女性主义是热火朝天的言论竞技场。没有异端审判，也没有除名。

——上野千鹤子

亲爱的媎妹：

见字如面！

「Dear Q&A 你问我答」虽迟但到！这一次我们精选了哪些问题呢？本期问答包括：那些批判麦琳和叶珂的人，到底在批判什么？谩骂“爱男”的女性是厌女吗？如何识别和抵抗语言里的辱女现象？

1. 化妆是艺术创作吗？

Q

紫色：陌生女人们最近有看《再见爱人4》吗？其中麦琳和李行亮的相处模式引发了许多讨论。麦琳因一些言行被认为‘作’，成了全网抨击的对象。与此同时，另一位女性叶珂也因其矫揉造作的风格成为群嘲焦点。作为女权主义者，我一方面觉得不应该参与对女性的围剿，另一方面也对麦琳、叶珂的某些行为感到不适。内心的矛盾让我有些困惑，你们如何看待她们以及这类现象呢？

A

陌生女人4号：我觉得大家对麦琳和叶珂的不满其实源于她们不符合当今社会对女性的期待。这既包括那些传统的要求（例如无私、善良、真诚），也包括很多新式的想象。在“独立大女主”成为热词的当下，女性在拥有传统美德的同时还要清醒独立、不讨好男性、情绪稳定、有自己的事业和爱好等。这些标准不仅构成了大众对女性行为的评价框架，也常常被我们内化为苛责自己的理由。

因此，辱骂麦琳和叶珂的人不只是在批判两个女性个体，而是在针对全体女性猎巫。女性的多样性本应被接纳，但父权社会总是用严苛的道德标准审判女性。这一点我们曾在《赞美or歧视：女人不会是杀人犯？》中做过深入讨论。“女人不可能是杀人犯”的说法将女性束缚在道德高地之上，这不仅是伪善的赞美，更是隐形的歧视——女性必须温柔善良、宽容大度、先人后己，只要偏离期待一厘一毫就会受到全方位的指责。麦琳和叶珂的遭遇就是这种机制最典型的体现：她们不是传统“好女人”，也不是新式“大女人”，因而活该受到群体性攻击。甚至不少女性也参与其中，认为她们行为可耻、面目可憎。然而，她们真的值得被这样辱骂吗？

就麦琳而言，她的形象是由节目剪辑塑造的，真人秀固然有真实的成分，但节目组为了讨论度和流量会刻意将嘉宾的情绪放大、聚焦于矛盾冲突。这导致我们永远无法得知事情的全貌，因此再“客观”的分析也只能是片面的。而在这种片面的呈现中，大家眼中麦琳的行为（例如用愧疚感绑架她人、渴求男性关注并无意识雌竞）触及了很多人的创伤，激起了观众的愤怒。尤其是许多人都经历过类似的操控和忽视，这种创伤共鸣进一步推动了大众对她的指责。

有人认为“麦琳只是令人讨厌的人，不能代表女性，所以这不是性别议题”。但实际情况是，麦琳的行为明明不涉及犯罪，甚至都谈不上违反公序良俗，却被无限放大以至成为全网讨论的焦点。与此同时，节目中的男嘉宾刘爽甚至涉及欺诈等法律问题，却远没有受到同样的关注或谴责。这种双标体现了社会对女性的偏见。

更引人深思的是，许多人批评麦琳以发泄对自己生活中其她女性的怨气（如婆婆、妈妈、前女友、闺蜜等），却鲜有人将男领导、父亲和节目中的男性挂钩。这再一次印证了社会对“麦琳”的审判其实是对女性的道德审判。随着麦琳成为“坏女人”的典型代表，会有更多女性被审判和孤立。与此同时，她们的困境却会被忽视，得不到应有的理解与支持。

如果说大众对麦琳的态度是憎恶，那么对叶珂就是轻蔑和嘲讽，大众因为她虚假的履历和直播时的表现给她贴上了“媚男”、”矫揉造作”、“拜金虚荣”的标签，嘲笑她为了「上位」不择手段却不够聪明以至于像个「小丑」。然而，叶珂的行为其实是在父权制下形成的。她所做的一切不只是个人的错误选择，更是所有人都无法摆脱的社会机制。在父权框架下，女性被诱导依赖男性以获取财富，从而迷失在种种陷阱中。叶珂注定要吞下自己酿成的苦果，但她的行为其实是结构性不平等的产物，把责任完全归咎于个体显然无法解决问题。

另外，有人认为叶珂给年轻女孩树立了媚男和拜金的坏榜样。这种说法看似是为女人好，却忽视了女孩在成长过程中应该接触各种各样的范本，而不是局限于“独立大女主”的理想形象。现实中，女性的形象是丰富多元的——她们可以强壮、独立、热爱生活，也可以软弱、虚荣、胸无大志。更重要的是，她们的生活经验和价值观可以也应该复杂多变。就像我们在第十八封来信中写的那样——女人是人。女人可以是坏人、俗人、小人、圣人、怪人、烂好人，也可以是个好吃懒做的人。女人可以是个蠢人、是爱耍小聪明的人、也可能是个为达目的不择手段的人。女人可以是热心的人、疯狂的人、谄媚的人、刻薄的人、爱贪小便宜的人、说不定还是个铁石心肠的人。只有接触不同的角色，女孩才能全面了解这个世界，发展批判性思维和判断力。而我们也应该相信每一代女人的潜能，尊重她们的成长轨迹，信任女性能在多样性中形成自己赖以生存的价值观和世界观。

我理解很多女权主义者对女性的批评并非恶意，但这种“高要求”其实可能正中男权下怀。所以，我们何不停止对女人的审判，从自己做起，不再内化社会对女性狭隘的评判标准，不再给任何女性带高帽，也不再将猎巫的火把指向我们的同胞。如果还是对她们的行为感到不满，不妨停下来思考，女性的困境是一两个女人造成的吗？如果她是个男人，批评还会如此普遍吗？「卑鄙是卑鄙者的通行证」，当今社会对男人的要求已经低到了令人发指的地步，那么我们为什么还要助纣为虐、让“高尚”、“完美”成为压死女人的墓碑？

2. 谩骂“爱男”的女性是厌女吗？

Q

佚名：互联网的存在居然让我觉得大环境的厌女越来越严重了。几天前刷到一条抖音，内容大概是：35岁的妈妈已经生育了两个5～7岁的孩子，但因为没工作且和娘家关系不好所以丈夫不怎么善待她，流产四次后丈夫仍然不戴套，并且她做完流产手术想的第一件事居然是回家做饭。评论区大片的指责让我有点崩溃，这可能有点圣母而且违背专注自我的女权思想？

可是评论区的谩骂让我感觉大环境越来越厌女，一位35岁的底层女性没有工作能力、无法脱离丈夫的管控离婚独自带着年幼的孩子生活，为什么不想想她有什么办法，而是站在制高点上指责她，立刻把她开除女籍并扣上“爱男，她超爱”的帽子、嘲笑和批评她活该。我看了她全部视频，她表现的一直是无奈和绝望，从未有过任何对老公的幻想和对爱情的希望。难道对不完美的底层中年女性就可以肆无忌惮地嘲笑她的处境吗？

A

陌生女人1号：你描述的现象我也注意到了。我觉得和“嘲笑爱男的女性是不是厌女”相比，这种现象背后的社会心理更值得探讨。细想一下，「批判不够女权的女性」这一行为似乎是当下女权发展状况和社会条件的必然。

重重阻碍之下，结构性的改变几乎无望，因此很多人只能寄希望于女性个体的改变，期望女人都能奋起反抗、像娜拉一样走出困住自己的牢笼。而为了让女性坚持反抗，大家就要去赞赏足够女权的“英雌”、打击不够女权的“叛徒”。这种做法主要目的在于树立正反两种典型，用舆论压力迫使个体改变。但是它最大的问题也正在于过度关注个体选择、完全忽视结构压迫。女性“爱男”可能是不得已/不自知的选择，疯狂谩骂只会让她们在受到实际压迫的同时再遭受一层语言暴力。更何况，即使大家通过攻击和谩骂「逼迫」娜拉走出了玩偶之家，事情就能解决了吗？玩偶之家依然在那里，依然会有女性不断陷入而成为傀儡。而原先的娜拉出走之后又会怎样呢？如果没有公平的社会条件，离家的娜拉也不过只有两条路罢了——不是堕落，就是回来。

而如果从批判者的角度看，这一现象也很让人悲哀。我一直觉得“尊重祝福”这类评论其实是帮自己「和受害者情感隔离」的武器。只要把责任归咎于个体，我们就可以心安理得地停止共情、放弃提供任何帮助，也不需要再去思考当事人为何会做出那样的选择、我们又要怎样帮她们脱离困境。毕竟“谁让她爱男了？路是她自己选的，以后发生什么都是活该，和我没有关系”。所以，只要留下一句轻飘飘的“她超爱”、“尊重祝福”，我们就可以轻轻划过，不用再对受害者付出任何感情了。从这个角度看，这种态度其实是很多已觉醒的女性在对现实无望的情况下一种自我保护的手段。诚实地说，我有时也会用类似的话吐槽，但还是会提醒自己这种态度是不对的。虽然偶尔的冷漠能帮人自保，但真正的女权主义者绝不应该用一句“尊重祝福”就轻易地卸掉自己身上的责任。

3. 如何识别和抵抗语言里的辱女现象？

Q

清清：姊妹们好！今天因为一件事我意识到了男权对语言的侵蚀，所以想问应该如何替换日常带有职业刻板印象和辱女嫌疑的词汇，事情是这样的：我在从事摄影有关的工作，部门里找出来有点类似老式采访的很重的机子，我脱口而出：“这个机子好酷，我也想像摄影大哥一样扛着试试！”但事后细想好奇怪，我明明是女性摄影半从业者，但还是因为行业刻板印象话语下意识说出“大哥”，就此觉得有点羞愧。

然后回到辱女词汇，在夸别人的时候我下意识就脱口而出“牛逼”，事后想想有点怪，网上搜索了同义词也没有特别满意的，目前决定先用“好牛”替换，然后关于替换词我看到有姊妹将“白剽”替换“白嫖”感觉非常贴切。我觉得纠正用词可能还得一步步来，还得常思考常改变。至少我现在意识到了自己的问题，今年我已经很成功地替换了“他妈的”，还需继续努力！

A

陌生女人1号：姐妹你好，你非常有洞察力！我们的语言和文字受到了父权的污染是一个不争的事实，很开心看到越来越多的人在有意识地改变。经济基础决定上层建筑，性别不平等的现实催生了厌女的语言，而这种语言又会再一次加深人们的偏见、加固社会现实。这也是为什么我们行文时也在尽可能剔除男本位的语言，例如用“母父”代替“父母”，用“其她”代替“其他”。而且，这种替换不是为了制造僵硬的教条，而是希望大家在看到“反常”的词语之后感到疑惑并反思：那些我们早就习以为常的东西，就是正确的吗？比如看到母父后人们可能会想：对啊，为什么我们说话时要把“父”放在前面？是不是因为婚姻是父权的产物？是不是因为男权社会更重视父系血缘？更进一步，父权社会是不是建立在对女性生育劳动的剥削之上？从一个小小的词语出发，大家很容易就能联想到更根本的制度问题，进而推动物质层面的变化。

不过这也提醒我们语言是社会现实的反映，它更多是不平等的结果而非原因。如果社会现实“重女轻男”，那人们说话的方式自然也会随之改变。所以，虽然换掉厌女的语言能够推动改变，我们还是应该始终着眼于造成性别歧视的根本原因，不要本末倒置、陷进抠字眼里。毕竟，改变一个词语的说法还算简单，但要彻底革除剥削女性的社会经济制度就是难上加难了。

所以回到你的问题，我觉得在培养了女性意识之后，我们很容易就能发现语言里的不合理，自然就会进行替换，倒是没有很大必要刻意去搜集男权词语。对语言的讨论和整理当然是有价值的，我只是觉得和「发展自我、切实改善姐妹们的生活」相比，它不是当下最重要的事。

陌生女人4号：这个问题让我想到前段时间在读书会接触到的《语言恶女》。在书中阿曼达·蒙特尔探讨了语言如何反映并塑造了性别偏见，同时也鼓励女性赋予侮辱性词汇（如slut和bitch）新的积极的含义，从而挑战社会对女性的污名化，例如“bad bitch（坏婊子)”在英语中已经开始指代有反叛精神的女性。中文世界对“女拳”的重新定义也是如此。

受这本书启发，我们在读书会上玩了一个小游戏。在场的八位姐妹围坐在一起，每个人要先给自己起一个“污名”代号（如绿茶婊、名媛、男人婆、灭绝师太），然后在接下来的一段时间里只能用新名字称呼彼此，通过体验这些“新身份”，我们一起思考了这些词语到底是怎样变成了针对女人的贬义词，女权主义者又该如何给这些被污名化的称呼赋予新的意义。游戏结束后我们拥抱赞美彼此，也与这些「恶女」名称建立了更紧密的联系。无论是「好」是「恶」，都是女人，都是「我们」。

以上就是第四期「你问我答」特辑的全部内容了，想提问/分享感悟的姐妹可以在后台私信或发送邮件，我们会定期在「Dear Q&A」系列来信中回复。期待下一次和大家见面！

陌生女人帮

二〇二四年十二月二十三日

I spent ten days in Norway this summer. What follows are reflections from my time there on Oslo, the Vikings, and WWII.

Oslo Vibes

“This place isn’t perfect Jordan,” a civil servant told me, “please tell me you won’t make that your angle.” I then asked him what the worst neighborhood in Oslo is, walked there, and felt it was nicer than half of Manhattan.

The first few days of 19 hours of sunlight in 72-degree weather were an unparalleled endorphin rush, but by day six I felt a little strung out.

Servicepeople regardless of your race start conversations in Norwegian so as to not make immigrants feel unwelcome.

I played some pickup sand volleyball in one of the thousand Oslo parks with a Kurdish culture affinity club. No-one on my team could tell me how to say “nice serve” in Kurdish but when some Kendrick came on their speakers, they all sang along to “certified Loverboy, certified pedophile.”

Chinese EV showrooms dotted Oslo, with Nio taking plum position on the main street right outside parliament. The salesman there said vibes are mostly good, though every few weeks someone walks in just to say “we don’t like Chinese cars here.” The XPENG 小鹏 saleswoman unprompted told me, “we are Chinese but a private company not owned by the government like BYD. Also, Volkswagen owns 5 percent and Norwegian oil fund owns some of us too.”

Norway up until the 70s was one of the biggest Israel supporters. Their two Labor parties both ran their countries for decades, and living on a kibbutz was a thing Norwegian lefties did. But Norwegian soldiers saw some shit as peacekeepers in Lebanon in the 80s, everyone got really invested in the Oslo Peace Process and felt burned by the Israelis in the subsequent decades. “We were a colonized country too, you know. First the Danes then the Swedes…”

Thanks presumably to oil wealth guilt, Norway might be the country most into ESG. The government in early June officially recognized Palestine but Parliament decisively voted down a push to make the Oil Fund divest from all companies with ties to Israel. They did recently sell $70m of Caterpillar stock…? The ratio of pride to Palestinian flags was maybe 5:1.

Haaretz recently ran a feature on rising antisemitism in Norway which convinced me I didn’t want to move there. For an illustrative excerpt on what happened when a group of Jews tried to join an International Women’s Day protest to raise awareness of Hamas. They got approval to join, and on parade day this happened:

The hostile reaction manifested almost immediately. Initially, the group was refused entry to the event and had to prove that they had the organizers' authorization to participate. "One of the organizers went on shouting and cursing, and then took one of our signs and threw it on the ground," Nilsen recalls. "After the police made sure he couldn't get close to us, more and more organizers told us that our message conflicted with the messages of the event.

"They looked at us with hatred and disgust and started to shout that we were Zionists and fascists. Then the crowd joined in with slogans and rhythmic chanting that we were already used to, like 'Murderers,' 'No to Zionists in our streets' and 'From the river to the sea, Palestine shall be free.'"

They avoided getting into a direct confrontation, Nilsen relates, "and we instructed our group not to scatter and not to respond. But when the atmosphere heated up, some of the other demonstrators – Norwegian men and women of my age – approached the members of the group very closely and whispered into their ear things like 'child murderer' and skadedyr' ['parasites' in Norwegian].

"I've had anti-Israeli calls shouted at me in the past," Nilsen continues. "But this time it was very different. The hatred came from people I thought we shared basic values with. The feeling was that we were being canceled as human beings. We weren't women and men – we were the embodiment of evil."

Parks midday on a Monday were packed. There’s an abundance of minigolf. Workdays in winter start very early so people can get some sunlight outside the office in the afternoon.

Norwegian youth wear the most boring clothes I’ve ever seen in a city. The one signature that stood out were these rainbow-tinted athletic glasses. A few years ago, a comedian made a hit song about the top brand which features a yodel.

Norway had the highest ratio of American to local music I’ve ever seen in a Spotify Top 50. The vast majority of what modern Norwegian hip hop, pop, and indie I came across was flat.

At first I thought there was some adverse selection going on where the best artists try to make it in English, but an arts and culture newspaper editor told me that actually that the cool thing nowadays is to sing in the local language. The Swedes have figured this out…what gives, Norway?

The closest to okay top Norwegian act I came across was Karpe, a rap duo of a Hindu and Muslim second generation immigrants. Electronic music was much stronger. I quite liked this mix and was told they do jazz well too.

Vikings

After flipping through a handful of intro to Vikings books, Children of Ash and Elm stood out for its writing and breadth. It an excellent portrait of the Vikings which brought the terror as well as the humanity to the culture. For instance, I quite liked this discursion into Viking bread.

Some more good writing:

And this:

This list of sea-king names was amazing:

The sagas were also surprisingly accessible and make for great audio books. The Poetic Edda would be my bet for an entry point.

But let’s not forget, the Vikings were actually horrible. This account of a king’s burial by a travelling Arab diplomat in the 900s is one of the most terrifying primary sources I’ve ever come across.

Sexual violence trigger warning.

Modern Norwegian History

Aside from non-fiction on Vikings and Hitler in Norway, the only book-length title I came across telling the history of modern Norway was The Norwegian Exception: Norway’s Liberal Democracy since 1814. I found its thesis hysterical: it’s been incredibly lucky. Its neighbors Sweden, Denmark, and Russia never invaded. The touchiest moment came in 1905 with Sweden…I’m sorry but I can’t help at laughing at the nationalist chest-puffing in Scandanavia.

But ultimately, good call by Norway conceding on the great reindeer dispute of 1905.

Other lucky turns: Norway’s time under Nazi Germany was the easiest ride of any country that got conquered in WWII (good book the occupation here). The country should get some credit for not having a civil war, fumbling the bag when it comes to exploiting the boom in global trade in the late 19th century, successfully leveraging water power to industrialize in the early 20th, and of course making the most out of its oil riches.

Final fun fact: Norway of course had an influential Maoist party! A paper if you’re curious.

Maoist skiing, who’d have thought!

But by the 70s, they somehow they became the party of no fun.

WWII

Aside from Vikings, you also have a number of incredibly detailed but not particularly engaging books on Hitler’s invasion. Here’s the case for caring:

The most interesting bits I found were on the strategic level, where before Germany made its move the UK was also dancing around a pre-emptive invasion primarily to secure iron ore. At one point, France pitched the UK to come into the Winter War on the side of the Finns, doing the enormously idiotic move of putting them directly in conflict with the USSR.

Can’t pass on another opportunity to clown on Chamberlain.

Photos

Oslo is big on public art and every other statue was naked. City Hall had some particularly suggestive murals.

I loved this 1919 woodcut.

Soy sauce is marketed at something for pasta sauce. I tried it and appreciated the umami boost—though I think fish sauce works better.

美国南方老乡的善良在城市中不容易感受到。他们以纯朴的方式表达友善。Theroux来南方旅行写成书，最深印象之一是当地人总是拿出吃的给陌生人，怕他们饿着。有一年圣诞节，我开车去海边，陷进沙滩，一位老人开皮卡，把我的车拖出来，给他钱答谢，他不收。告别时，他说“圣诞快乐”，停顿一下，又说“节日快乐”。

老人讲了一辈子“圣诞快乐”，肯定习惯了，但一说出口，也许觉得我可能不过圣诞节，马上又说“节日快乐”。这种随处可感的善意和体贴令人异乡人感动，也感慨——想及一些中国来的基督教友对说“节日快乐”捶胸顿足，这可能就是文明程度差距吧。文明程度和学历高低实在不同，跟信什么教更没有关系。

年轻一些的时候，甚至人到中年，经常忽视生活中这些善意，甚至用恶意去看世界，以为是犀利或深刻。年龄会改变人。像得克萨斯演员Tom Lee Jones演绎的得克萨斯故事中说的一样：“Age will flatten a man”（No Country for Old Men）。大意是说，“年纪会磨去人的棱角”，尤其是恶意的棱角吧。觉得年纪大了些，变化之一就是，知道学习体会周围人和陌生人表现的善意和体贴，开始珍惜这些善意和体贴。以前不在意的一些事，现在觉得宝贵了。

曾经有位下属，UT Austin毕业，刚工作不久，家里没有钱，开一辆破旧的Camry。几年前，国内来了几位实习生，租住的地方离她住的公寓不远。周末，我请她把他们捎到我家来玩。

那天，她开着一辆半新的Lexus E350把他们拉过来。我说，你换车了，很漂亮啊。她说，没有，那是她妈妈的车，她觉得客人坐这车会舒适一点。她父母住在城市的另一端，一个说西班牙语的区，也不是有钱人家。这种普通人身上表现的善意和体贴是超越语言、文化的，让人感受到人间情意的珍贵。

更年轻一些的时候，不在意这些，错过了很多人生中宝贵的人和事。Age flattens a man。曾经有过的大大小小棱角，大部分都磨平了，反倒开始珍视年轻时错过的那些。从云端落到地上，更加珍惜人间温情。

Commerce released its much-anticipated chip export-control updates earlier this month. To discuss, I was joined by Dylan Patel of SemiAnalysis and Greg Allen from CSIS. We were not impressed.

Below is part two of our discussion. We get into:

• Dylan’s and Greg’s pitches to incoming Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick.

• Why America’s “scalpel approach” to chip controls backfired and what a “shotgun approach” could look like.

• How China’s focus on trailing-edge chips and power semiconductors creates vulnerabilities that current controls don’t address.

• How Trump’s team could use novel tariff strategies to turn China’s massive chip buildout into “ghost fabs”.

Click this link to listen to the show on your favorite podcast app.

And a job post! ChinaTalk is hiring for a dedicated China AI lab analyst. Chinese fluency and a technical background are required. Apply here!

Okay, Trump — Your Turn

Jordan Schneider: We have new regulations with significant gaps [discussed in depth in part 1 of our conversation], and a new president arriving in four weeks. What should Trump and his team do on chips? And what do you think they will do?

Greg Allen: Marco Rubio, our presumptive Secretary of State, has consistently criticized the Biden administration’s export-control packages as too lenient, citing numerous loopholes and oversights. While the Commerce Department leads on dual-use technology export controls, the State Department participates in the interagency decision process.

Rubio’s passion for addressing Chinese technology threats could make him an influential voice in this arena. Similarly, the incoming national security advisor, Mike Waltz, prioritizes Chinese technology competition. The Biden administration established this new approach to the Foreign Direct Product Rule — a tool now available to the US government. The Trump administration might wield this tool quite differently.

Jordan Schneider: Let’s revisit our strategic premises, particularly regarding allies and partners. Trump’s negotiation style with allies differs markedly. The irony would be if Trump confronts allies over minor issues like Mexican auto imports or Canadian timber while overlooking semiconductor manufacturing equipment — the EU’s primary export to China and Japan’s second-largest.

If Trump takes an aggressive, unilateral approach, allies might accept semiconductor restrictions while focusing on larger concerns like NATO’s stability or US troops in Okinawa. The impact on industry follows similar logic — these restrictions won’t collapse American, Dutch, or Japanese economies.

The crucial question becomes, “Do we abandon end-use controls for a nationwide approach?”

Should we implement straightforward restrictions on sub-300mm semiconductor equipment exports to China, eliminate servicing allowances, and replace 200-page rulebooks with five-page directives?

Greg Allen: The Trump administration initiated our modern semiconductor export control approach — from chip-level restrictions with ZTE to the Foreign Direct Product Rule affecting Huawei and TSMC, and equipment export controls involving Dutch EUV machine licensing. The question is whether they’ll follow this strategy to its logical conclusion.

No apology to China would dissuade their pursuit of domestic self-sufficiency and indigenization. They’re fully committed to this strategy regardless of any potential trade deals with Trump. The distinction lies between appearing tough and implementing effective policies.

Regarding countrywide export controls: they’ve proven unambiguously most effective among our policy iterations. The current 200-plus pages of regulations create enormous complexity for future negotiations. Simplicity benefits both companies and allies in understanding these policies. While I appreciate the nuanced logic behind these complex distinctions, countrywide controls offer valuable simplicity.

Dylan Patel: The real question is exactly what Greg said: “How tough will they be on China?” While they initiated these measures, they ultimately relented with ZTE. They didn’t follow through completely, allowing ZTE to survive and continue growing. The core question remains.

Banning 300-millimeter equipment seems like an extreme measure. Perhaps they’re just accelerating the tightening of restrictions. Most people presume they’ll take a tougher stance — they’ll certainly appear tougher, but the extent remains uncertain. If they were to ban all 300-millimeter equipment, it would completely halt the Chinese equipment industry, though such a drastic step seems unlikely.

Jordan Schneider: Different question. If you had half an hour with Howard Lutnick to pitch the right export control policy, what would your key points be?

Dylan Patel: First, don’t listen to tool company lobbyists — they’re motivated to maintain loopholes that allow them to continue selling for another year, worth over $5 billion to them.

Regarding tools being multipurpose: should we maintain the 14-nanometer logic threshold? Even above that, China has achieved significant indigenization in their military equipment, which the US lacks. Is that the right boundary? Moving it to 28 nanometers would eliminate many dual-purpose equipment issues. At 14 nanometers, some 20-nanometer equipment might work for 7-nanometer applications.

We must consider China’s breakthrough innovation capabilities. They’re developing interesting technologies beyond EUV. We could restrict these areas — for example, Zeiss lenses to China face minimal restrictions. Looking up the supply chain is crucial because even if China achieves breakthrough innovation in tools, they’d need to replicate entire companies like Zeiss and others across the industry.

Understanding the primary goal is essential. If it’s slowing China’s AI chip development to limit their economic and military projection power over the next decade, there’s much more to address beyond AI chips, though they remain the primary focus. The strategy should be tactful — ban subcomponents first, then tools at a lesser level, followed by chips at an even lesser level. This framework still needs refinement.

South Korea presents a crucial consideration, particularly regarding Samsung and SK hynix’s large Chinese facilities. We need their alliance while preventing IP transfer from their Chinese operations. Perhaps CHIPS Act 2.0 could provide significant support to Samsung and SK hynix in the US.

The diplomatic approach with South Korea requires more finesse than with the Netherlands. Dutch companies only make tools and rely heavily on US supply chains — while Korean manufacturers like CMS rank seventh globally in tool production. Their fabs lead in certain areas with significant Chinese capacity. We can’t simply impose blanket bans without considering the implications for Samsung.

Closing loopholes seems straightforward, but the strategic objectives and precise targets require careful consideration.

The current strategy resembles a jigsaw puzzle. Give a hundred-piece puzzle to an eight-year-old, and they’ll complete it. Remove one piece — they’ll still figure it out. Take away ten pieces — it becomes much harder. Remove fifty pieces — they can’t finish it. Remove all the edges — they’re completely stuck.

Right now, the strategy involves removing just a few puzzle pieces.

Greg Allen: And they’re doing it one at a time, giving China time to stockpile.

Jordan Schneider: Not to mention announcing it in Reuters six months before removing the puzzle piece — saying nothing of listening to Gina Raimondo’s phone calls. It’s all publicly available outside of paywalls.

Dylan Patel: This strategy is clearly failing. They remove a few puzzle pieces, but China responds by stockpiling equipment, accumulating HBM, buying subsystems, and dedicating significant engineering resources to solve each banned component.

Take high-aspect ratio etchers for 3D NAND: because the ban was telegraphed, they purchased substantial Lam Research equipment beforehand, including years of spare parts. They positioned new tools beside foreign equipment, analyzed the data from both, and now YMTC is close to developing domestic high aspect ratio etchers. The quality might not match Lam Research, but it’s progress. This happened because the 2022 restrictions for 3D NAND only removed one puzzle piece.

The key insight is that you need a shotgun approach, not a scalpel. If you precisely target one linchpin technology, they’ll solve it with their substantial engineering talent, capital, and industrial base. A shotgun approach increases both cost and time requirements — if you force them to simultaneously solve ten different technologies, splitting their engineering resources, they’ll advance more slowly and fall further behind in AI development.

Jordan Schneider: The irony here is fascinating:

• If you sell them the complete puzzle, they won’t learn to manufacture pieces — there’s no incentive.

• With a shotgun approach, they might decide it’s too challenging and redirect resources to other sectors like EV batteries.

• However, America’s current approach of leaving enough scaffolding actually creates the perfect industrial-policy scenario. Companies typically avoid researching existing technologies when ROI is low, but the Swiss-cheese nature of restrictions over the past two years keeps them in the game, pushing indigenization further than if the US had either implemented dramatic FDPR in 2022 or continued selling everything.

Greg Allen: Say you and your spouse are choosing where to build your house: you’ve selected the neighborhood, but are still debating which side of the street. The dumbest thing you could do is compromise and build your house in the middle of the street. You can make logically consistent arguments for selling almost everything or almost nothing to China. The illogical approach is telegraphing your intention to restrict China while leaving numerous loopholes that undermine the strategy’s effectiveness.

These policies emerge from political compromises, which can be problematic. However, the “sell everything” scenario wouldn’t have ended well either. We sold everything regarding solar manufacturing equipment, and China now dominates that industry. The same happened with electric vehicles. Chinese policy documents and industry patterns don’t support the hypothesis that unrestricted semiconductor sales would have yielded positive outcomes. At this point, we’re committed to the export control strategy — we need to implement it effectively.

Jordan Schneider: Let’s create an alternate history. Up until October 2022, we sold everything to China. Huawei controlled one-third of global market share while Apple struggled in China. Meanwhile, SMIC was approaching competition levels with Intel, TSMC, and Samsung...

Dylan Patel: In this alternate history, Huawei had unlimited purchasing power until the Trump administration implemented restrictions. Huawei became TSMC’s largest customer and dominated Apple in the Chinese phone market. They emerged as the world’s largest phone manufacturer — not quite as profitable as Apple, but they were getting there. They dominated global telecom equipment markets, only facing resistance in regions where we explicitly banned their equipment due to security concerns, despite their technical superiority.

When companies have unrestricted purchasing power, they overtake industries. Take SMIC, for instance. With unlimited access to resources, they achieved 7-nanometer technology independently. Even though they could access TSMC’s 7-nanometer technology since 2018, SMIC still developed their own capabilities and found a market for it.

Their capacity today would be significantly larger without restrictions. Consider NAURA before the October 7, 2022, restrictions. Why did they maintain hundreds of millions in revenue when Applied Materials and Lam Research could sell freely to China? Because China’s industrial policy focuses on replication and building domestic supply chains. In an unrestricted scenario, it’s like giving them the complete puzzle, which they then recreate independently. Now, we’re only withholding one piece, yet they’re still determined to complete the puzzle themselves.

‘We Must Decide’

Jordan Schneider: Final thoughts — what’s the “America First” argument for investing in domestic semiconductor industry while restricting China’s semiconductor development?

Dylan Patel: Making American chips great again requires more than just the current CHIPS Act. $50 billion barely scratches the surface — Intel alone spends $20 billion annually on R&D, plus additional capital expenditure. The current allocation represents less than one year of spending, with Intel receiving under $10 billion spread across multiple years.

The renewable energy subsidies in the Inflation Reduction Act represents about the same cost as securing even 5% domestic market share in chips. The semiconductor industry, where we currently hold significant market share, requires proportionally less investment. Industrial policy must be implemented before we lose our competitive edge.

To maintain at least 20% market share in memory, advanced logic, and other sectors, we need to act now. The cost increases dramatically if we wait five years. Tariffs alone won’t relocate chip manufacturing since the focus should be on end systems and servers. Manufacturing servers should happen in places like Vietnam and Mexico.

We need industrial policy that encourages significant capacity development. Should TSMC allocate 15-20% of their leading-edge capacity here, or should we aim for 30-40%? This goal is achievable with modest additional investment relative to government spending. Companies like Samsung, SK hynix, STMicroelectronics, and Infineon should be manufacturing in the US.

The CHIPS Act focuses primarily on leading-edge technology. We need expanded funding for both leading-edge and trailing-edge technologies to counter China’s dominance in the latter. Between 2022 and 2025, China’s IGBT [insulated-gate bipolar transistor] capacity growth exceeds the world’s existing capacity. While their yields may initially be lower, they’re positioning to control 50% of global capacity in power semiconductors. This creates significant supply chain security concerns that require strategic industrial policy rather than blanket restrictions.

Greg Allen: My question regarding everything you said is that Donald Trump considers himself “tariff man” and loves tariffs. The current tariffs on Chinese semiconductors apply only at the chip level when shipped as standalone items. While it would be complex to apply tariffs to the component value of chips in finished goods, it’s not impossible.

I’ve been wondering if the Trump administration might say that they don’t want what Trump has called “corporate welfare” through the CHIPS Act. Instead of industrial policy through subsidies, they may prefer industrial policy through tariffs. The current tariffs on Chinese semiconductors aren’t effective, but a different approach to tariffs might work. Though I’m not certain this is what they’ll pursue, it seems consistent with their messaging.

Dylan Patel: The question is, “Are you going to tariff electronic systems manufactured in China? Are you going to tariff 90% of iPhones?”

Greg Allen: We’re entirely speculating here, but I think they would say if an iPhone contains Chinese chips, the tariff applies based on the value of those Chinese chips. We’re always tariffing chips, whether they arrive in a box labeled “chips” or in telecommunications equipment.

Dylan Patel: Presumably it would be tiered — Chinese chips at a 500% tariff and Taiwan chips at a 10% tariff.

Greg Allen: Exactly. All this Chinese legacy buildout we’ve discussed — some of which might be advanced node production disguised as legacy node — could become the industrial equivalent of those ghost apartment buildings in China. If there’s no end market for these Chinese semiconductors, their industrial policy would be a disaster. They would have built a bridge of subsidies to nowhere. While I haven’t heard from Howard Lutnick or others in the Trump administration that this is their planned policy, I could see this approach being attractive.

Dylan Patel: But if you want to prevent China from gaining global market share in trailing chips outside of China, the primary task is moving electronic manufacturing out of China. The US market share for most products — excluding high-end AI servers — is only about 30% to 40%. For AI servers, it’s around 70%. We can dictate policy on AI servers, assuming we resolve the data center shortage, which requires significant regulatory changes.

Greg Allen: You’d have to persuade Europe and Japan to participate.

Dylan Patel: Exactly. Otherwise, why wouldn’t Xiaomi phones — which hold 20% global market share — and other Chinese phone makers like OPPO simply use Chinese RF chips, power management ICs, and antennas? They clearly will, unless we can move both manufacturing and vendors out of China.

Consumer goods, especially phones, are dominated by China. For laptops, you’d need to convince Dell and HP — through their ODMs [original design manufactures] like Compal — to completely relocate to southeast Asia, India, or elsewhere. A tariff on chip value made in China doesn’t solve this issue.

Since we’re speculating about the Trump administration’s approach, why not be more heavy-handed? We could tariff everything shipped from China, with lesser tariffs on Taiwan and southeast Asia. This would make moving out of China a massive cost saver — perhaps not enough to justify Mexico, but definitely southeast Asia.

Greg Allen: We’re at a point in the story where the Biden administration has assessed the policy toolbox created by the first Trump administration. Now we’ll see how a second Trump administration utilizes the toolbox Biden’s team has created. While some people in DC — certainly not me — may be tired of the semiconductor and AI great power competition narrative, I don’t think it’s going anywhere. This will remain a significant part of geopolitical competition and a key focus for the Trump administration.

Jordan Schneider: I got one more riff.

The intellectual- and execution-level challenges the Biden administration encountered with export controls exemplify broader Democratic Party challenges. There’s a tendency to believe they can devise the perfect algorithm that balances all competing interests. They think with solving enough integrals, extensive legal review, and track changes on docs, they’ll reach the optimal solution.

This pattern emerged with the Inflation Reduction Act’s lengthy development, the CHIPS Act’s extended negotiations, the periodic reassessment of Ukraine arms distribution, and these export controls. The problem is that, if you can’t make tough strategic decisions upfront and execute them — accepting that not everyone will be happy — you end up in limbo. You achieve worse results by trying to moderately satisfy five variables instead of maximizing the two most critical ones.

Greg Allen: Another way to put it: faster and good enough is almost always better than slower and theoretically perfect.

Jordan Schneider: As a new American dad returning from paternity leave, I’ve been exercising by birthright by reading Civil War history. There’s an excellent quote from Colonel James Rusling’s memoir about how Grant made decisions.

The irony is that October 2022 really felt like a decision point. Jake Sullivan gave a dramatic speech stating we needed to stay as far ahead of China as possible in critical strategic emerging technologies. A month later, ChatGPT emerged, clearly demonstrating AI as the critical emerging strategic technology. They were onto something, but now we’re left with this muddle.

Part 1 of our conversation:

Mood music:

本文写于中国几乎每天一条当街杀人新闻的那几天，也是在那几天过后我卸载了仅剩的常用简中公共社交媒体（微博好早之前就被炸了，微信很早之前就关闭了朋友圈的界面，抖音更是从来没用过），开始了物理学和数学的学习，也继续着之前的语言，社会学，心理学，经济学（包括投资理财的学习）。在我们元旦即将更新的播客《活在历史的垃圾时间，我们如何度过时代的乱纪元》里有我为什么要学习这些和学到了么更全面的介绍。我还准备几个月后把最近的学习成果做一期播客和大家分享。接下来是我在今年11月的某一天，因为学了物理学，产生了一个aha moment，继而在我每天写作15分钟的页面，写下的文章，希望它也能陪你度过可能得垃圾时间，为你带来一些aha瞬间！

今天我看了一个视频是物理学家费曼用浅显易懂的方式讲解我们日常生活中的物理现象，看了一会就觉得脑子澎湃运动，热起来了！

而这个反应刚好也是我看的视频核心学到的一点：物体内部原子或者分子越剧烈运动，物体就会温度越高。同样温度越高，原子或者分子这些运动也会更剧烈。

其中有一个点给我的大脑粒子带来了加速运动：就是我一直以为树的树干和枝条，主要是靠土壤中的矿物质和水分而生长起来的。

今天看了视频才知道树的大部分来源于空气而非土壤！构成树干和枝条的最主体的部分是碳，而碳源于空气中的二氧化碳。它的形成方式是这样的：空气中的二氧化碳进入树木，其中的碳原子和氧原子分离，碳原子和水构成了树干，而氧原子被踢出去进入空气成为了氧气。

而当你烧树木时，树木中的碳被释放，回到了空气中，和氧气一起构成了二氧化碳。

这也是为什么焚毁树木森林，就会加剧碳排放，让空气中的二氧化碳增多。而多种植树木，空气中的二氧化碳就会减少。我以前知道这个结论，但是我并不知道为什么，或者从生物学的“光合作用”的角度，我大概能理解，植物可以通过呼吸来吸走碳，呼出氧气，但是我当时并不知道碳被截留下来，成为了树干最主要的构成部分。

现在知道了这个，就有一种“通了！”的感觉，原子不仅在空气和树之间运动，也在我的大脑内运动，多多运动，大脑才会发热通畅，大脑中的灯才会被点亮，才会有aha moment!

讲述完这一段，费曼说他要留一个问题，就是太阳为什么如此炙热？

我就沿着这个我刚学到原子运动的思路思考了下去：太阳能如此炙热，应该也是因为它内部的分子和原子在猛烈运动。

那太阳内部粒子为什么能猛烈运动呢？是不是因为内部的温度很高，或者引力或者压力巨大，所以一直牵引着粒子来运动。倘若是这样的，那又是什么带来了太阳内部如此高的温度和强的引力压力呢？

我去问了一下chatgpt，的确是因为太阳内部高温高压，而带来的粒子的剧烈运动。而这个内部的引力或者压力，则是因为太阳的质量巨大。质量越大，内部引力就越强，就会把所有的东西往中心挤压，形成巨大的压力，像一个“超级高压锅”，粒子运动也就越强烈。而强烈运动就会带来炙热的温度和热量。

质量越大，引力越大这个原理，也让我再一次理解了“万有引力”的公式（我可能高中浅浅理解过，但不是真理解，所以给忘了）。

我们上高中应该都学过一个词，叫做太阳的“核聚变”，我一直记得这个词，但是我现在完全不记得它是啥意思了，今天我想到太阳内部的剧烈的粒子运动时，又想到这个词，想说它会不会就是在描述太阳内部的粒子运动，结果一查果然如此。

太阳因为质量巨大，内部就有极大引力和压力，在这种极端的压力下，氢原子核能够克服电磁力的排斥，被狠狠“挤”在一起，发生核聚变，释放出巨大的能量。这个能量也就是我们和地球万物感受到的温度的来源。

由此我又想到，不会核武器就是模仿太阳的核聚变吧？然后就发现还真是！氢弹的确是在一定程度上模仿了太阳的核聚变原理。

然后我就在在这里感受到了人类的聪明和恐怖：不仅是“欲与天公试比高”，还直接模仿“天公”，太阳用自己的核聚变反应来给万物提供能量和温度，人类通过模仿太阳来自相残杀，杀死万物。

继而联想到最近层出不穷的新闻，我就感觉今时今日的中国也是一个“人造太阳”。（因为以下内容直白危险，设置了paywall，也可以在游荡者平台的莫不谷主页解锁阅读）

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