的时候，嘴角不禁流出笑意，我好像去的太晚了，但又不晚，毕竟早两年的话，我也不会有今天的感受。世界没有改变，但我一直在改变。我想先写尼斯，再写巴黎。巴黎对我来说太严肃了，写得不好会感觉在亵渎巴黎；尼斯不一样，尼斯一定会原谅我所有的唐突和逻辑混乱。

尼斯，你的天性是什么就该是什么

我从来没有如此的解放天性过，细数在尼斯的种种失常行为，那都是我内心压抑了很久的渴望，是真实的我、浪漫的我。

今年5月，我们仨和粽子一起去了夏威夷，她们仨多次在直播中唱歌，甚至反复cue我一起，我绝大多数时间都拒绝了，我开不了口。其实我是一个喜欢唱歌的人，我经常自己唱歌，有时候在家里，还自己一个人去过ktv。但是在别人面前唱歌，我开不了口。甚至不是身边真实存在的人，光想到直播的另一端有人听到我在唱歌，每一个细胞都在拒绝。

到尼斯的第一天晚上，喷泉广场上远远听到有人在唱ed sheeran的《perfect》，我简直是一整个大步流星小跑过去，边走边跟着一起唱，围观的观众一起打开手机手电筒，一群欧洲人摇摇晃晃的看着一个亚洲面孔唱英文歌。至今找不到任何缘由，就是那一个瞬间，所有的包袱都不见了，这首歌的歌词从我的血液直接流淌到嘴巴中。唱完歌脚步都轻松了，从广场上颠颠跳跳地回酒店，感觉自己像个精灵，拥有快乐的魔法。

尼斯的人给我的冲击太大了，大家是真的是活在这个世界上，不是活在别人的眼光中。海边桥洞下有一个裹着被子的流浪汗，他把一只手手放在小狗的嘴巴里，让小狗咬着玩，另一手放在另一只狗的背上摩挲。下午路过他的时候，他在对我微笑，晚上路过他的时候他已沉沉睡去，耳边就是地中海摇荡的声音。

海岸边有人靠着行李包读书、有人睡去，有年轻的小伙子裹着紧实的身体划向大海，也有岸边还未消散的大麻气味。老城里台阶一侧是裹着小包裹睡去的妇人，另一侧是正在吃披萨的情侣。16:50分的时候我进入一家手工品商店，店员告诉我们还有10分钟下班。外面下着雨，教堂里有免费的吉他演出，教堂门口的流浪汗问我的朋友要了一根烟。

在尼斯几乎每晚都淋雨，雨打在我的身上，不冷，我们像欧洲人那样在雨中走路，雨水渗过头发流过脸颊。一开始我会觉得淋雨是一种文化认同，后来从巴黎淋到尼斯，雨水甚至穿透了我的灵魂，我像是一个透明人在雨中行走，没有身份，也没有被人看见。

昂蒂布的海让我激动，带着一点恐惧的兴奋越靠近越慌张。我看过有人从昂蒂布海边的一个将近3米的石头上一跃而下，无尽的潇洒和自由，落进琥珀般闪耀的清澈的海面。我也想跳一下试试，想证明一下自己也配拥有这种潇洒和自由。但其实我不是善于游泳的人，只能在游泳池里带着泳镜游泳，而且只会蛙泳，踩水的技术也很一般。但我就是想跳。

我没敢直接站在那个石头上，于是先站在水边，想着直接从水边跳下去先试试，只有20厘米的高度却犹豫了20分钟迟迟不敢往下跳。我的勇气没有想象的那么充沛，大海晃晃悠悠的把我的勇气抹了个干净，每提起一口气，就化为叹气。朋友跟我在一起互相打气，但是两个人却都在不停的摇摆，一个人不跳，另一个人是不会跳的。直到牙一咬，下去吧！海水很快把我托起，我划回岸边。朋友在我跳完后，不到一分钟也立马跳下去了，她甚至跳了两次。我们两个都备受鼓舞，我决定挑战那个两米多高的石头。

光脚爬上去，站在边缘我腿都软了，那块石头2米多高，我178的身高，从上往下看，累计4米多的高度，无异于从二层楼跳下来，这对恐高患者太不友好了。但是，你已经站上去了，四周都是大家期待的眼神，几个朋友和中国游客甚至拿起手机帮我记录，这时候比起退回去，跳下去好像更简单。我跳了，好疼，皮肤被砸得生疼，而且跳下去的瞬间耳朵的角度没找对，轰隆一声巨响，耳朵里疼到恶心，上岸后缓了好久，我的内心也激荡了好久。

现在，如果给我一次机会穿越到站在石头上的那一刻，对自己的耳边说句话，我会说“Go for it, and you will get it!”

关于尼斯的更多图片，已经分享在小红书“游荡者的日常”，分为尼斯的人、尼斯的海、尼斯的城3篇，感兴趣的朋友可以去小红书浏览。

巴黎，平等地对待每一个行人

一定是因为巴黎有太多古老的建筑，丰厚的藏品，这些历史的痕迹把我封印住了，在这里根本不敢造次。我在这个城市有很强的不配得感。博物馆的震慑无需多言，可甚至是走在路上的人，他们的时尚穿搭都把我击个粉碎。颜色、材质、叠穿、首饰搭配，非常有个人特点和创造力，这才是搭配，这才是时尚，大家有着独特的美和个性，张扬又不招摇。相比较起来，我从巴黎世家店里买来的那些，简直像是站在天安门前穿着一个身上印着“北京”大字的T恤。

博物馆的画作和展品像菜市场一样就这样水灵灵的摆在面前，就这样在你脸跟前，或许用一望无际形容博物馆不太合适，但我感觉巴黎的博物馆就是一望无际。我根本看不到尽头，无论是往远处看，还是往深处看。在卢浮宫租了一个导览，一眨眼，四个小时过去了，甚至感觉只看了5%，可能3%？

好几次在巴黎都产生深深的怨恨，为什么有的人可以出生在这里。这里的人给我一种孤独的感觉，是那种珍惜自己时间的孤独，是每个人都有个性的孤独，是一种不顺从的卓尔不群的孤独。孤独是对个人时间更高自由度的支配，在巴黎从早到晚每个时间段都能看到跑步的人，在公园里、塞纳河边、城市街边，可我一直以为跑步只有晨跑或者夜跑，怎么大家什么时候都可以跑步？孤独的人在公园里抬着头晒太阳，双手插兜，双脚跷在喷泉水池边；孤独的人骑着自行车在街上飞速穿梭，一旦你在自行车道骑得慢，一定能听到身后铃铃的催促声，或者下一秒他就从你耳边呼啸而过。

但巴黎的咖啡馆稀释了这种孤独，路边咖啡馆，小小的圆桌上两两相坐，吵吵闹闹，抽烟喝酒喝咖啡。我很喜欢《巴黎记》中的一句话，“人需要孤独，也需要群。巴黎为什么有那么多的咖啡馆，这是对孤独的缓解，人们在这里获得群的温暖。”

比起博物馆和时尚，这次收获的最意外的震撼是巴黎的路，城市的道路。

刻板印象中，越大的城市、越发达的城市，道路肯定越宽敞，飞驰的汽车和地铁。巴黎不是这样的。假如说一个街道有10米宽，只给机动车道留了4米（往返两个方向各2米），自从车车道2米（往返两个方向各1米），人行道4米。我只是举例形容感受，不是真实的街道宽度。有的地方甚至人行道更宽，比如香榭丽舍大道，狭窄的汽车道两边是人行道，人行道的两边是树荫下的人行道，树荫下的人行道的另一边又是公园；塞纳河岸边是人行道，塞纳河上的两遍也是人行道，再往边缘拓展才是可怜的狭窄的机动车道。我在巴黎骑自行车，感觉有的时候自行车比打车还快，自行车道非常清晰便捷，有明确的方向规划，有的时候自行车道和公交车道还是共用的，遇到红灯自行车停车线也在机动车前面。在这个城市，没有钱买汽车的人，也可以散漫自在地行走。这个城市欢迎走路的人，欢迎骑车的人。我感觉被尊重了。“今天，巴黎是所有大城市中唯一可以让人惬意地走完全城的地方。在城市的活力上，它比其他任何城市都更依赖于大街上走过的人们，其他城市似乎只是勉强允许游荡、懒散、闲逛的社会废物存在，而在巴黎，实际上它的街道邀请人人都这样做。”

写在后面：

在43期的心愿清单中有提到本次巴黎的旅行清单，回溯这段实际经历和那期播客只能说几乎毫无关系。我没能如约探索巴黎，但是我真的抵达了那里。想到开头写到的，回国后并没有对欧洲产生更多的思念，是因为我知道我终将会再次抵达那里。那在再次抵达之前，我一定要好好活着。

【放学以后文章&书籍&其它】

解锁放学以后《创作者手册：从播客开始说起》：https://afdian.com/item/ffcd59481b9411ee882652540025c377

解锁莫不谷《做一个“蓄意”的游荡者》口袋书：
爱发电：https://afdian.com/item/62244492ae8611ee91185254001e7c00微信公众号：《放学以后After school》（提示安卓用户可下载“爱发电”app，苹果用户可把爱发电主页添加至手机桌面来使用，目前爱发电未上线苹果商店）

Newsletter订阅链接：https://afterschool2021.substack.com/（需科学/上 网）

联系邮箱：afterschool2021@126.com （投稿来信及合作洽谈）

为全球华人游荡者提供解决方案的平台：游荡者（www.youdangzhe.com）

小红书：游荡者的日常

同名YouTube：https://www.youtube.com/@afterschool2021

同名微信公众号：放学以后after school

欢迎并感谢大家在爱发电平台为我们的创作发电：https://afdian.com/a/afterschool

播客收听平台：
【国内】苹果播客（请科学/上网）、爱发电、汽水儿、荔枝、网易云、小宇宙、喜马拉雅、、QQ音乐；
【海外】Spotify、Apple podcast、Google podcast、Snipd、Overcast、Castbox、Amazon Music、Pocket Casts、Stitcher、Radio Public、Wordpress。

The following is a guest translation from Sihao Huang, a current PhD candidate at Oxford.

Two researchers from Fudan University—renowned for its American Studies program—published an impressively detailed analysis in FT Chinese examining Trump and Harris's tech policies. As it turns out, Chinese analysts have been reading about the AI Manhattan Project, tracking the debate around Lina Khan, and even listening to the All-In Podcast [JS: god bless them…].

The analysts believe that Harris, the "AI czar," will pursue a more interventionist approach to AI regulation but will likely have a weaker hand than Biden in antitrust policies due to her active engagement with tech giants and her Californian roots. They also think she will take an "iterative strategy of checking for loopholes and filling gaps" with export controls.

In contrast, they expect Trump to run an "AI Manhattan Project" to compete against China, accelerate the development of military technology, repeal Biden's AI Executive Order, and encourage more flexible AI governance. They also see Trump as being more "radical" with export controls, blocking China's access to cloud compute and taking some action against Taiwan for ‘stealing’ America's semiconductor business. Ultimately, the two authors argue that regardless of who wins the election, "the current trend of pan-securitization in the U.S. digital technology industry is not affected by the change between the two parties." Given the ENFORCE and Remote Access Security Acts, the "march to suppress Chinese technology will continue."

Stick around till the end for a painting and some poetry by my favorite Chinese painter, Shitao.

Divergent Paths: Differences in Harris and Trump's Technology Policy Approaches

The technology policies that Harris and Trump might adopt represent two distinct paths for future U.S. technology governance. However, both share a consensus on technology policy toward China.

October 30, 2024 - Written by Yao Xu and Zhang Ao (Fudan University) for FT Chinese. Source. Translation abridged.

As candidates for the Democratic and Republican parties, Harris and Trump show significant differences in their attitudes and positions on technology policies. Harris is likely to continue Biden's technology policies, including artificial intelligence (AI) regulation, antitrust enforcement, increased taxes on the ultra-wealthy, opposition to racial and gender bias, cryptocurrency regulation, and promotion of digital equity. In contrast, Trump has explicitly stated that he will overturn Biden's AI governance policies as represented by the "Biden Executive Order," adopt relatively loose regulatory measures on the technology industry, give the green light to mergers and acquisitions, and continue tax reduction policies. Regardless of who is ultimately elected as the next U.S. president, their policy propositions will profoundly impact the global technology ecosystem and the geopolitical technology landscape.

Artificial Intelligence: Will Biden's AI Executive Order Be Abolished?

On October 30, 2023, Biden signed the Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence, the White House's first regulation on generative artificial intelligence. It aims to strengthen federal government safety oversight of AI, calling on federal departments to review AI's impact in their specific domains and find solutions to problems within each agency, thus becoming one of America's landmark policies on AI regulation to date.

Harris is inclined to continue this executive order, strengthening government supervision and public oversight of AI. She believes AI development needs regulation to ensure public safety and interests. Analysts believe that if Harris wins the election, she may adopt a more proactive and interventionist AI regulatory policy. The federal government is expected to be encouraged to actively procure AI tools while ensuring appropriate safeguards for their use across federal agencies. Additionally, Harris will urge Congress to legislate and improve the legal framework for protecting data privacy and cybersecurity.

Harris's political career began in California, with close ties to the tech industry, and she started focusing on data privacy and security issues in the technology sector early in her political career. Since becoming vice president, Harris has earned the nickname "AI Czar" for her active leadership in AI-related affairs. "It's very important that she's from California, from the Bay Area, and has served as a politician there," said Alondra Nelson, former director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. "Silicon Valley is not unfamiliar to her." Harris has her own agenda in AI governance. "When an elderly person's healthcare plan is canceled because of an erroneous AI algorithm, isn't that a matter of survival for them?" Harris expressed concerns about AI algorithms' impact on marginalized social groups in a November 2023 speech. Harris emphasizes AI's social impact and safe development, striving to maintain a balance between technological progress and public interests.

Although she advocates stronger regulation, Harris is not as outspoken as Biden in calling for the breakup of tech giants or reshaping the current AI power structure at the federal level. As the election approaches, Harris is actively engaging with tech giants, continuously easing tensions between the Democratic Party and Silicon Valley while advancing the agenda from a middle-ground position. Box CEO Aaron Levie says Harris's positive attitude has achieved results, and "tech giant executives also need a stable leader who supports immigration and science." Levie states that as long as leaders respect technology and tech companies' own development logic, even if they implement tax and antitrust policies or strengthen AI safety supervision, they won't face strong opposition from the tech community.

Trump seeks to repeal Biden's executive order. In his campaign manifesto, Trump claimed: "We will repeal Biden's dangerous executive order, which has hindered AI innovation and imposed radical left-wing ideas on the development of this technology. Instead, Republicans will promote AI development based on free speech and human prosperity." Trump opposes excessive regulation of cutting-edge industries like AI while encouraging flexible "non-regulatory methods" such as policy guidance, pilot trials, and voluntary frameworks to minimize barriers to AI technology development and application, ultimately serving comprehensive competition with China. According to The Washington Post, in response to the Biden administration's AI executive order, the Trump team is drafting a new executive order proposing the implementation of an "AI Manhattan Project," aimed at promoting rapid development of AI technology, especially military applications, and will work to clear legal obstacles for implementation. Increased military investment in AI will benefit technology companies like Anduril and Palantir that have established good cooperation with the Pentagon. The main executives of these giants support Trump and have close ties with the Republican Party.

According to The Washington Post's exclusive report, the "AI Manhattan Project" will also create an "industry-led" agency to evaluate AI models and ensure they are protected from foreign adversaries. The plan includes a section titled "Making America Number One in AI," which proposes a strategy for the AI industry that differs significantly from the Biden administration's AI executive order. This suggests that if Trump returns, he may implement policies beneficial to Silicon Valley investors and tech giants. To win votes and realize his political agenda, Trump has become increasingly friendly toward Silicon Valley. In June of this year, Trump appeared on the "All-In Podcast" YouTube channel, hosted by well-known technology investors. After the show, Trump also participated in a fundraising event hosted by podcast co-host and former PayPal executive David Sacks. In the podcast, Trump stated that he has realized Silicon Valley's "geniuses" need more resources to promote AI development to compete with China. Chamath Palihapitiya, founder of venture capital firm Social Capital, believes Trump has gained more support in the technology industry than in the 2016 election. Trump's inclination also shows he needs to cooperate with technology elites and build a cabinet to "change the status quo."

Export Controls on Technology Industries Like Semiconductors: Will They Become More Radical?

Harris will continue the Biden administration's strategy of taking small, quick steps, gradually escalating, and fixing loopholes in the export control process for semiconductors and other sectors. The Biden administration's export control policy design around semiconductors and other fields reflects a pragmatic action strategy, which is more evident in the export control regulations issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce in October 2022 and October 2023, respectively. The former restricted the peak computing power of single chips and the data transmission performance between multiple chips, resulting in NVIDIA's most advanced GPU models A100 and H100 being banned from export to China. NVIDIA provided the Chinese market with cut-down versions A800 and H800 chips. To prevent NVIDIA from continuing to "exploit loopholes," BIS changed the restriction method in the 2023 new regulations, removing the previous "interconnection bandwidth" as an important parameter for identifying restricted chips, which directly led to the ban of A800 and H800. It can be predicted that if Harris comes to power, she will continue the iterative strategy of checking for loopholes and filling gaps, controlling and restricting some "emerging" advanced technologies while seeking a balance between blocking and suppressing China's technology industry and controlling differences.

Trump may become more radical on export controls. Based on his previous term, China was the first to be hit in semiconductor export controls under Trump. Since March 2018, when Trump launched the "301 investigation" and initiated trade and technology wars against China, the Trump administration began extensively using the BIS "Entity List," weaponizing export control regulations. Numerous technology companies, universities, and research institutions became victims, and the global supply chain suffered serious impacts. Additionally, in his last year in office, Trump targeted TikTok and WeChat's international versions, seeking to implement harsh ban measures on Chinese-based digital platforms in the United States. If Trump returns to the White House with extremely conservative vice presidential candidate J.D. Vance, he may continue using CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) to restrict Chinese companies' acquisitions in semiconductors and other high-tech fields, continue restricting the export of high-computing chip products to China, and restrict exports of chip manufacturing equipment, parts, and chip design software upstream in the industrial chain, as well as computing power leasing services downstream. Beyond China as the main competitor, Trump's "America First" stance will also affect upstream and downstream interests in the semiconductor industry. On July 18, Trump commented on U.S. involvement in Taiwan's defense, saying that Taiwan "took away" U.S. chip business, and the U.S. should not act as "insurance" for Taiwan's defense. TSMC, the world's largest chip foundry, saw its stock fall that day. Overall, although Trump has shown a strong tendency toward export controls, his governance style is changeable, and if he comes to power, the scope and effectiveness of his policies remain uncertain.

Antitrust Enforcement: Can Silicon Valley and Wall Street Breathe a Sigh of Relief?

Harris may be inclined to promote antitrust regulation. On the one hand, the social impact and security development of cutting-edge technology are political priorities that Harris values highly. She tends to increase enforcement against Silicon Valley tech monopolies, believing these platforms abuse their strong market position and infringe on consumer interests, making it difficult to meet people's basic living needs. She has repeatedly spoken about the need to reduce inflation and provide more economic opportunities for all Americans. If Harris comes to power, she is expected to appoint strong law enforcers to key positions in core departments responsible for antitrust, such as the Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission, or Federal Communications Commission. On the other hand, Harris also maintains contact with tech giants and tries to find a balance between government regulation and corporate innovation. During the 2020 election, Harris said that while strengthening regulation, the breakup of tech giants like Google should be opposed.

So far, Harris has not made a statement on how to handle antitrust issues. Wall Street hopes Harris can relax the antitrust enforcement seen during the Biden administration and create a new antitrust regulatory environment. Democratic donors such as IAC Chairman Barry Diller and LinkedIn co-founder Reid Hoffman believe Harris's position on this issue can be adjusted. As election day approaches, Harris is also under pressure to quickly enrich her position on key policy issues, and her final stance will depend on practical political considerations. Within the Democratic camp, firm antitrust policies are favored by party progressives such as Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, who hope Harris will continue Biden's policies. Elizabeth Wilkins, former director of the Federal Trade Commission's Office of Policy Planning, believes that despite Harris's ambiguous attitude, her other work protecting families and small businesses during her vice presidency is "fully consistent with the antitrust agenda."

Trump is not very active in antitrust enforcement. During his first term, Trump was rather cold toward antitrust matters. If he comes to power, he may continue to deal with current technology antitrust enforcement cases but will still give the green light to technology mergers and acquisitions. Trump's business background makes him generally more sympathetic to the business community, and his tax cuts and trade protectionist economic policies are quite popular with tech giants and their wealthy executives and middle-class employees. Out of consideration for their own interests, the Silicon Valley technology community, known as the "liberal bastion," has recently expressed support for Trump after the shooting, causing Trump's donations from the technology community to rapidly rise and surpass those to the Democratic Party.

However, the conservative camp to which Trump belongs also has its own antitrust agenda. His deputy, Vance, has publicly praised Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chair Lina Khan for "doing a pretty good job" in antitrust work against tech giants such as Amazon and Google, and said that large technology companies need to be restrained. In February of this year, Vance called for the breakup of Google on social media. The conservative camp tends to reduce regulatory agencies while being willing to use antitrust supervision to check and balance tech giants. The contradictions in the conservative camp's antitrust stance will also impact Trump's antitrust policy.

The March to Suppress Chinese Technology May Be Difficult to Stop 

The policies that Harris and Trump may adopt regarding technology industry issues represent two different paths for America's future technology governance. However, they have formed a consensus on technology policy toward China: internally promoting innovation policies while externally pursuing technological decoupling.

On one hand, the Biden administration is strengthening its technological competition with China. Since this year, the United States has used data as its entry point and data security as its justification to implement America First policies in technology industries and infrastructure construction, intensifying the competitive situation with China. On February 28, 2024, U.S. President Biden signed Executive Order 14117, "Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern," restricting the transmission of personal data to "specific countries." Subsequently, Chinese industries such as smart vehicles and shipping have also received focused attention due to alleged data security concerns. Furthermore, the United States has also restricted China's artificial intelligence development through means such as the Enhancing National Frameworks for Overseas Restriction of Critical Exports Act (also known as the ENFORCE Act) and the cloud computing bill.

On the other hand, Trump initiated the strong suppression of China's technology industry. During his term, Trump launched a trade war with China through the "301 investigation" and quickly extended it to a technology war. Through various means such as the "Entity List," presidential executive orders, and the promotion of China-related bills, the Trump administration adopted a strategy of universal coverage and focused attacks on China's technology industry. In 2018, the Trump administration launched the so-called "China Initiative" and conducted internal reviews to prevent research results from being "stolen." According to MIT Technology Review's study of prosecuted cases, the program fabricated numerous "unfounded" cases, many of which had little connection to technology and national security, negatively impacting American scientific research's reputation. During Trump's term, China's technology industries, including semiconductors, communications technology, artificial intelligence, new materials, and digital platforms, were generally "targeted." Multiple Chinese technology companies were placed on the entity list. WeChat and TikTok were once on the verge of being banned. Huawei was particularly targeted by Trump, causing serious damage to its global supply chain. Even in his final moments before leaving the White House, Trump signed an executive order directing federal agencies to assess the security risks of Chinese-made drones in the government fleet and to prioritize the elimination of Chinese-made drones.

Although the election is approaching, the current trend of pan-securitization in the U.S. digital technology industry is not affected by the change between the two parties. The overall direction of the United States' technological containment of China will not be affected by the final election result. The difference lies in the specific implementation methods and paths. Whether it is Harris's "gradual escalation" or Trump's "extreme pressure," their policy propositions will profoundly affect the global technology ecosystem and the geopolitical structure of technology.

(Note: Yao Xu is an associate researcher at the Development Research Institute of Fudan University, and Zhang Ao is a research assistant at the Development Research Institute of Fudan University. This article only represents the authors' personal views.)

A painting to take you into the night: Shitao’s Drunk in Autumn Woods from 1702.

The Met’s description:

Exploring the theme of intoxication, Shitao makes us reel with the unsteadiness of his figures and landscape. He probably created this picture to commemorate an autumn outing in the hills with friends. The three inscriptions testify to the pleasure and pride that Shitao took in his achievement; they make it clear that the exhilaration experienced by the friends was inspired by nature, poetry, conviviality, and creativity as well as wine.

原题跋（一）：

常年閉戶卻尋常，出郭郊原忽恁狂。
細路不逢多揖客，野田息背選詩郎。謂倪永清處士。
也非契闊因同調，如此歡娛一解裳。
大咲寶城今日我，滿天紅樹醉文章。

Behind closed doors I've dwelt all year, content with routine days, Yet beyond the city walls, my heart suddenly runs wild.

On these narrow paths I meet few who bow in greeting, In wild fields I rest my back, choosing a companion in poetry.

It's not that we share old bonds or sing the same tune, But such joy makes me cast aside all restraint.

How I laugh at myself in Bao City today, Beneath red trees filling the sky, drunk on poetry. (Translation: Claude.)

原题跋（二）：

白雲紅樹埜田間，去者去兮還者還。
昨日郊原憑放眼，七珍八寶鬭青山。
人同草木一齊醉，脫盡西風試醒時。
大雅不知何者是，老來情性慣尋癡。

White clouds and red trees amid the wild fields, those who go, go; those who come, come.

Yesterday in the open countryside, I let my gaze wander free, seven jewels and eight treasures compete with the green mountains.

People and plants are all drunk together, when the west wind strips all bare, that's when we try to sober up.

Who can say what true refinement is? In my old age, my nature tends toward seeking foolishness. (translation: Claude).

原题跋（三）：

頃刻煙雲能復古，滿空紅樹漫燒天。
請君大醉烏毫底，臥看霜林落葉旋。

In an instant, mists and clouds can return to their primeval form;
Red trees fill the skies, spreading fire through the heavens.
I invite you, sir, to get very drunk on my black brushstrokes;
Lie down and watch the frosted forest as falling leaves swirl. (translated by 枫荣注)

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Antoine, aka Duoduodiliao 多多底料, is a Mandarin teacher in France by day and a Chinese rap enthusiast by night. Today, he’s here with a setlist of his favorite hip hop tracks. His original songs can be found here.

Have a listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.

Don’t forget to vote tomorrow!

Track 1: 芳草地 (The Fragrant Meadow) by DIGI GHETTO (艾志恒Asen/thomeboydontkill/mac ova seas/KIV/Mula Sakee/付思遥)

Duoduodiliao: DIGI GHETTO is a rap group based in Chengdu, composed of six members. Their official debut made quite a fuss because the six of them were already pretty famous before they began to work together. Some people say they are like a new-gen Higher Brothers. The mixtape is really nice — it’s club-friendly, the beats are good, and the flows are very inventive. The lyrics are a little bit corny, but there is great chemistry between all the members. You can tell they enjoyed themselves while recording the album.

Track 2: 威远故事 (The Story of Weiyuan County) by GAI周延

Duoduodiliao: The next song is by GAI — he’s one of the most successful rappers in China.

Jordan Schneider: For background, GAI is from Chongqing, and he initially became famous by winning the first season of “Rap of China,” which came out in 2017.

Duoduodiliao: GAI’s 2022 album is called 杜康 “Dù Kāng,” and it’s pretty uneven but it’s a proper rap album. This isn’t the GAI we see on CCTV singing Chinese New Year nonsense — this is the real GAI rapping his guts out, on some tracks at least.

The song I chose is 威远故事 “The Story of Weiyuan County,” and it’s one of the greatest Chinese rap tunes that came out in 2022. It's an introspective song where GAI talks about his past, his childhood, and his hometown — and it’s absolutely beautiful.

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Jordan Schneider: GAI got canceled for having songs about drugs and doing crimes. Then he had this weird patriotic rehabilitation tour where he was making songs about the Great Wall and how awesome China is. It looks like GAI is going back to his roots with this album.

Track 3: 变蓝 (Turning Blue) by 也是福 (Eddie Beatz) feat. PO8 and 喜辰晨

Duoduodiliao: Next we have something different — this song is from a producer’s mixtape from 2022. The record is by 也是福, also known as Eddie Beatz — he’s one of the greatest producers in China. He has worked with notable artists like MaSiWei 馬思唯, Wang Yitai 王以太, and Xiao Lao Hu 小老虎. His tracks are usually quite jazzy and organic — he uses many live instruments rather than computer programming.

I discovered this record while randomly browsing NetEase Music. This album (也是蓝) is a collaborative mixtape featuring beautiful instrumental interludes. The song we're going to listen to is called 变蓝 (Turning Blue) featuring PO8 and Voision Xi 喜辰晨.

Track 4: 亚特兰蒂斯陷落 (Atlantis Surrenders) by 弗兰德斯坦/C-Low

Jordan Schneider: You mentioned browsing NetEase Music 网易云音乐 to find Chinese songs. Could you explain what NetEase is? How can people access it, and what makes it special compared to Spotify?

Duoduodiliao: NetEase Music is a Chinese streaming platform similar to Spotify, but it’s primarily available in China. There’s a modified international version, but it’s a different app, kind of like the distinction between Douyin and TikTok.

On NetEase, you can find Chinese artists, including underground artists who don’t focus on reaching international audiences. They simply release their music on Chinese apps. To truly understand Chinese music, especially underground, you need to use platforms like NetEase Music or QQ Music.

Jordan Schneider: You can access it by switching your app store to China, downloading the app, and then switching back to the country you live in. You can also use the desktop apps.

The apps themselves are fascinating to explore. They offer AI-generated playlists, user-generated playlists, and unique features like KTV (karaoke) functionality for every song. There’s even a national KTV leaderboard for each song, which keeps track of high scores like in an arcade game. Each song has discussion sections where people debate about the music and discuss specific lyrics. Artists maintain active profiles, similar to Weibo, where they share music updates and lifestyle content. It’s much more interactive than Spotify.

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Anyway, what’s the next song?

Duoduodiliao: The next song is by 弗兰德斯坦 (Flanders), a new rapper from Changsha. He recently appeared in the CSC Changsha City Cypher 2023, but for now, he’s still underground. This track, “Atlantis Surrenders” is only available on NetEase Music. It’s not on YouTube or Spotify.

The track features C-Low, former leader of the Beijing rap crew Easy Boys Gang. The use of autotune in this track is unique in Chinese rap. What makes this track special is the instrumental beat and Flanders’ deep, rich voice. It’s really impressive.

Track 5: 春雪采耳 (Ear Cleanse In The Spring Snow) by 施鑫文月 (SHII) and 小老虎 (Lil Tiger)

Duoduodiliao: Let’s continue with 施鑫文月 (SHII). He released an album in 2023 called “Sichuan Renaissance: Chapter Two” (巴蜀文藝復興：第二章), following Chapter One from 2021.

This record brings fresh air to an oversaturated rap scene. It crosses boundaries between musical genres like hip-hop, pop, and alternative. It’s also an ode to Chengdu local culture, discussing memories and intimate moments from the district where he grew up in Chengdu.

He talks about specific cultural elements, like elderly people playing mahjong, exercising, and dancing in public squares.

The song we’re discussing is from another one of his records, but it really captures an interesting slice of Chengdu culture — people in parks and squares offering to clean your eardrums with special tools.

Jordan Schneider: There’s a Douyin video of me getting that done.

Duoduodiliao: How does it feel? Is it pleasant?

Jordan Schneider: No, it’s not pleasant — it felt invasive. Your body produces ear wax for a reason. For days afterward, I felt like particles were getting into my ears because there wasn’t any wax to catch them.

TLDR; I’m not a fan. Maybe we need some randomized controlled trials to study it. Anyway, here’s the song.

Track 6: THE MESSAGE PT.2 by CREAM D and 艾热AIR

Duoduodiliao: The next track is by CREAM D from his album “Life After Life.” He's an OG rapper from Xi’an 西安 who started in the early 2010s. He’s Christian, and he discusses his spirituality a lot on this album.

Since CREAM D hadn’t released an album in many years, expectations were high for this one. He didn’t disappoint his audience. While he’s known for his technical skills, sharp flows, and lyrical ability, the introspective nature of this particular album makes it stand out.

The song we're going to listen to is “The Message Pt.2,” featuring a famous artist from Xinjiang called 艾热AIR. He’s a Uyghur rapper who won the 2023 season of Rap of China.

Jordan Schneider: Cool. I really like this one.

Track 7: 落幕 (Sunset) by Asen (feat. GALI, 堵琳Caroline)

Duoduodiliao: GALI is a Shanghai-based rapper who’s gained significant momentum through Rap of China. He went mainstream thanks to his natural charisma, clean flows, and well-written punchlines, making him hugely popular among Chinese rap audiences.

The song we’re going to listen to isn't actually from GALI’s album but rather features him on another rapper’s track. It’s called “Sunset” by Asen featuring GALI.

Track 8: 囚 (Cage) by 李佳隆 (JelloRio)

Duoduodiliao: The next album is 传奇 “LEGEND,” by Sichuanese artist 李佳隆 (JelloRio). He’s one of my personal favorites. I love what he's contributed to the culture these past few years.

In my opinion, this 2022 album is a flawless piece of work. The production team paid great attention to detail, with songs transitioning seamlessly from one to another. To fully appreciate it as the production team intended, you need to listen to the whole album in order.

The song we’re going to discuss is called “Cage,” and it blends Chinese folk 民谣 with hip-hop elements.

Track 9: 恨与爱 (Hate and Love) by AThree

Duoduodiliao: Next is Xinjiang rapper AThree with his 2022 album “Alpha 8.”

AThree’s record stands out for its lyrical quality - great poetry and smooth flow. He might be one of the few mainstream rappers in China who confronts political subjects in his songs.

The track we’re discussing, “Hate and Love,” addresses the Xuzhou chained woman incident 徐州铁链女事件, which sparked significant controversy in 2022.

Jordan Schneider: A man in Jiangsu province had a woman chained under his house for years, essentially keeping her as a sex slave. It was horrific. The discovery process revealed police negligence, and it became a weeks-long national discussion about how something so terrible could happen in modern China.

Moly’s Substack

2/23/23 - COGNITOHAZARD WARNING

Trigger Warning: Look, I want you to take me seriously. I am not someone who does trigger warnings. I have covered fucked up shit before without putting up trigger warnings. This post is going to go into a lot of detail about abduction, torture, sex slavery, and the worst kind of evils. Learning about this has ruined my life and my ability to live with …

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2 years ago · 31 likes · 12 comments · Chinese Doom Scroll

Jordan Schneider: What does AThree say on this track?

Duoduodiliao: His message is that rappers should be speaking out about these kinds of incidents. He criticizes how Chinese rap has changed since 2017, with many mainstream rappers only talking about cars and money.

Jordan Schneider: He’s a Uyghur, right?

Duoduodiliao: Yes. On all of his albums, there are always one or two tracks only in the Uyghur language.

Track 10: 不负责 (Why u blame on me?) by Capper and (ﾉI A I)ﾉ♡

Duoduodiliao: Our final song is from Capper's album. The English name is “Sword and Roses.” To me, it's one of the best Chinese rap albums of 2022.

Capper is a new-generation rapper based in Xi’an. He’s participated in several TV shows like Rap of China. His album is pretty incredible — both musically and production-wise, it’s really unmatched this year because it pushes musical boundaries to new heights. He experiments with nu-metal and hyperpop, and he executes it all perfectly.

His flow is on another level. He's a very promising artist with the potential to lead Chinese hip-hop toward new horizons. The song I've chosen is called 不负责 (Why u blame on me?). It’s super catchy.

Reflections on the Chinese Rap Ecosystem

Jordan Schneider: Can we discuss politics and hip-hop over the past few years? How have the boundaries changed, and how have rappers navigated these limits since 2021?

Duoduodiliao: The pandemic period in China revealed the extent to which rappers could address political topics before facing consequences. During this time, several rappers openly discussed the zero-COVID policy and Shanghai lockdowns. Because these were sensitive subjects, hearing critical voices was rare. Many WeChat groups faced bans.

Dr. Li Wenliang, who criticized the pandemic management approach, later died. Seeing rappers speak openly about these issues was refreshing — it suggested Chinese rap maintained connections to conscious rap traditions of addressing societal problems and government policies.

However, this trajectory didn’t last. One rapper, Sean ZH, based in Beijing but educated abroad, was banned from Weibo for a month after discussing the lockdown situation. This government response likely discouraged others from addressing political topics.

The boundaries remain unclear. Rappers can still discuss certain societal issues like work culture, but touching more sensitive subjects results in complete bans — their songs become impossible to post on any platform or social media.

Jordan Schneider: In 2018 and 2019, many rappers began traveling internationally and collaborating with foreign producers. How did travel restrictions impact Chinese music production? Has the situation changed since China reopened?

Duoduodiliao: The market changed significantly. Previously, many Chinese rappers toured North America, performing in Canada and the U.S., leading to numerous international collaborations. The lockdown completely halted this progress, preventing rappers from maintaining their international audience.

Now that travel has resumed, rappers are gradually rebuilding these connections. Many Chinese rappers attended the Rolling Loud festival in Thailand. However, progress remains slower than pre-lockdown levels.

Chinese rappers still face challenges in developing international audiences. The different social media platforms and apps used in China versus overseas create additional barriers.

Jordan Schneider: Any final thoughts on hip-hop’s evolution in China?

Duoduodiliao: Understanding Chinese rap requires recognizing the significance of rap TV shows like “Rap of China.” These shows traditionally offered underground rappers opportunities for mainstream success.

A rapper’s stance toward these shows defines their position in the scene. Some maintain “authenticity” by refusing to participate, viewing the shows as compromising artistic integrity. Others embrace these platforms for exposure.

The meaning of “keeping it real” differs between Chinese and U.S. rap contexts. Due to censorship and local conditions, Chinese hip-hop authenticity often centers on artists’ positions regarding these TV shows rather than traditional markers of credibility.

And one more for the road from Jordan: