然而，对于企业是否需要真心支持女权，参与者们看法不一。一些受访者发现她们的行动对企业的影响有限，所以以后也不太想再参加了。例如韩束直播里的产品有很多是清仓货，包装上甚至还印着吴亦凡的照片，这说明品牌其实主要只是想趁势大捞一笔。不过，大多数受访者认为品牌的真实意图不重要，只要能让大家知道“尊重女性消费者才能盈利”就行了。例如有受访者说，“品牌如果想骗女性的钱，就必须从头到尾包装自己。Fake it until you make it。”
在以前的节目中，我曾经给大家讲过“短语的奴隶”——slave of phrases。这是教育普及后出现的一个观察力萎缩现象。人们从书上看到一个词，一个短语，像“平庸的恶”“恶的平庸”之类，就被这个词，这个短语牵着鼻子走，成了短语的奴隶，不再观察，不再思考，不再用现实来矫正概念的偏颇。明明现实中的恶，一点都不平庸，但不少人一看到阿伦特说“平庸的恶”“恶的平庸”，就觉深刻，就放弃了自己的眼睛和头脑。
Rahm Emanuel returns to ChinaTalk with a characteristically blunt assessment of U.S.-China relations and verdict on year one of Trump 2.0.
We discuss:
The “Fear Factor” in Asia: Why Japan and South Korea are ramping up defense spending not because of Trump’s strength, but because his unpredictability and isolationism have forced them to buy “insurance policies” against a U.S. exit,
Corruption and “Own Goals”: How “draining the swamp” has turned into institutional degradation — and why the Trump family’s entanglement of personal business interests with foreign policy damages U.S. credibility and strategic leverage,
Adversary, Not Competitor: Why the U.S. needs to stop viewing China as a strategic competitor and start treating it as a strategic adversary — one whose win-lose economic model is designed to hollow out global industrial bases,
Education as National Security: Why tariffs are a distraction and the only real way to beat China is a massive domestic push for workforce training,
AI and Inequality: Rahm’s evolving thinking on artificial intelligence — why he’s still learning and why a technology that boosts productivity but widens inequality is a political and social risk.
Plus: why Ari Emanuel’s UFC US-China robot rumble is sound policy, Rahm’s case that he’s now the real free-market capitalist in the room, and rapid-fire takes on J.D. Vance, Marco Rubio, and the 2028 Republican field.
Jordan Schneider: Rahm Emanuel, welcome back to ChinaTalk. What a year for US-Asia policy it has been.
Rahm Emanuel: That is the understatement of the year.
Jordan Schneider:In our 2024 show we started out with me asking you questions about, “Oh, look at all this nice stuff you guys did. Rebuilding alliances. Japan and South Korea are friends again.” And now we’ve got all this.
Rahm Emanuel: How did we go downhill so quickly? Is that what you’re asking?
Jordan Schneider: We now have a year-long sample size of “Trump II” taking a very different take from both Biden and Trump I. Really, it’s a departure from the past 70-plus years of US foreign policy when it comes to relations with our treaty allies. What has it been like watching this, Rahm?
Rahm Emanuel: It’s depressing. It’s infuriating. There are a lot of other emotions. Look, it starts from a premise. China’s view is that they are the rising power. America is receding. Their message is, “Either get in line, or we will give you our full China coercion policy.”
Our message is that we’re a permanent Pacific power and presence and you can bet long on the United States. Unfortunately, everything President Trump’s doing is underscoring China’s message with a bunch of exclamation points because of the way we’re behaving.
When President Biden and his team walked in in 2020, China was on their front foot. When we left, they were on their back heel. They were angry at being isolated and it took a strategy of flipping the script. Rather than them isolating Japan or the Philippines, we isolated the isolator through the United States, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and India. They knew it on a political, military, and strategic level.
All our military exercises were multinational. Japan was the number one foreign direct investor in the United States and is a long pole of our policy there. We built an alliance that China thought could never be done — and part of their strategy relied on it not being done — between the United States, Japan, and Korea. This culminated in what we accomplished at Camp David. That was, and remains, China’s worst nightmare. Trump basically took it off the page.
We then extended it to Japan, the United States, and the Philippines. If you look at where the Philippine islands are and where the Okinawa islands are, China’s strategy to quarantine Taiwan becomes much more difficult to achieve.
Rahm Emanuel as U.S. Ambassador to Japan meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi. February 2022. Source.
It had a strategic, political, and military level that was unprecedented. Then we had the Quad. We doubled down on the Quad, which Trump had actually pushed along in his first term to his credit. But now he has taken a 35-year project of bringing India into our orbit and totally expelled them for Pakistan’s vanity. It looks like it was done for Pakistan’s economic gifts to the Trump family, the Witkoff family, and the Lutnick family. Specifically to the Trump boys. That’s what it looks like.
China has been trying to force Japan into submission through economic coercion — which they haven’t done since 2010. It took the United States almost two weeks from the get-go to finally do a B-52 air surveillance run with Japan’s F-35s. Crazy. We should have been there immediately to send a direct message, but we didn’t.
At every level, this administration has made America weaker and more vulnerable. It has actually played into China’s message to all the countries we were attempting to pull into the US gravitational pull.
Jordan Schneider: The MAGA retort would be, “Look, we said some mean things, and defense spending in all these countries is going up. What’s not to like about that?”
Rahm Emanuel: First of all, not Japan. Let’s just deal with that. Japan increased their defense budget from the ninth largest to the third largest when I was there. To their credit — I don’t deserve it, and the Biden administration doesn’t deserve it — they did it early on, even before I got there. That wasn’t due to President Trump. They committed to 2% and did it in five years. They were well on their way before President Trump ever put his right hand on the Bible. So that’s calling offsides for what was not true.
Second, they have done things in that defense budget regarding counterstrike capability that pre-date Donald Trump. They just concluded a sale of ships to Australia. They did things they were constitutionally prohibited from doing, also pre-Trump. If anything, their willingness to go above 2% of GDP in defense spending is probably more out of fear of Donald Trump’s failure to show up than it is because of prodding by the Trump administration.
That has also been true to the credit of the new Korean president. His first set of conversations were with the Japanese because of their fear that the United States is AWOL. The facts just don’t bear out.
Plus, I’m right about India. The Trump administration totally punted on a bipartisan project that was succeeding in making China very nervous. Go look at what they were doing in the Himalayas. They haven’t shown up as it relates to the Philippines and the South China Sea islands.
Then last week, the Trump administration validated the AUKUS submarine project between the United States, Great Britain, and Australia. That all predates them as well. If that’s their argument, they better get some facts to back it up because nothing across six different countries adds up to that argument.
Jordan Schneider: There is a part of this that is downstream of this MAGA worldview that America just isn’t up for it anymore. What do you think about this whole idea of defining down what America can accomplish on the global stage?
Rahm Emanuel: I don’t buy it. A superpower doesn’t pick geographies, which is what they’re trying to do. They failed with Canada, they failed with Panama, they failed with Greenland. We’ll see what happens in Venezuela. The only place you could say they had a success was a $40 billion pledge to Argentina in the middle of cutting healthcare for the United States. I don’t think it should be hemispheric.
As a superpower, does that mean they are going to pull up stakes on the Middle East where Russia has now been kicked out and China is a bit player? That is an important geographic, strategic, and resource-rich area. Dumbing down or strategically pulling back only makes the world more dangerous.
Now, there are reforms that should be made to the alliances. But as you and I are talking about this, for 40 years the United States was telling Europe, “Don’t get economically energy-dependent on Russia.” Now the President of the United States is begging Europe to become more of a vassal energy-wise to Russia. This is in direct competition with our own energy policy and interests.
I’m a former ballet dancer, so I’m proud of being flexible. But these guys redefine flexibility. Here you are saying maybe we should dumb down or restrict ourselves, yet you’re telling Europe to get more dependent on Russia — and less dependent on Texas, Oklahoma, North Dakota, Wyoming, and Colorado. I can’t think of anything more stupid than that.
Rahm Emanuel during his ballet days — still not as flexible as the Trump administration. Source.
Also, in the Mideast, Russia has been kicked out of Syria. China has no play. It’s a major geographic area strategically. It’s a major purchaser of defense weapons. It’s a major investor in America’s economy. We have an ally both in Israel and in the Gulf countries, and also in the immediate Arab world. That is to our strategic advantage. Pulling back from that would make America more vulnerable politically, economically, and strategically. It’s foolish without even touching the rest of the world.
Would I say that Latin America and Central America in American foreign policy over the years have been stepchildren? 100%. Focusing on it is the right thing to do, but not at the expense of other regions. America can walk, chew gum, and be a superpower that brings a strategic presence to our policies in the Indo-Pacific, as an example.
Flooding the Swamp
Jordan Schneider: When I was reading that national strategy document, I was trying to make sense of it. You try to get in their worldview and think about how serious it is. But at the same time, you got everyone’s children making billions of dollars on the side. I really think this is a new thing in American history. It makes it very hard to take this new grand vision of how they want America to play in the world all that seriously.
Rahm Emanuel: Well look, I saw this today — it’s a pivot. When they had the big signing in the Sinai and around this ceasefire in Gaza, the Indonesian president says to Trump, “I need to talk to Donald.” The two boys are very upfront about it — they got caught on tape. In the midst of a tariff negotiation, we are mixing our strategic vision with President Trump’s checkbook. They’re not one and the same.
When I got to Congress, I set up a blind trust. First member to do it. Kept it as Chief of Staff. I had to re-up it and change it to meet the executive branch requirements. As Mayor, I filled out massive financial forms. In fact, I got an email about four months after I left saying, “You have to do your exit financial form.” I said, “You guys must be really lonely because you’re chasing me after I’ve left where I have no conflict.”
Meanwhile, you got a bunch of people who just left prison and are now investors. Crazy. Okay? I don’t know if you noticed, but they just left prison.
But you can go through the country. There was an announcement the other day. A startup company on one of the private equity funds from — I’m not sure which of the sons of Donald Trump — won a $700 million contract out of the Pentagon. A startup.
I wrote about this in the Wall Street Journal. The theory of “Broken Windows”is that small crimes create conditions for big crimes. That’s exactly what’s been happening. It’s not just about streets — it’s also about the corporate suite. The kids of Lutnick, Secretary of Commerce Witkoff, the special advisor for everything and anything, and Donald Trump’s kids — their checkbook is bigger today and yours is smaller today because they’re conducting themselves to enrich themselves.
The only envy Donald Trump has of Putin is that that is their business model, and he would like it to be America’s model. He has to work around some legal boundaries, of which the Supreme Court continues to remove for him. It is unbelievable to me what goes on here, having spent a lot of money with lawyers and accountants.
One of the things I’m proud about, starting from Bill Clinton forward, is that I’ve never hired a lawyer for anything I did when I was in public service. What these guys are doing makes me feel like I was a schmuck. I’ve never seen anything like this, and nor has America in American history. We have a lot of competition — and I’m from the city of Chicago — for corruption. But they have not only corrupted in the sense of the money they’re making in public policy, but they’ve corrupted the process of doing it.
Jordan Schneider: There’s big 17th or 18th-century European aristocracy energy here — like the princes marrying each other and doing deals on the side. [Neo-royalism!]
Rahm Emanuel: Here’s the thing. In the last 48 hours, two people were caught — ethics reports for not selling stock or whatever. Who’s going to investigate them? The FTC? The SEC? The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department? The Supreme Court — John Roberts and the rest of those hacks — gave him a carte blanche to go steal.
You basically can appoint members, fire all the Inspector Generals, and appoint or fire whoever you want at these independent agencies. You have a Justice Department and FBI which is a bunch of Keystone Kops. So of course people are going to break the law. You told them they get to write the law for themselves and nobody will enforce it. That’s what John Roberts did — the genius that he isn’t.
Jordan Schneider: I’m old enough to remember, “Drain the swamp”. And it won an election.
Rahm Emanuel: And what they decided was just to make the swamp a little bigger. Take India and Pakistan and the strategic point here, because there are other things relating to the American family’s checkbook being smaller than the Trump family’s. One is getting bigger and one is shrinking.
We have had a project from George Herbert Walker Bush to Bill Clinton to George Bush to Barack Obama to Donald Trump One to Joe Biden — bring India into a closer strategic alliance. Because Modi did not want to play stooge to Donald Trump, he made peace. Trump gets angry. Pakistan waves a bunch of contracts. The Financial Times has a great story about this regarding crypto and mining for the Trump kids.
We’ve abandoned a 35-plus-year project of America’s strategic interest just so the two Trump boys can have a little gold coin. That is what happened. And I stand by it.
Jordan Schneider: I would be remiss not to bring up Hunter’s pardon.
Rahm Emanuel: Bring it up. It was wrong.
Jordan Schneider: I thought it was really gross. It was really disappointing. I actually thought he wouldn’t do it.
Rahm Emanuel: If you want me to live in a glass house before I throw a stone, I ain’t doing it. But I’m going to say this, I never hired a lawyer for something I did. I believe in what Kennedy said about public service. That is not the virtue of this White House. They are stealing in broad daylight and getting away with it because John Roberts gave him a “get out of jail” card.
Who’s the Socialist?
Jordan Schneider: Let’s talk US-China. We had Liberation Day, we had Liberation Day v2. We had rare earths thrown on the table twice. Then the Trump administration backing off. What’s your read on all this, Rahm?
Rahm Emanuel: The whole “Tariffs and Liberation Day” was about drugs one day, then manufacturing the next — whatever the moving target was based on the day. I don’t disagree with the desire to build America’s industrial capacity, but three points of fact illustrate the issue.
When the President walked in, there were 50,000 manufacturing jobs with “Help Wanted” signs that nobody could fill. We would be 50,000 manufacturing jobs ahead today if we had focused on the training side — getting Americans ready to do those jobs. Instead, we’ve lost jobs under Trump.
Number two — this went unnoticed, but two weeks ago, the CEO of Ford said he has thousands of empty jobs today paying six figures because people don’t have the skills — mechanics, electricians, etc. These are not in the corporate suite. They’re on the shop floor, and he cannot fill them. He says it’s only going to grow.
There was a story about China being ahead of us on energy production. One of the big problems for us to compete with China on AI and transmission is that we are short 200,000 electricians. Every one of those is a six-figure job with healthcare and retirement. The Merchant Marines — which are key to building up both economic and security capacity — are short 200,000 jobs over the next decade.
If we had focused on the problem analysis — that you need industrial capacity and a base in the United States to compete — that part is true. But tariffs and looking weak? Of the top five choices, that was number ten. We have Americans looking for work, the ability to buy a home, and a way toward economic independence. We have jobs that would give you a start on that independence — six figures — and every one of those companies is short workers.
Nobody covered what the CEO of Ford said. It was treated like a little thing that happened on the side. If the President had dropped 50,000 “Help Wanted” signs on manufacturing the day he walked in, we’d be a hell of a lot farther ahead on manufacturing than with tariffs — which he calls “the most beautiful word in the English language.”
Nearly half a million U.S. manufacturing job openings available as of October 2025. Source.
The President continues to do this. He analyzes a problem not entirely wrong — not always right, but not wrong — but then his solution is far worse than the problem he started to try to solve. It didn’t work against China, it made us look weaker, it divided us from our allies, and he is telling Europe to buy oil and gas from Russia, not from us.
In fact, the oil and gas industry in America has fewer wells today — which means fewer people working, drilling, and transporting — than when he walked in. Even his “drill baby drill” strategy is failing. I find this immensely frustrating from an economic renaissance perspective because we have a challenge that is actually an opportunity and our politics, and specifically how this administration is failing America and Americans, is the issue.
Jordan Schneider: So, forward-looking — we’ve had this rare earths saga. It is clear that big parts of the US economy have — and probably will for the foreseeable future — large dependencies. The economic coercion playbook that China has is significant. What is the international strategy to handle them? And also, how do you spend that money to start to ameliorate those vulnerabilities at home?
Rahm Emanuel: Having been Ambassador to Japan, I recall the first critical minerals economic coercion playbook China started was in 2010 against Japan around the Senkaku Islands. We knew about the old playbook and didn’t do squat — both parties. Then, when it came to COVID, they withheld basic medical gloves, masks, etc. That was economic coercion up front, though more for their own self-preservation than just for punishing everyone else. This has been part of their playbook.
You have to look across the system. I wrote a piece in the Washington Post about how we’ve had five helter-skelter national industrial policies. The auto bailout was a national industrial policy. What we did on CHIPS and the IRA under Biden was a national industrial policy. What we did during Warp Speed and COVID was an industrial policy. Some elements of policy are successful and others aren’t.
You quoted the National Security Council producing the NSS. I would have the National Economic Council produce an economic blueprint at the beginning of every administration — that looks out over the horizon. Here are our strengths, here are our weaknesses, here are our vulnerabilities. Today, it’s obviously critical minerals and magnet production. Four years ago it was — and still is — semiconductors and the production of chips, which was the impetus for the CHIPS Act and IRA coming out of the chip wars. Look through the strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities, and then develop a strategy around that.
China has decided that on quantum, AI, life sciences, fusion, and alternative energy, they’re going to kick our ass. They’re not going to compete with America; they’re going to try to beat it. You saw after COVID their vaccine was a debacle. They made a decision that would be the last time. Now, five years later, they are competing, if not superseding us in certain areas, on life sciences and new drugs. You can look at what they did on chips and what they’re doing on alternative energy.
This attack on America’s research foundation, the university system, is an “own goal” of the worst kind. You won’t see the pain today — you’ll see the pain for the next decade. Donald Trump is leaving America far worse off. We should not concede any one of those areas. I spent time as an ambassador helping on quantum computing for America’s competitiveness between the University of Tokyo and the University of Chicago, bringing IBM and Google in to fund that at $150 million.
Pick the areas, compete, and win. Our scientists and our funding mechanism, while not great, keep us at the top of the game. We should not be trying to strangle MIT, Harvard, Stanford, the University of Michigan, or the University of Illinois in competing and winning the innovation war against China. That’s number one.
Number two, the brawn behind the brains. We should be in a massive education push, whether it’s electricians, mechanics, or in jets, so we have the capacity to compete. China’s AI is getting more competitive not because of innovation, but because their electricity is 50% cheaper than ours — because our transmission and energy production are way behind.
Third, related to regulatory reform, there is a place for consensus on legal immigration. We should be very clear about bringing the best scientists, the best engineers, and the best-educated to the United States of America. Each one requires drilling down deeper, but at 10,000 feet, that’s what I would do.
Jordan Schneider: At a principle level, it’s been very interesting to watch. In 2009 and 2010, you guys got screamed at for being socialists for saving GM and Ford. Now we have a Republican administration taking equity bites. We’re doing “national champions” now, I guess. What’s your read on that? And broadly, how far should the government go to mess with these private sector dynamics?
Rahm Emanuel: You have golden shares in Nippon buying US Steel as an example. You have the Intel 10%. I disagreed with Senator Romney on this — then a presidential candidate. He talked about GM and Chrysler going bankrupt. We spent political and financial capital saving the auto industry for a reason. Yes, we were called socialists. We were also called socialists on healthcare. It’s a normal card. I suppose, if you keep playing it, one day you may be right.
Jordan Schneider: We’ll see how many companies Zohran ends up buying.
Rahm Emanuel: What China has done is outright intellectual property theft — some of it explicit, some corrupt. But they invest in certain new technologies and they refuse to let those companies raise money so they can bankrupt them, and then steal all the patents or take them back to China. That is their national strategy. They can’t replicate the beauty of America’s research, innovation, and entrepreneurship, so they steal it through the front door, the back door, and the kitchen window. That’s what’s going on right now.
To me, that’s where we’ve got to sharpen up. To your point about socialism — Solyndra. We invested in this new solar firm and everyone’s like, “Oh my God, oh my God!”, and here are these guys investing in and putting public money in companies with zero operating capacity.
I believe I’m more of a capitalist and a free marketer than the Trump administration and the Republican Party. The Democrats would never take economic stakes in a company. Let me say this — we did bail out GM and Chrysler to save the jobs and the communities that depend on them. We got our money back, plus profit. But the goal was to get out, not to stay in and increase ownership. We did it with AIG, got out, and made a profit.
The goal was not to get in, stay in, and increase your stake. The Secretary of Commerce says we want royalties for our public dollar investments now. I think there’s a way you could pay a system that funds greater research, but what he’s thinking about is ownership — which is the last thing you need. I love politics, but that’s not the type of politics I want.
Jordan Schneider: Here’s a blast from the past. I was a press office intern in the Biden administration. It was during Solyndra, I think it was summer 2012. And what you guys ended up doing was letting journalists see every single email that was sent about it. I had to sit in a room minding all these Politico journalists. We’ve gone from that level of transparency to, like, if Sasha and Malia were on the board of Solyndra or something.
Rahm Emanuel: Let me just be really clear. You had us investing in a startup to jumpstart a technology in America and that was called socialism. Today, you have the United States investing and owning pieces of companies. Back then you had journalists who actually cared about what was going on. Today, if you did that, you’d get fired from your corporate leadership because you were “offensive” to the President. So the world’s gone full circle. You’re not crazy. It’s just gone upside down.
“We’re Now Adversaries”
Jordan Schneider: So let’s do the US-China piece a little bit. This idea of America losing escalation dominance — we had a Biden administration that was able to slowly start to boil the frog when it came to a lot of these technology controls without necessarily having China snap back in an aggressive fashion that would affect America’s economy. And now that dynamic has shifted. So what happens next, Rahm? What’s the smart play here?
Rahm Emanuel: Look, I’d just be forthright and honest. I would tell China: “You wanted to be strategic competitors, but you have decided you want to be a strategic adversary. You have decided to go into our entire infrastructure — our utilities, our waters, and our systems. You’re also in our software, in our government agencies. That’s not a competitor — that’s an adversary. So if you want to go back to the competitive era, I’m ready. Everything you’ve done to endanger America — get out of here. We’ll compete, but we’re gonna go to a different level if you want to be adversaries.”
In this challenge, we don’t have an American to waste or a community to overlook. We made a mistake in 2012 thinking that Battle Creek can battle Beijing on their own. It’s going to take an all-country effort. I’m talking about what Ford said. I talked to you about other industries that have job openings and nobody there to fill them. We have thousands of young men and women looking for purpose and looking for economic independence, and every one of these jobs they can do. So I would go on a massive training push.
And I would be clear both on a technological level and a strategic level to our allies — “We have a certain period of time we have to buy. Our allies can play a bigger role in that effort so we can get to a point of competitiveness and a point of making China as deterred as they have done to us under President Trump.”
Don’t lose sight of Liberation Day and how we backed off. How much degradation to our deterrence posture was created when the President — after his talk with Xi, which he does first—then calls the Prime Minister of Japan (our number one ally) and never mentions Taiwan? And then for two weeks, while China is intimidating Japan, we don’t do anything. How much does that deterrence get degraded?
And while it’s being done to Japan, if you’re in the Blue House in Korea, you’re in Melbourne in Australia, you’re in New Delhi in India, you’re in Manila in the Philippines — you’re looking at what the United States doesn’t do with Japan and you’re saying, “There I go but for the grace of God.” So you bet you start to buy your insurance policy. You start to say — “Okay, the United States can’t be trusted. So what do I do?” That’s what’s dangerous here.
Jordan Schneider: The nuclear proliferation arc, which we haven’t quite seen yet, but I mean it’s coming, right?
Rahm Emanuel: When I got back early in February, I wrote this — if you think non-proliferation was expensive, wait till you see the bill for proliferation.
We spent a good time — not me directly, but in the region — convincing South Korea not to go independent on a nuclear weapon. We made a lot of assurances, too. You look at what’s happening now; it’s going to be hard to convince South Korea, given North Korea and China, to stay nuclear-free much longer. Not saying it’s not possible, but they’re going to look around. Part of their strategic overview is a nuclear and military guarantee and support from the United States. You look at what’s been going on in the last year, you’re going to sit there in the Blue House in Seoul and say, “Well, we can’t keep it like this now.”
If South Korea were to go nuclear, other countries like Japan would sit there and go, “Wait a second.” You have China building up nuclear capacity massively. North Korea, we know. And India and Pakistan. What if you add in South Korea and Japan? What could go wrong with six nations in a small geographic space — all who have 800 years of history and animosities — what could possibly go wrong? This is insane at every level.
Jordan Schneider: Well, we haven’t even talked about Iran, Saudi, UAE...
Rahm Emanuel: Can I say one thing that’s underappreciated in the strategic world and doesn’t get a lot of coverage unless you’re like a weirdo like me and read it? Iran is going through one of the biggest social-cultural revolutions since the Ayatollah walked into Tehran in 1979. They’re allowing concerts because they can’t control the youth. Women are openly totally disregarding the cultural norms of the ruling government. Because of a water shortage and corruption, they’re thinking of moving the capital out of Tehran.
I get Tehran has a strategic vision of themselves in that Shiite arc from Tehran to Beirut. There is a slow-boil implosion happening in Tehran right now. I don’t know how it manifests itself, I don’t know where the ball bounces, but there’s a cultural revolution going on — and I use “revolution” with a small ’r,’ not big. Given the demographics of the country — it’s dominated by people aged 30 and younger who so much want to be part of the rest of the world and believe the ruling class is holding them back economically, politically, and culturally.
There’s something going on in Iran and in a year from now, or maybe two —I’m going to look prescient saying what I just said. Something is happening there that we’re not seeing. And one day we’re going to wake up and say, “Who knew?” But you can’t have a ruling class all of a sudden — because of political vulnerability — say to the kids, “Right. You want to have all these concerts and go out and do all this that are not part of the norms? Go ahead.” Once you do that, that genie’s out of the bottle. If that genie’s out of the bottle, there’s going to be another genie out of the bottle. That’s the one thing we know from cultural history.
Jordan Schneider: One more foreign policy one for you. Let’s do a little bureaucratic reform talk. Someone’s going to have to rebuild the civil service. Say you’re Secretary of State 2029. What do you do with the place?
Rahm Emanuel: You know, it’s interesting you say this. I was down in Austin about three weeks ago, and I grabbed lunch with two very, very good top national security former generals. I don’t want to use their names — I don’t want to get them in any trouble if they’re doing any kind of advisory board for the government. Very smart people that I’ve worked with who rose to the highest levels in their roles out of the national security institution.
And I asked this question, “Okay, you got all this chaos. We all operated in this. If we have the opportunity here — you got a clean legal path — how would you reorganize this?” I was thinking, you know, move this here, move that there, which is the thrust behind your question. Basically, I was in the same kind of zeitgeist you are.
Their response was interesting. I’m not saying they’re right, but it was actually interesting and not what I expected. They said, “You hire good people at the top. It does two things — lifts morale and brings the talent that’s left back in. If you start changing things and moving furniture around, it’s just all this energy on something else, when the immediate thing you have to do for the next couple of years is get the intellectual capacity back in. That means the top of the org chart. No B’s, no B-minuses, no B-pluses. You got to get A’s. They’ll get the morale up, and they’ll get talent to come back in and do public service.”
I gotta be honest, I was surprised because I thought, “Oh God, it’s a clean slate. We could do this.” But they said, from a capacity to run while you’re fixing something in chaos, talent is the number one goal. They said some other things which are true, like the intel operation capacity over the State Department, and the anti-terrorism financial end of the Treasury — both underappreciated in the intelligence world and swinging way above their weight class and they should be at the big boys’ table, not at the kids’ table anymore.
Those were just two observations from the national security side that I thought were persuasive. So I posit that that’s how I would approach it. Go with a talent at the top, get morale up, and make it a magnet for other types of talent to come back in.
Jordan Schneider: All right, rapid fire round. Selling chips to China?.
Rahm Emanuel: No.
He is the worst negotiator. I’m going to give you a story. We’re negotiating a balanced budget. It’s Erskine Bowles, myself, Gene Sperling, Bruce Reed, John Podesta, Sylvia Mathews, and I’m senior advisor. So one day in the morning I go to the Oval Office and I said, “Mr. President, every night Gingrich is calling you and you’re giving away the store. We spend the first three hours clawing back stuff you’ve given away. I’m just going to tell you, if you’re negotiating, Rule One is the other side has to know that you can live with the ‘No.’ You want to get to a ‘Yes.’ Everything you do is to convince the other side you are very comfortable with a ‘No’ as much as you are with a ‘Yes.’” I said, “We cannot have you doing this. We’re going to get to a balanced budget agreement. We have the upper hand here, but we are giving it away and diminishing it.”
Rahm Emanuel in the Oval Office with President Bill Clinton. 1993. Source.
Anyway, the lesson here is Donald Trump is so solicitous of trying to get a deal that he’s selling the family jewels to get it, and the Chinese know it. He’s going to run around on some soybean deal — which is his problem — or fentanyl and a couple other things. I’m not disregarding the fentanyl issue, but he’s so hungry for a deal, the Chinese are going to play him. And they’re playing him now — and they haven’t even gotten to a deal yet. And you can see it.
He just gave away the chips for what? What’d you get? He gave away something he could have gotten at the table for something else. What did we get? They just did a military exercise with Russia around Japan, your ally, forcing you to come out of the closet and finally do your B-52 covers with the F-35s. What did you get for that chip deal? Bupkis. As my grandmother used to say, “Bupkis”. The worst negotiators I’ve ever seen.
China’s Win-Lose Model
Jordan Schneider: Where is the Democratic Party on China?
Rahm Emanuel: There’s no uniformity. Having spent some time on this, I’ve come to the conclusion that we have a fundamental problem. They’re not strategic competitors — they’re strategic adversaries. They’re trying to bury us. Your competitors don’t get buried into the infrastructure, technology, and systems to destroy this country. God forbid we ever get to something kinetic. We don’t steal private information from government officials like they do, or steal from Google. We’re not stealing Huawei’s IP.
Second, we believe(d) — until Trump — in the rule of law. As part of their business model, they’re open to economic espionage and intellectual property theft. It’s very hard to have two economic models integrated where one believes in the rules and one believes the law doesn’t apply.
Third, our economy, even with the tariffs and Liberation Day, is integrated. The world is dependent on America. Their economic model is that the world becomes dependent on China, and China becomes independent of the world. That is why they’re exporting and crushing every other country’s industrial base — developed or developing world — whether it’s steel, toys, or EV cars.
It’s very hard to have an integrated model where destroying the other side is the goal. It’s one thing if you want to trade and it’s one thing if you want to compete. It’s another thing if the goal is “I win, you lose.” There has never been a “win-win” in China’s model. I don’t say that because I’m angry at them. That’s a fact.
Now we have to figure out where we’re going to go from here. They just passed a trillion dollars in trade, and their imports from other countries are down. South Korea’s only steel plant closed. Chile’s only steel plant closed — 20,000 jobs. That’s not the United States. That’s China. They’re doing it across the board. If Europe doesn’t protect itself, its auto industry will be destroyed.
We’re on a win-win model. Sometimes we win, sometimes we lose. They’re on a win-lose model based on economic espionage and intellectual property theft. There’s a case where they were stealing AI secrets from Google and from ASML, which is Dutch. They were caught stealing intellectual property.
I have not seen our companies that are into chip manufacturing stealing intellectual property from companies of other countries. I’m willing to stand corrected and say I’m wrong if there are suits on patents, but not outright government-sanctioned, government-sponsored intellectual property theft. As an example, Tokyo Electron, which makes chip manufacturing machinery, competes against ASML. Neither one has been found cheating and stealing IP from the other. China has been caught stealing and cheating from both of those companies.
Jordan Schneider: Rahm, your brother’s got a role to play in all this. Ari pitched the UFC on having an event in China, and they took him to a robot demo. He said this on a podcast — maybe we should have American and Chinese robots fight in a cage. America needs to see our robots getting their asses handed to them because right now, it’s not salient just how good China is getting at all these emerging technologies. You don’t see the cars on the road, you’re not really using the AI models. It just shows up in trade numbers and in factories closing. Having that as a primetime thing on Paramount Plus — there’s something to this, Rahm.
Rahm Emanuel: Let me just say this. Since I usually tell Ari and Zeke at family meals and holidays to just shut up, I’ll let Ari know that you think he has a good policy idea. But it will not come from me complimenting him, because there’s very little space I’ll give Ari in the policy world. The worst thing to do is tell somebody in Hollywood they have a good idea because they think they’re brilliant.
Jordan Schneider: Unless you’re George Clooney.
Rahm Emanuel: Yeah.
AI and Education
Jordan Schneider: Ok, domestic politics of AI. This dog hasn’t really started biting yet. But by 2028, it’s gotta be one of the top three things just from an education, social change, and job displacement perspective alone. You just pitched that we should be banning social media for kids under 16. What’s your take on all this?
Rahm Emanuel: You wanna talk about kids, poverty — I’ve got ideas. I’m learning about AI. I had a lunch today with somebody I consider very, very smart who discussed the confusion between OpenAI and open weights, and how the real challenge is in open weights where there are no firm protocols.
I want to be clear: I don’t have the answer. I know it’s important. I’m learning as we go. I’m trying to figure out who really knows their stuff.
While AI is important to the future and productivity, I have two cautionary notes. One, we have to figure out our energy production in the United States. China adopted the Obama “all of the above” strategy. We walked away from it in 2016 under “Drill Baby Drill.” We’re now paying the price because our electricity costs are two times China’s. They decided to go with an “all-in” approach, and we decided to go with a singular approach. Full stop.
Two, we’re short of the workforce to build out that energy capacity, to build out this chip capacity, and to build out the AI language capacity because we don’t have the workforce we need — from brawn to brain. Energy is going to be essential to the success, not just how small the chip is, but how much energy you produce.
Third, regarding AI, there is a cautionary note from the last 30 years. While globalization and technology worked, they didn’t work across the board. They worked for you, they worked for me, but they didn’t work for everybody. If you want a new technology to benefit society, it has to benefit everybody in the society. If it doesn’t, then you have to figure out ways to ensure there’s a better level playing field.
And we did. That doesn’t mean you could have stopped the clock and said “no Internet, no trade.” The question is, if you’re going to go forward — to quote President Clinton — how does everybody cross the bridge to the 21st century? You don’t have a queue where just some people make it and other people stand in line. That’s my cautionary note about AI — it will have an impact on productivity, and it will also have an impact on the people that lose their jobs because of that productivity.
What’s the strategy behind that technology to keep America competitive while ensuring all Americans are part of that? I don’t have it figured out yet. If I told you I did, I’d be full of crap. I know what the opportunities are. I know what the challenges are. I know how we have to start to think about it. Who has got the best thoughts on it? I don’t know.
Jordan Schneider: Two pitches for you on that. The education adoption side is the piece I’m most worried about. The productivity diffusion — the free market is going to figure out how to make workers more impactful, do their jobs better and faster. But the promise of having the greatest tutor that humanity has ever invented tailored to every single child, exactly where they are in their learning journey, is a world-historic opportunity. You’re talking about the haves and have-nots here. You fought teachers’ unions in the House. There’s going to be a lot of mess, a lot of hesitancy, and a lot of fear.
Rahm Emanuel: There’s a lot of fear. That’s not illegitimate. When I was mayor, we had the shortest school day and the shortest school year in the entire United States of America. I said, “What are we fighting about? You have great teachers. I want more time with the kids with the great teachers.”
We had no kindergarten, no Pre-K, no recess, no lunchtime, no gym time, and no arts class. I said, “What are you talking about here? It’s the shortest school day. Kids are being cheated.” I said to the head of the union, “I can’t believe we’re arguing about this. We have no recess, no arts education, reading is down to 40 minutes a day. We have no money for kindergarten, no money for Pre-K.” All the things that we eventually took care of. I said, “You believe in this? Why are we arguing? This makes no sense to me.”
Jordan Schneider: When we did our first show, my wife was five months pregnant. We now have a one-and-a-half-year-old. We spent this morning at preschool interviews for twos programs. I came out a little nauseated because, you’re right, Rahm, I have resources that not everyone has in this city. Walking through this incredible place — which is, again, a twos program — Pre-K starts for free in the US when your kid is four. They have the paints and ceramics, and literally, the ceramics are from the nicest ceramic store that you’d find in a $10 million apartment. I’m sitting here thinking, “This is gross.” It’s going to be the same for middle and high school, but it’s going to be an even bigger deal because they’re going to have access to $20,000-a-month AI tutors.
Rahm Emanuel: When I became mayor, there was no universal kindergarten and no Pre-K. We made every five-year-old get a full day across the city and every four-year-old get a full day across the city. But the biggest accomplishment was on the other end, in high school.
We did three things in high school that we haven’t changed since we first brought it along.
One, if you get a B average in high school, we made community college free — tuition, books, and transportation.
Two, we brought college into high school. 50% of our kids were graduating with college credit so they didn’t have to pay for it later on, and they got the confidence they could do college-level work.
Three — the most important thing we did — to receive your high school diploma, you had to have shown us a letter of acceptance from a college, community college, a branch of the armed forces, or a vocational school. It was a requirement. 97.8% of our kids met that requirement. When you walked on graduation day, you had to be able to show us where you were walking to.
Not just your child who is young. Mine are all grown up past those years. Two are in the military — one full time, one reserve. They all went to college. They knew where they were going. I don’t really care whether you’re going to Michigan, or to be a bricklayer, an electrician, the Air Force, or Harold Washington Community College. I don’t care. But you are not stopping when you’re 17. And that to me made my time in public life worth it.
Stanford said that the Chicago public school system was the best of the big 100 — the best. When I walked in, William Bennett had called it to the worst. But what Dr. Janice Jackson and I did in reforming the high school years was fundamental to the trajectory of these kids’ lives. 20,000 went to community college for free.
Jordan Schneider: I got one more pitch and then a final question. You talked about banning social media. The other thing to watch is AI companions. Everyone’s saying these AI are going to be better friends than people. That is a whole different thing from what Instagram was.
Rahm Emanuel: I will keep my eye on it, but I’m going to stake my battle on what I know. Chicago, under my tenure, had the most restrictive policies on tobacco sales to teens, and we took teen smoking down to single digits. As I told you, we did the same with Pre-K and kindergarten. When I was Senior Advisor to President Clinton, I negotiated the Children’s Health Insurance Program for 10 million children whose parents worked but didn’t have health care.
If it relates to kids and teens, that’s where I’m going to put my energy. It’s the future. My dad was a pediatrician — that may be my own desire regarding what I think is important. I’m not saying other issues aren’t important, but that’s where I’m going to spend my time. Given what Australia is doing, and given what I think you can do technologically to turn the algorithm into an ally rather than an adversary, that’s where I’m going to spend my time. I’m not saying the issue you raised isn’t important, but I’m not diffusing my energy.
Hot Takes on the GOP Field
Jordan Schneider: Everyone on all these other podcasts asks you if you’re running, and they ask you about all the other Dem candidates. I want to talk about the Republican ones. We’re going to just go down the list. Kalshi has J.D. Vance at 50% to be the Republican nominee. What’s your take?
Rahm Emanuel: Politics is crazy these days, but it is very hard to knock off a sitting Vice President. My guess is it’s probably right.
Jordan Schneider: Aside from electability, what do you think of him as a politician?
Rahm Emanuel: Likability is an important factor, and I think that’s a vulnerability for him. That’s all I’ll say.
Jordan Schneider: Rubio, 9% right now.
Rahm Emanuel: Part of leadership, in my view — and I’ve said this repeatedly — is you got to know why you’re doing what you’re doing and have the strength to get it done. You can infer from that anything you want.
Jordan Schneider: DeSantis, 4%.
Rahm Emanuel: That’s generous.
Jordan Schneider: Tucker, also at 4%.
Rahm Emanuel: That’s overly generous.
Jordan Schneider: And how about Donald Jr. rounding out our top five, also at 3%?
Rahm Emanuel: I can’t wait for him to do the financial disclosure form.
Jordan Schneider: Rahm Emanuel, it’s been an absolute pleasure. Thank you so much for being a part of ChinaTalk.
Rahm Emanuel: Can I say one thing?
Jordan Schneider: Yeah, of course.
Rahm Emanuel: I have three kids — 28, 27, and 25. You’re about to experience the greatest journey of life with a lot of hits and a lot of misses. But you have two parents who are role models. You’re going to be great at it, and it’s going to be a great journey. Mazel Tov. Thank you so much.
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Most coverage of China’s pandemic response has focused on its handling of COVID. Far less attention has been paid to what China has done in its aftermath, during which the country has been making interesting moves to prepare for the next large-scale biological threat.
Since 2023, Beijing has revised the Infectious Disease Law (IDL) and the Biosecurity Law and launched new frameworks like the Public Health Emergency Response Law (PHERL). Their rhetoric has also been increasingly telling, with criticism of the US’s pandemic response and self-proclamations of China as a global leader in pandemic oversight.
Pandemic prevention in China has moved from emergency reaction to long-term system design.
Chinese officials appear determined to ensure the next COVID doesn’t start within their borders. That determination increasingly stands in contrast to the United States, where public health institutional capacity has lost steam since 2020, especially during Trump 2.0.
Today’s installment examines governance initiatives, but this is only one part of a much larger ecosystem. Future pieces hope to explore PPE stockpiles, vaccine production, early-warning surveillance, research and lab standards, and the AI-bio crossover.
At the start of COVID: “China’s National Health Commission Advises Medical Institutions to Use Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) to Treat Coronavirus,” March 2020. Source.
Main Takeaways
The CCP looks to be taking pandemic risk seriously. After China’s public-health system was shown unfit for purpose when COVID hit, Beijing has now enacted some of the most actionable steps of any major country to bolster its pandemic-readiness system.
COVID exposed how costly Beijing’s old instincts were: burying early signals, punishing whistleblowers, and relying on improvised crackdowns left the center blind and politically exposed. The new reforms try to fix this by giving local officials clearer rules, reporting guidelines, and more room to act early without fear of punishment. Beijing appears willing to trade some information-control for a more rule-bound, faster-moving system, though whether officials feel empowered to speak up remains uncertain.
A more centralized domestic monitoring and command system gives China greater ability to manage potential outbreaks internally, reducing pressure to depend on international organizations. That avoids reputational costs and protects “face,” which helps explain why China can buy-in heavily to pandemic preparedness while still resisting meaningful collaboration or data sharing with groups like the WHO.
Globally, Chinese state rhetoric casts the U.S. as the country that bungled COVID while downplaying its own early missteps. And Beijing is positioning itself as an international leader on health governance, especially for the Global South.
*Starting with “Recent Government Initiatives,” each section ends with a grade. Taken together, China earns a C+ overall, which is an improvement over the D I would have given it pre-COVID, though still shy of the B- I’d give the US.
Since 2023, the major players in China’s pandemic readiness system have received new mandates, budgets, or planning documents to strengthen their roles.
At a high level, China’s system runs on a clear hierarchy. The State Council directs national strategy, the National Health Commission (NHC) leads implementation, and a network of technical and support agencies (at both federal and provincial levels) executes the work.
Key Players
State Council (国务院) — the top command centre in any outbreak. It activates the “Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism” (联防联控机制), created during COVID, to coordinate ministries across health, industry, and emergency management. Since 2023, the State Council has signalled an effort to bolster its coordinating role for pandemic response.
National Health Commission (国家卫健委, NHC) — China’s main health authority and a cabinet-level executive department of the State Council. It drafts and enforces key laws, oversees the China CDC and the National Health Emergency Response Center, and manages early-warning and emergency-medical systems.
National Administration of Disease Control and Prevention (国家疾控局, NADC) — created in 2021 to strengthen disease control and biosafety. It sets national standards for surveillance and builds modern early-warning/data systems. It’s one of the key additions of China’s post-COVID infrastructure.
China CDC（中国疾控中心） — the technical core of the system. It collects and analyzes infectious disease data, runs testing labs, and provides guidance to local CDCs. The CDC workforce numbers surged during COVID, increasing by about 20% to reach 240,000 in 2022, the highest level ever. This was preceded by years of post-SARS neglect, which left the system understaffed and unprepared for COVID (see graph below).
“The total workforce of CDCs in China (1999–2023), determined based on China Statistical Yearbooks published between 2000 and 2024.” Source.
There are also many supporting ministries that handle logistics, funding, and research, such as
National Health Emergency Response Center (国家卫生应急中心) - coordinates emergency medical teams and logistics during crises.
National Biosecurity Work Coordination Mechanism (国家生物安全工作协调机制) - coordinates biosecurity-specific policy and emergency response across ministries.
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (工业和信息化部, MIIT) - manages medical supply production and logistics.
Ministry of Science and Technology (科学技术部, MOST) - supports new R&D programs in pathogen detection and modelling.
National Medical Products Administration (国家药品监督管理局, NMPA) - fast-tracks new countermeasures.
People’s Liberation Army (中国人民解放军, PLA) - deploys medical units and runs military R&D in pandemic-related situations.
How Does the US Compare?
In China, authority flows from the State Council through the National Health Commission and its affiliated agencies. Provinces largely mirror this structure, which makes it easier to coordinate and implement national policy quickly once priorities are set in Beijing.
The US system is much less centralized. The Department of Health and Human Services — mainly through the CDC and the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) — leads at the federal level, but state and local governments hold most of the practical authority over public health measures. In practice, the federal government provides funding, guidance, and aggregates data, yet in a major pandemic, it’s less clear that the US could quickly coordinate a unified national response.
Centralization, on the other hand, has trade-offs. China’s unified chain of command can move quickly, but a bad call at the top can misdirect the entire system. The U.S.’s decentralized model is more heterogeneous, since one state’s mistakes don’t necessarily drag everyone else down. China’s approach, therefore, relies heavily on accurate information flowing upward and on giving localities enough room to adapt policies to local conditions, which many of the initiatives below attempt to do.
Recent Government Initiatives
In September 2025, China’s top legislature (NPCSC seventeenth session) passed the Public Health Emergency Response Law (突发公共卫生事件应对法, PHERL). It’s the country’s most significant effort since COVID-19 to overhaul how it manages outbreaks, arriving alongside a substantial revision of the Infectious Disease Law (传染病防治法, IDL) earlier this year. Together, the two laws do a good job of weaving in many of the major pandemic readiness updates in recent years, and are meant to give China a more coordinated and legally coherent framework for handling future epidemics.1
One surprising feature of both PHERL and IDL is that neither substantively mentions the Biosecurity Law (生物安全法). Since its introduction in 2020/2021, the Biosecurity Law has been China’s main legal framework for managing biological risks, specifically, from pathogen labs to zoonotic disease surveillance. The law divides biotechnology research and development activities into three risk categories — high, medium, and low — requiring approval for high-risk and medium-risk activities. It also establishes classified management of pathogenic microorganisms and hierarchical administration of pathogenic microorganism laboratories. The law was mildly amended in 2024, though many of its weak spots remain.
The gist of these recent moves is an attempt to correct the legal and regulatory weaknesses that became apparent during COVID. At the time, SARS-CoV-2 was classified too slowly, lines of authority in emergencies were poorly defined, and rigid central control over information disclosure left local governments hesitant to act.
All Talk?
Do these reforms have any teeth? There are a few ways to parse this out.
The Biosecurity Law, IDL, and PHERL are binding laws (法律) passed by the NPC Standing Committee. This makes them more authoritative than the guiding opinions (指导意见) and plans (方案) that often crowd China’s policy space. Responsibility for their implementation also increasingly falls under the State Council, the top executive body of the land, giving these measures more political backing than if they were purely the responsibility of various lower-ranking ministries.
Still, the NPC passes many laws that aren’t effective. This is because (1) people don’t know they exist, or (2) they are not clear enough to be actionable. Therefore, what’s more important is enforcement clarity. Can local officials, hospitals, and labs actually understand what these laws require and act on them in real time? Here, the picture is mixed.
Many provisions are more explicit than previous drafts, but some remain vague or lack operational detail. For example, Article 74 of the IDL allows private entities to file complaints (申诉) if they believe emergency measures are excessive, a gesture to remediate the lack of voice many people felt during Zero-COVID. However, Article 74 offers little guidance on how such complaints will be handled or whether they provide meaningful recourse, making it unclear to people tempted to complain whether they will face consequences. By contrast, more fleshed-out stipulations like the updated early-reporting requirements (explained in the next section) clearly spell out responsibilities, timelines, and penalties, making them more obviously enforceable.
After reviewing the earlier versions of the IDL and Biosecurity Law and comparing them with the updated texts and the addition of PHERL, the system as a whole has gained some enforcement clarity. My rough sense is that only about 20–30% of the original provisions felt truly actionable, meaning that, as a local official or doctor, you could read them and understand what you were expected to do. In their current form, it feels closer to 40%.
Enforceability is jagged, though. The revised Biosecurity Law doesn’t feel meaningfully clearer to me, while PHERL and IDL seem to have made big strides.
Finally, we can look to historical analogues. The post-SARS reforms significantly reshaped China’s pandemic response system. Before 2003, the public health apparatus was fragmented and underfunded; the China CDC had only been established a year before, and case reports were still handwritten and faxed to Beijing. SARS prompted the government to carry out a wave of initiatives, such as building a real-time reporting network that linked clinics and hospitals across the country. The SARS reforms were incomplete, of course, given China’s lack of preparation for COVID, but it was a significant evolution from what little previously existed. The post-COVID reform wave feels like a similar energy stemming from a similar realization that their pandemic readiness system was far behind where it should have been.
The Content
*Graded from Best to Worst: Partly Post-COVID Improvements, Partly Overall Performance
Interagency Coordination
PHERL and IDL stress interagency coordination. The “joint prevention and control mechanism” (联防联控机制) created by the State Council during COVID is now written into law. It brings together more than 30 ministries and agencies across health, industry, and emergency management. At least a dozen civilian and military departments must share surveillance data, coordinate logistics, and build a unified national information platform for early warning.The aim is to keep ministries from working in silos and ensure outbreaks are met with synchronized mobilization.
Before COVID, no comparable command structure existed. Outbreak response rested with the NHC and China CDC, agencies without the authority to pull in heavyweight ministries or compel timely reporting from local governments. Coordination was improvised and slow. By placing the joint mechanism under the State Council, PHERL and the IDL give epidemic response a body that can enforce nationwide logistics and require all relevant ministries and provinces to report upward, ensuring that at least one institution has a complete, real-time picture of the entire situation.
Grade: A-
Mobilizing dozens of ministries and a national response is something the CCP can do better than anyone. The key caution is avoiding excessive uniformity; provincial conditions vary, and a highly centralized system must take care not to impose directives that could overlook unique situational circumstances.
Classification
The IDL updates China’s three-tier disease classification system (Classes A, B, C). Class A diseases, such as plague and cholera, trigger the highest-level emergency responses: immediate reporting, mandatory isolation, and broad quarantine powers. Class B diseases, like SARS or COVID (once it was officially listed), require strong but somewhat less sweeping interventions. Class C diseases, being the least concerning, are monitored primarily for trends and local containment, such as influenza or the mumps.
Previously, new or unknown pathogens couldn’t trigger a response until they were formally classified, a flaw made clear by how long it took to classify COVID. The revision tries to fix this by adding “sudden outbreaks of unknown origin [突发原因不明的传染病]” as an event that can be treated as Class A for response purposes. This designation prompts the State Council to rapidly investigate and issue a formal recommendation, allowing containment measures to begin before full classification is complete.
The concern for diseases of unknown origin reflects China’s growing rhetorical emphasis on “Disease X (X疾病)” (coined by the WHO in 2018), which calls for proactive preparation against future, as-yet-unidentified pathogens. As a government white paper put it earlier this year, China now aims to “draw on the experience of COVID-19 prevention and control, and make proactive preparations for future pandemics such as Disease X.”
Grade: A-
This lets officials act preemptively rather than reactively, but I’m docking half a grade as the incentives around sounding the alarm early are still uncertain. It’s unclear whether people will actually feel safe triggering a potential Class A response even when they’re technically allowed to do so.
Monitoring and Surveillance
Surveillance has taken on a more prominent role in the new framework. IDL Article 42 now mandates what’s called “sentinel surveillance” (哨点监测), a system in which selected hospitals and clinics continuously report data on specific diseases or symptoms to detect unusual spikes early. The revisions also strengthen requirements for identifying and reporting clusters of unknown or emerging illnesses, bringing China’s procedures more in line with the World Health Organization’s revised International Health Regulations (IHR).
Article 13 forbids excessive data collection and limits the use of personal information (like digital travel codes) to infectious-disease prevention and control. In theory, that’s a privacy safeguard; in practice, it’s anyone’s guess how strictly those boundaries will be enforced.
More speculatively, China’s ‘AI Plus’ Plan and related AI + Medical/Healthcare guidelines envision using artificial intelligence to enhance this surveillance network. The health-industry guideline lists public health services as one of four key application areas for AI, and pilot programs in cities like Shanghai are experimenting with AI systems that use citizens’ health data for lifelong health monitoring or proactive symptom detection. These efforts, however, remain largely aspirational.
Grade: B+
China already has the world’s most capable general surveillance system, so it will likely be able to implement this effectively. It’s still surprising that disease-specific surveillance measures weren’t firmly in place before COVID.
Local Authority
Under the IDL, local authority is also expanded. County- and city-level governments can now issue early warnings (Arts. 9, 53) and activate emergency responses when dealing with a sudden outbreak of unknown origin (Art. 65). This aligns the IDL with the Emergency Response Law, closing the gap between local initiative and national oversight. In theory, it allows quicker reaction on the ground while keeping reporting lines to Beijing intact.
Grade: B
Local officials can now move faster while Beijing deliberates — just not too fast, given an early move might look bad optically and provoke backlash from Beijing if it turns out to be a false alarm, given how vague the ostensible protections are.
Government Accountability
When it comes to checking central government power after some of the most controversial Zero-COVID measures — such as sealing residents in their homes, welding apartment doors shut, mass quarantine transfers, and imposing citywide lockdowns that lasted weeks — the recent reforms offer only modest adjustments. New provisions require local governments to ensure food and water supplies, maintain medical access, protect vulnerable groups, publish emergency hotlines, and keep workers employed during lockdowns (Arts. 64–67).
These steps are intended to prevent the worst excesses, but they do not meaningfully limit the state’s authority to impose sweeping restrictions in the first place. It is stated multiple times that decision-making remains centralized, and local officials must still carry out whatever directives Beijing issues.
Grade: B-
The CCP won’t be publicly apologizing for Zero-COVID anytime soon. But these reforms tacitly acknowledge its excesses and theoretically prevent future worst practices, like quarantined residents being locked in their homes without food.
Punishment
The revisions further strengthen enforcement but aim to channel it through clear legal authority. Individuals or institutions that refuse to cooperate with legitimate disease-control orders can now face fines of up to 1,000 yuan (~US$140), and entities up to 20,000 yuan (~US$2,810) (Art. 111 of IDL). Previously, Chinese law didn’t penalize most violations of epidemic orders, forcing police to repurpose unrelated statutes — such as those meant for constitutional “states of emergency” — to enforce zero-COVID restrictions. The fine is small, but “refusing to cooperate” is defined so broadly that even something like declining to wear a face mask could trigger a penalty.
Grade: C+
If this were aimed at punishing officials who bury crucial information — like those in Wuhan who hid early COVID signals — it would be a big upgrade. Instead, it mostly adds small fines that feel more suited to policing minor noncompliance, which risks echoing the punitive instincts of Zero-COVID rather than fixing the real failures.
Dual-Use Technologies
TheRegulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items(中华人民共和国出口管制法), updated in late 2024, fold biological materials, technologies, and associated equipment into the same export-control framework that governs chemical, nuclear, and other sensitive goods. Under the new update, biological exports are managed through MOFCOM, under the State Council, which now appears to have greater authority over licensing and enforcement. Still, it’s unclear what exactly has changed — the specific list of what qualifies as “dual-use” biological items has yet to be clearly defined.2
Grade: C
This feels more about restricting what China sells abroad than about tightening its own safeguards around creating dual-use biological tools to begin with. It’s good as a nonproliferation measure, but the issue of creating clear research norms and controls over dual-use work inside China is still largely unaddressed.
Early Reporting
A core reform is early reporting. Under IDL, hospitals, blood banks, and local CDCs must report suspected outbreaks, clusters of unknown illness, or abnormal health events within two hours through the national Direct Reporting System. Those who report in good faith are protected from punishment (and eligible for some sort of award) even if their alerts later turn out to be wrong (Art. 51), while any official or institution that interferes with or delays reporting can now be penalized.
These provisions appear to respond directly to the early weeks of COVID-19, when local officials in Hubei delayed or suppressed information about the emerging virus — most infamously in the case of Dr. Li Wenliang, the Wuhan physician reprimanded by police for spreading “false information” after trying to warn colleagues about an unusual respiratory illness. Tragically, he later died from COVID.
However, it’s never really explained what disease reporting is supposed to include, and the promise of protection for “good-faith” reporting also feels fuzzy, since no one has defined what counts as good faith.
Grade: C-
If I were a doctor, I’d still be somewhat uneasy reporting early warnings. The protections are vague, and the precedent for punishment is much higher than in other countries.
Li Wenliang’s death triggered a rare nationwide outpouring of grief and anger. Source.
Biotechnology Risks
The biggest shortcoming with China’s pandemic readiness system, in my opinion, is that it has not made substantial progress in addressing the safety risks posed by biotechnology — meaning the dangers that arise when genetic engineering, synthetic biology, or laboratory manipulation of organisms could unintentionally create or amplify biological threats.
The 2021 Biosecurity Law was the first statute that gestures at governance in this space. It formally divided biotechnology R&D into three risk tiers — high, medium, and low — with high- and medium-risk projects requiring approval or registration and restricted to legally incorporated domestic entities. The law also established security management rules for human genetic resources and biological resources.
The law was amended with updates that took effect in April 2024, but the changes appear largely procedural rather than substantive. There are still no specific ethical guidelines for biotechnology R&D; the three-tier risk system (high, medium, low) lacks concrete criteria for how projects should be classified; and the vague references to “relevant departments” (有关部门) leave unclear which agencies are responsible for what. In practice, this means ethical oversight is likely to devolve to institutional review boards or ministry-level discretion. These bodies vary widely in capacity, and because biotech research is competitive, institutions may have incentives to adopt more permissive review practices to maintain an edge.
This gap is likely related to the fact that Beijing also views biotechnology as a strategic growth sector. Much of the Biosecurity Law reads more like a biotech development agenda with biosecurity sprinkled on top. Article 5, for instance:
“The state shall encourage innovation in biotechnology, strengthen the building of biosecurity infrastructure and the biotechnology workforce, support the development of the bioindustry, raise the level of biotechnology through innovation, and enhance the capabilities to guarantee biosecurity.”
Grade: D
Synthetic pathogens are one of the most plausible routes to a truly catastrophic outbreak, yet Beijing’s biotech push largely ignores these safety concerns. However, in the US and other countries, ethical oversight also seems to fall to institutional review boards or ministry-level discretion, so I can’t give this a completely failing grade.
To sum up, China’s recent policy initiatives reflect a system trying to learn from its own COVID contradictions. Beijing wants a more unified and legally codified pandemic readiness system, one that detects and contains outbreaks before they spread, but also one that avoids repeating harsh crackdowns and which made provincial authorities feel powerless to national authorities. It’s a tough balance to strike.
Overall Grade: C+
Many of the laws and local incentives are still unclear, but Beijing is at least increasingly turning abstract goals into concrete procedures and has an unmatched capacity to trigger a unified response. And unlike some countries, its rhetoric does not actively denigrate public health measures.
For reference, I would give the US a B-. Even with its issues, the US does better at dual-use tech governance [pdf] and has better incentives for early reporting and information sharing.
Funding
Funding is an indicator of whether these statements have backing to them, but data is limited.
Our best piece of evidence comes from the Chinese Ministry of Finance, which shows that major infectious-disease prevention funding rose from about ¥16.98 billion ($2.38 billion) in 2018 to ¥23.82 billion ($3.34 billion) in 2023 — an increase of roughly 40% over five years. These funds are meant to expand things like vaccine-production capacity, surveillance systems, and hospital preparedness.
There’s no visible COVID-era spike in 2020–21 because much of that emergency spending flowed through temporary epidemic-response channels — one-off MOF transfers and provincial emergency budgets — rather than this regular subsidy line. The subsidies in the graph instead indicate Beijing’s effort to institutionalize emergency spending within its normal public-health budget.
Small bits of additional evidence tentatively point in the same direction. China launched a multi-billion-dollar reconstruction of the national CDC system in 2023, alongside major provincial investments in places like Shanghai and Guangdong. Data beyond 2023, however, is limited, so drawing further conclusions would be premature.
Grade: B-
They’re on an upward trend, but the total still looks modest relative to China’s GDP and population. In 2023, ¥23.8 billion (~US$3.3 billion) works out to only about US$2–3 per Chinese citizen per year. By contrast, OECD estimates put average pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response spending at around US$101 per capita, with the United States at US$279 and Germany at US$209. The true gap must be smaller, since China adds money through provincial budgets, immunization programs, and other health lines that don’t show up in the MOF subsidies, but I estimate that the sum of these monetary investments still falls well below the OECD average.
How China Talks About the US
One interesting factor shaping China’s pandemic governance has been its rhetorical positioning vis-à-vis the United States.
Beijing has leaned heavily on the narrative that America’s COVID response was chaotic, politicized, and unscientific, using US failings as a foil to validate its own system. The strategy deflects criticism of China’s early missteps and reinforces the idea that China’s centralized model is not only legitimate but superior.
For example:
A People’s Daily editorial from May 2025 calls the US the “全球第一抗疫失败国” (literally: “world’s No. 1 failure in pandemic response”), citing CDC death totals and arguing that the outcome exposes pseudo-science.
A Global Times editorial said, “As the world’s most developed country, its response to the pandemic has been a complete failure, offering no positive lessons.”
This narrative has political uses, but it could also make Beijing overconfident. By defining itself in opposition to the US, China has built a pandemic story that depends on its own perceived success, which could also make addressing institutional shortcomings difficult.
For instance, Chinese state media outlets have often disparaged the effectiveness of US vaccines, framing Western rollout efforts as reckless or unsafe. Yet beneath those critiques lies the unspoken acknowledgment that during COVID-19, China’s vaccine sector fell far behind its Western counterparts in both technology and trust. Beijing’s decision to reject mRNA vaccines like Moderna, despite their demonstrated efficacy, left millions reliant on weaker domestic shots.
Meta-Grade: China is grading its own paper here, and giving itself full marks despite doing a lousy job of handling COVID. Revising history, rather than addressing one’s mistakes, tends to be a bad idea.
International Moves
China has also engaged in a series of international initiatives on pandemic preparedness, though international communiqués on public health are rarely binding. Xi’s Global Security Initiative, for example, claims China will lead international biosecurity, but says little about how it will actually accomplish this.
Funding is a clearer signal. In May 2025, China pledged $500 million to the WHO over five years, effectively becoming the organization’s largest funder after the US withdrawal. China has also contributed to many other initiatives, like the World Bank’s Pandemic Fund, and hasn’t abstained from other multilateral health financing mechanisms (unlike the US).
A substantial portion of China’s health funding targets the Global South, particularly in Africa. China committed $80 million for constructing an Africa CDC headquarters in Ethiopia, a project that became operational during the pandemic, and $2 billion in assistance for COVID-19 response and economic recovery in developing countries. China’s WHO funding notably includes the condition of “a certain amount of voluntary contribution and projects support through the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund” — terminology tied to China’s Health Silk Road initiative, essentially the public health dimension of the BRI. 52 out of 54 African countries have participated in these health programs.
The China-aided Africa CDC Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Source.
China has also recently convened ASEAN Conferences on biosecurity governance in conjunction with the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs. These talks emphasize lab safety, pathogen-sharing, and early-warning systems between South East Asian countries.
Despite positioning itself as a global health leader, China consistently fails to report the specifics of its assistance activities to international agencies like the OECD’s Common Reporting System or the International Aid Transparency Initiative. Tensions have also flared with organizations like the WHO over China’s lack of timeliness, completeness, and durability of data sharing, especially around origins-relevant evidence for COVID and during recent disease surges. In November 2023, for instance, the WHO formally requested detailed information on pneumonia clusters among children following reports of cases in northern China. Beijing eventually provided data, but only after a significant delay, underscoring a pattern of reactive rather than proactive disclosure. China furthermore does not participate in Joint External Evaluation Assessments, where a team of independent international experts evaluates a country’s health security capabilities across 19 technical areas.
CDC report, May 2024. Green countries participate. Grey countries do not. Source.
I believe this kind of behavior makes sense when accounting for how central reputation and “saving face” are to China’s public-health motivations. Reporting outbreaks quickly or exposing gaps in its own system can be embarrassing; projecting itself as a global public health advocate and generous benefactor to the Global South is not. If China can manage its own health problems internally and fund other systems externally, it (1) looks good and (2) reduces outside scrutiny — a bit like a boyfriend who pays for dinner so his girlfriend doesn’t go through his phone.
Grade: C
They say all the right things, and it’s good they’re helping the Global South’s public health infrastructure, but they still avoid building the deeper collaborative foundations we’d need for a globally unified response to a major infectious outbreak.
The CCP is taking pandemic readiness seriously, but the through line isn’t a coherent strategy so much as a collection of post-COVID impulses: prevent another global pandemic from originating in China, avoid another round of draconian lockdowns, and do it all without loosening Beijing’s grip while empowering people to speak up.
Call to action
If you know anything about this topic or think I’ve missed something important, please reach out. I’m particularly interested in hearing from people with knowledge about China’s vaccine development capacity, high-end PPE manufacturing, biosurveillance systems, or research and safety standards for future installments.
I did not find nearly as many experts on Biosecurity x China as I would have liked. China’s pandemic preparedness apparatus remains surprisingly under-studied, especially compared to the extensive analysis of its COVID response or the pandemic readiness systems of other countries. The expert on this could be YOU.
The broader Emergency Response Law (突发事件应对法) still seems to be responsible for certain types of pandemic emergency situations, but the two new laws appear to have taken over many of the responsibilities this law originally covered.
Chloe Lee wrote a strong analysis of the Biosecurity Law and Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items as they existed before the 2024 updates, laying out some of their weak points.
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