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【404文库】法度Law|“常济淙非正常死亡事件”最新进展:3位律师宣布公益代理

17 September 2024 at 08:19

相关阅读:【404文库】白鹿新闻|嫌疑人疑死亡后仍送医院抢救9天真相:停药后审讯发病,身上有明显伤痕

“常济淙非正常死亡事件”一案有了新进展。

9月15日,北京京哲所律师龚华、北京策略所律师胡楠、北京泽亨所律师江丞华分别发布朋友圈,表示已经正式接受常济淙妻子委托,决定公益代理该案。

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CDT 档案卡
标题:“常济淙非正常死亡事件”最新进展:3位律师宣布公益代理
作者:法度Law
发表日期:2024.9.16
来源:微信公众号“法度Law”
主题归类:常济淙非正常死亡事件
CDS收藏:公民馆
版权说明:该作品版权归原作者所有。中国数字时代仅对原作进行存档,以对抗中国的网络审查。详细版权说明

“白鹿新闻”的报道说,今年3月,在北京生活、工作的河南籍商人常济淙,在北京被郑州警方以涉嫌“拒执罪”跨省抓捕,被抓次日晚即非正常死亡。

龚华律师在朋友圈里说,常济淙死亡后,他的妻女二人恓惶无依,北上四处求助,希望请律师帮其查明丈夫死亡真相。

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法度Law: 为什么决定接受常济淙家人的委托,免费代理该案?

龚华:常济淙家属提供的材料比较客观,反映出办案过程一些细节存疑,客观事实扑朔迷离。人命关天,事关公义,值得援助。

法度Law: 目前,本案处于什么阶段?

龚华:常济淙已死亡,其涉嫌的拒执案按规定应当撤案。

法度Law: 下一步的工作计划是什么?

龚华:下一步我们将开展调查取证工作,努力还原案件事实,查明常济淙死亡真相。

2024年9月14日,白鹿新闻发布长篇调查报道《嫌疑人疑死亡后仍送医院抢救9天:停药审讯发病,身上有明显伤痕》。报道发布后,常济淙非正常死亡一事引发广泛关注,一度登上热搜榜。

关于常济淙非正常死亡一事,白鹿新闻在这篇深度调查报道中提出了数个疑问,其中,有三个疑问,引起的讨论最多。

疑问一:郑州警方跨省强制带走嫌疑人是否为非法办案?

报道显示,当时前来北京强制带走常济淙的赵俊华等三名办案人员,均没按规定穿警服、持传唤证办案。在家属的强烈要求下,只有赵俊华一人出示了警官证。

此外,常济淙的拘留通知书疑似“早产”。据拘留通知书显示,常济淙于3月28日晚上6点被警方刑事拘留的,并羁押于郑州市第三看守所。

但郑大医院出具的《院前急救病情记录》显示,120抵达案管中心的时间是当晚8点32分。

这意味着,嫌疑人还在案管中心审讯时,派出所就提前两个半小时办理了刑拘手续,并同时办理了看守所羁押手续。

常济淙妻子任海云意外获得的通话录音显示,郑州市公安局通泰路派出所副所长赵俊华在与他人打电话聊到常济淙一案时明确表示,郑州警方涉嫌违规执法。

白鹿新闻曝光的部分内容如下:

赵:对,我们公安以前带人,传唤证肯定批不下来,拘证批不出来,只有违规去执法。

赵:你这一点说得对,他是主动来我这配合调查的,我们没给他设为嫌疑人,我可以不去办传唤证。

赵:我们拘留证快批下来了,确定是嫌疑人了,法院那个高鑫鑫(音)法官来这了,机关批了(批捕)以后,他有重大嫌疑。

赵:这个很有价值,我只能尽心去办,但是现在钱上这个事······。

赵:他原来有病,这是事实,又没有说有这种病就不处理,不批拘留,就没有这规定,是不是。

赵:120的人说你上车吧······,后来,我又去了,给他挂个号,我给他垫了一万八,后来想想那一万八不该给他垫,但是咱的心老善良啊。

赵:没啥事,张旭(音)那边说也没啥事,张旭刚才也给我回过电话了,他们讨论这个事了,他说全是案管(中心)责任,他上卫生间那没人跟着,而且穿个一次性拖鞋,拖鞋一沾水滑。

疑问二:郑州警方有没有遵照家属的多次嘱托,按时给常济淙服药?

据媒体报道,丈夫常济淙被郑州警方带走时很匆忙,漏掉了一种名为“利伐沙班”的药物。一款新型口服抗凝药,可预防静脉血栓形成和肺栓塞,从而有效缓解右心房血栓问题的加重,以降低卒中和全身性栓塞的风险。

任海云对媒体表示,在丈夫常济淙今年2月份出院时,主治医生曾嘱咐过她,一定要记得给他每天服用“利伐沙班”,且不能间断。医生在《出院记录》中还特别注明医嘱:“出院后每天须按时服用20mg的“利伐沙班”一次……,规律服药,预防肺栓塞”。

关于服用的剂量,医生曾解释,正常情况下,右心房血栓患者只需服用10mg的“利伐沙班”,但老常右心室内的血栓巨大,所以要加大一倍的剂量,且每天必须准点准时吃药,否则一停药就会有生命危险。

为此,任海云数次叮嘱警方,称其丈夫常济淙每天早上7点需要服用救命药。

但是,一直等到次日傍晚,赵俊华才通知她将药物送到指定地方,交给指定的民警。

疑问三:常济淙被送往医院抢救之前是否已经死亡?

白鹿新闻报道称,死者常济淙在突发心脏骤停后,至少超过3个10分钟才得到120急救人员的抢救。据郑大医院出具的《院前急救病情记录》显示,现场办案民警主诉嫌疑人“晕厥20分钟,加重5分钟”呼叫120,医务人员接120指令于当晚20:32:50到达现场,20:34:26见到病人。而白鹿新闻根据卫星导航,从郑大医院开车到病历载明的抢救地案管中心,全程行车4公里多、约8分钟。这表明,常济淙在心脏骤停至少超过30分钟以后,医务人员才赶到现场施救。

另外,郑大医院在其出具的《院前急救病情记录》中明确写道,患者“抢救前死亡”,肺部“呼吸音消失”,心脏“心音消失,未闻及心音”,“经全力抢救,患者呼吸心跳仍未恢复,心电监护导联呈一直线,血压未测出……”。

截至目前,白鹿新闻的报道已被删除,但相关转载仍在。

【404媒体】“要是所有的媒体都能够追寻并披露真实的真相,又何需自媒体来写‘故事’ 呢?”(外二篇)

By: elijah
17 September 2024 at 07:03

CDT 档案卡
标题:【404媒体】“要是所有的媒体都能够追寻并披露真实的真相,又何需自媒体来写‘故事’ 呢?”(外二篇)
来源:贞观风慢慢JUSTLAW

主题归类:404媒体
CDS收藏:时间馆
版权说明:该作品版权归原作者所有。中国数字时代仅对原作进行存档,以对抗中国的网络审查。详细版权说明

《404档案馆》讲述中国审查与反审查的故事,同时以文字、音频和视频的形式发布。播客节目可在 Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Spotify 或泛用型播客客户端搜索“404档案馆”进行收听,视频节目可在Youtube“中国数字时代· 404档案馆”频道收看。

欢迎来到404档案馆,在这里,我们一起穿越中国数字高墙

尽管中国的言论审查和舆论管控日趋严峻,国家对公民的监控也无处不在,但我们依然可以看那些不服从的个体,顶着被删号、被约谈、甚至被监禁的风险,对不公义勇敢发出自己的声音。

中国数字时代在“404媒体”栏目中长期记录这些被当局审查封禁的媒体或自媒体。

本期节目,我们将介绍遭到封禁的媒体、自媒体账号为:贞观、风慢慢、Just Law。

一、贞观|自媒体都只能评论已经发生的事?

2024年8月16日,扎根在陕西西安的自媒体工作室“贞观”在其微信公众号发布了一篇名为《一个外地女孩,死在了我出租的公寓》的文章。

该篇非虚构报道以房东的视角讲述了一个来自西北偏远农村地区的女子,靠考学离开家乡,却在经历了原生家庭重男轻女、考公考编不公、工作难找等问题后三十多岁客死他乡的悲惨故事。

文中写道:

整理这些记忆,依然觉得内心烦乱,过程中有太多颠覆认知的地方,太多中国社会、中国农村难以触及、根深蒂固的痛点。

我该如何叙述,一个西部贫困山村女孩,经过怎样的努力,考入北京某211名校,毕业后的几年,一心考公,多次取得家乡省份事业单位笔试第一的成绩,却连连因面试环节落榜,最终又怀着怎样的失望远走他乡,依然没有找到与内心孤傲、与名校出身、与家人期望相匹配的工作,最后又是在怎样的绝望中结束了自己短暂的33岁的生命?

我也曾气愤过,气愤人要寻死,方法千千万,却为何死在租住的房子里,让我蒙受巨大损失;气愤她莫名奇妙、不留只言片语的离开,让我也背负过嫌疑。但随着案件的深入调查,我却又恨不起来,我为死者年轻生命的消逝而惋惜,也心疼死者面朝黄土背朝天一辈子却依然一贫如洗的双亲,也因西北贫困落后地区的风俗习惯而落泪,但很多时候谈起来,只有一声叹息……

起初,读者们为这位女子的悲惨遭遇感到难过,并以此对当前的种种社会问题进行反思和追问。

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然而,在该文走红网络后,有另一些网民、自媒体以及官媒则对故事的真实性表示怀疑。并导致微信公众号“贞观”在短短一天后便将原文删除。

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不久,“贞观”账号便被官方封禁。

之后,很多反对封禁“贞观”的声音在中文互联网流传,一些自媒体账号作者同时提出争议的真正原因是权力对新闻的垄断,即自媒体没有采访权,官媒则压根不会对此类话题进行跟踪报道。

在微信公众号“洞见报告”发布的文章《“贞观”公众号被封禁了,我担心的事发生了》中,作者就如此评论:

现在的现实就是,国内的自媒体都挺难的,没有新闻采编权,只能做做新闻评论。

说白了,自媒体都只能评论已经发生的事,不能自己挖新闻出来。

实际上,大家都知道,新闻得真实可靠,这是最基本的。

但是,传统媒体在报道速度上确实有点慢,而且为了安全起见,有些尖锐、 敏感的问题他们也不敢轻易碰。

像“油罐车事件”能被报道出来,背后肯定克服了不少阻力。

像“贞观”这样的号,写的文章介于新闻和生活之间,但这也是个风险点,万一哪篇文章火了,就容易招来麻烦。

就譬如这次写的“33岁考公女孩死在出租屋”的文章一样。

要是所有的媒体都能够追寻并披露真实的真相,又何需自媒体来写“故事” 呢?

二、风慢慢|赞美是爱,批评也是爱

微信公众号“风慢慢”,作者丰鸿平,昵称“丰不丰” ,其公众号自2023年12月开始更新,发表了多篇时事、文化、历史类评论。在2024年2月初《人民日报》“整个国家都洋溢着乐观向上的氛围”事件中,连续发布文章《整个鲁镇都洋溢着乐观向上的氛围》以及《股民朱由检启示录:认清形势,放弃幻想》,讽刺官方宣传。

中国数字时代收录并选读了多篇来自该号的文章,其中大多都遭到审查删除。

此外,在“风慢慢”被禁之后,其备用号“候补的风慢慢”也遭到封禁。

在一篇于2024年3月发布的文章《“爱国者”们遵循着流氓三定律》中,作者以分析鲁迅《流氓变迁史》为契机,嘲讽当前充斥在中国社会的极端爱国主义情绪。

文章中写道:

鲁迅在《流氓变迁史》一文,把流氓的起源追溯到墨子门徒,也就是“侠”。作为侠,要求高,死亡率高,回报还低,就演变为强盗,但继续打着“替天行道”的旗子。

所以流氓有3个特征,一是有一个虚拟的借口,比如替天行道、维持风化;二是所作所为却是伤害人的事情;三是只挑弱的下手,强横的非但不敢犯禁,一般是要下跪的。
这可称为“流氓三定律”。

总结起来,所谓流氓,就是幻想着自己是在做一件崇高的事情而安全地去伤害他人。流氓可以表示一个人、一个群体,也可表示一种行为一种思潮。

爱国是一种朴素的情感,并不需要在强国论坛上达到多少分才算爱国。谁会不爱自己生活的地方呢?每个人都在用自己的方式朴素地爱国,比如多交税、多买房、多生孩子等是爱国,但你不能说别人交税少、不买房、不多生孩子就是不爱国,也不能因为别人对一些问题有意见就是不爱国。

爱国也是一种道德自律,是对自己的要求。有人立下宏志“为中华之崛起而读书”,这无疑是爱国,有人抱怨搬砖烫手,也不是不爱国。赞美是爱,批评也是爱,都是让我们生活的国家变得更好。

这些道理应该很简单吧?

但他们爱国的方式是指责别人不爱国。并且他们指责别人不爱国的依据也极不靠谱,等同于构陷。比如莫言“侮辱先烈”、商家装饰有日系元素、农夫山泉的包装是日本文化等。

买华为还是苹果,喝娃哈哈还是农夫山泉,喜欢国漫还是日漫,和爱国是一点关系都没有的。

说别人不爱国也绝不代表自己爱国。这是对爱国的“矮化”。

其次,他们的行为目的和结果都是伤害他人,小一点伤害个人利益,大一点伤害一个企业,再大一点伤害营商环境,更大的伤害我们国家。整天对自己的作家、商家、企业下手,这不就是“亲者痛仇者快”吗?

最后,他们只会对自己安全的、能欺负的下手。比如说继承人国籍这事,某遥遥领先公司老板的长女也是外籍,某地事业单位要招聘外籍人员,你敢站出来说一句抵制、反对吗?当然我并不赞成有人这样做,因为毫无必要。

“后面是传统的靠山,对手又都非浩荡的强敌,他就在其间横行过去。”鲁迅的这一句来描述现在的所谓爱国者,非常的生动而贴切。

三、Just Law|面对公共事件,要么说真心话,要么玩大冒险

微信公众号“Just Law”是一个关注中国司法进程和法律公平的自媒体账号。正如其简介写道的“面对公共事件,要么说真心话,要么玩大冒险”,“Just Law”长期坚持着发布文章批评一些法律不公事件。中国数字时代收录了部分该号发布的文章,其中很多遭到404。目前,微信公众号“Just Law”也已被当局封禁。

在一篇“Just Law”于2023年10月发布的对裁判文书不公开进行抨击的文章中,作者写道:

如果裁判文书不公开,公众可能就不会知道江苏连云港90后女辅警性敲诈多名公职人员案。随着舆论关注和网络热传,法院将已经公开的一审判决书,从中国裁判文书网予以撤回。

如果裁判文书不公开,公众可能就不会知道深圳律协原会长林某炽的荒唐事儿。他为了“充分发表辩护意见、不被打断发言”,竟然向法官行贿了20万元。

如果裁判文书不公开,公众可能就不会知道那起引发检法强烈对抗的中铁公司总部纪检干部余某平案。这位纪检干部酒驾撞死人并逃逸,躲在足疗店,案发8小时后才投案,一审检察院、法院竟认定余金平构成自首?!

哪些人害怕裁判文书公开?

一些贪腐官员怕公开,毕竟是自己的丑闻。此前,还有落马官员的家属投诉媒体报道其涉案情况,认为侵犯贪腐官员的隐私和名誉,影响了家人的正常生活。

一些涉案者怕公开,他们有的牵涉案件但未被查办。这些人是最慌的!因为要接受社会公共的灼热目光。既得利益和社会谴责,让他们很煎熬,但又不愿引咎辞职。比如,某市律协会长持续被人实名举报“向官员行贿”。

一些办案者怕公开,某些司法机关的工作人员,其所办案件可能受某些因素干预而经不起公众关注和历史检验。那些办过冤假错案的人,随着判决文书公开,其职业污点全网留痕,这会让他们如鲠在喉、如坐针毡。

一些办案机关乱作为者害怕公开,因为优秀的裁判认定和证据评判,需要进行列举和详述,那些污糟之事将无法被掩盖。

一些主政的地方领导害怕公开,他们觉得丑闻会影响当地政府形象和自己的颜面,更愿意“家丑不外露”!

然而,反观另一面,哪些人希望公开?

期待通过公正审判来主张自身权益者希望公开,如此可以推动维权,排除非法律因素的干扰。

媒体记者等关注社会公益人士希望公开,透过一例例个案标本,观察司法运行中的共性问题,完善和推动司法工作乃至立法工作。

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【404文库】法度Law|对话李佩霞案家属委托律师:询问能否依法依规安排会见未被回应

30 August 2024 at 15:12

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CDT 档案卡
标题:唐山通报后,实名举报的原警察再次发声
作者:法度Law
发表日期:2024.8.29
来源:微信公众号“法度Law”
主题归类:李佩霞
CDS收藏:时间馆
版权说明:该作品版权归原作者所有。中国数字时代仅对原作进行存档,以对抗中国的网络审查。详细版权说明

8月29日,关于李佩霞案家属委托律师称会见受阻、已有“官派律师”一事,北京市中闻律师事务所郭睿律师告诉“法度law”,今天(8月29日)早上,其按通知前往看守所,但被告知可以会见李佩霞但要派员在场,“我们多次询问他们,能否依法依规安排律师会见,他们不回答,所以我们离开了看守所。”

此前,郭睿律师和北京市京师(上海)律师事务所的李送妹律师发布声明,接受家属委托,担任江西省万年县上坊乡原党委书记李佩霞涉嫌职务犯罪一案的辩护律师。

今年6月,李佩霞被查。据官方通报,其涉嫌严重违纪违法,主动向组织交代问题,接受万年县纪委县监委纪律审查和监察调查。

7月25日,李佩霞的父亲李长柳网络实名举报万年县委书记毛奇涉嫌性侵女下属。李长柳称,今年5月份,李佩霞与毛奇发生争执并声称要去省纪委监委举报毛奇,3天后李佩霞自己却被万年县纪委监委带走并留置。

李长柳称,李佩霞被带走前曾留给家人一个U盘,嘱咐这个U盘能救她的命,李长柳还公布了3段录音。

事情发酵后,官方介入调查。8月18日,上饶市委联合调查组发布关于李佩霞严重违纪违法案件的情况通报。通报称,李佩霞涉嫌受贿犯罪,经按程序报批,对李佩霞给予开除党籍、开除公职处分,将其涉嫌犯罪问题移送检察机关依法审查起诉。发现毛奇存在利用职权影响与李佩霞发生不正当性关系问题,李佩霞为了职务调整升迁违反生活纪律。对毛奇涉嫌违纪违法问题,省纪委监委正在审查调查中。

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在官方通报前的8月15日,李佩霞的家属已委托郭睿和李送妹二人担任李佩霞的辩护律师。不过,就在律师团队介入案件13天后,8月28日,郭睿律师公开发文称会见受阻、投诉无果,当地已安排“官派律师”下场。

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郭睿律师说,8月21日,两名辩护律师在上饶市看守所会见李佩霞,会见时间仅10分钟且中途多次被打断。

“欲签署委托书时,李佩霞身边站着三名工作人员。最终李佩霞表示,她已经向调查组申请与家人联络,联络后再签署。”郭睿律师说,随后律师向上饶市检察院递交了投诉上饶市看守所侵犯律师执业权利的控告信。

郭睿律师称,8月28日,两名辩护律师再次赶到上饶市看守所,得知当地已安排“官派律师”汪某某拟会见李佩霞,且这名“官派律师”为地方政府法律顾问。“我们律师团队对当地办案机关严重侵犯律师执业权利和在押人员合法权利的行为表示严重抗议,强烈要求审查官派律师所持委托书的来源。”

28日傍晚,李佩霞的父亲李长柳在社交平台发布《十问李佩霞的官派律师》一文,询问律师汪某某是如何拿到李佩霞的委托书、谁支付的律师费、如何成为第三名律师、是否会见过李佩霞、受何人安排等问题。

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新黄河曾联系上饶市多个部门了解情况,有工作人员表示“李佩霞案以市纪委通报的信息为准,后续可关注市纪委的官网”。

8月29日,“法度law”联系到郭睿律师了解此事的最新进展。

“法度law”:截至目前,律师团队一共会见了几次?

郭睿律师:一次。具体情况我在此前投诉中有提及。

“法度law”:“官派律师”一事,家属和律师是什么时知道的?当时是何情形?

郭睿律师:我们是昨天(8月28日)知道的,然后告诉家属。

当时我们在看守所排队会见,看到排在我们前面的江西赣都律师事务所汪某某律师的会见手续。当地的汪某某律师不是法律援助律师,手续不是法援公函,而是打印好的有李佩霞签字的委托书,落款时间是8月28日。

后来我们跟家属确认,家属表示他们全部不知道委托的事情,也没有签合同,都很奇怪。那么,是谁传递了李佩霞的委托书?怎么传递的?明显违法。

“法度law”:家属对“官派律师”一事是什么态度?

郭睿律师:坚决反对,强烈谴责,不认可,并且已经发信息给“官派律师”要求其立即停止代理。

家属发给汪某某律师的信息:“汪某某律师你好,我是李佩霞的家属,我现在代表全体家属要求你立即停止代理李佩霞的案子,你的行为严重侵害了李佩霞和我们家属的权利!”

“法度law”:稍早前你发文称,看守所给律师团队的回复是,需要领导研究,48小时内给答复。目前此事有进展了吗?

郭睿律师:此事进展是,今天(8月29日)早上,看守所负责人通知我们去看守所,要给我们答复。

我们到了之后,看守所工作人员就开着执法记录仪对着我们。他们回复的核心是,我们可以会见李佩霞但是他们要派员在场,我们表示这是违法的,坚决拒绝,并告知他们,看守所昨天下午安排汪某某律师会见李佩霞也是违法的。

我们多次询问他们,能否依法依规安排我们两位作为家属委托的、目前仍依法享有辩护权的律师会见李佩霞,他们不回答。所以我们离开了看守所。

作者|赵果

煽情罪

By: fivestone
15 June 2024 at 23:34

60 多岁的 L 先生,在维园举着手机,显示白色蜡烛的照片,被大批警察包围、搜身,警告其涉嫌「煽动他人情绪」。

之前一些「煽动罪」的案例,还属于在街上喊口号、勿忘时代革命、或者坚持在媒体和网络上以笔做刀枪的范畴。——这类活动在高压下渐渐消失后,「煽动」的罪名,似乎渐渐被拓展到,一些更细微的,p2p 之间的领域。

这就有一些形而上学的味道了。

我们的情绪,是怎样被「煽动」起来的呢?如今早就没有公开的活动了,大家只是在某些时刻,走在那里。或许有一些隐晦的衣着标识,或许什么都没有。目光交汇,甚至不需要交汇,仅仅是知道你也在这里,我的心就因此而触动。在这种细微的,如水一样的共鸣中,我们的情绪互相「煽动」,一起酝酿。

而此刻「法律」,授予执法者的权力,也让他们脱离了实证,一起沉浸到这些细微共鸣中。作为人类,他们也有感知这些共鸣的能力,却把这些能力用来捕捉、判定:我们的哪些行为,是在彼此煽动?

喊口号,是煽动情绪,
点蜡烛,是煽动情绪,
一起走路,是煽动情绪,
目光交汇,是煽动情绪,
感知同类的存在,是煽动情绪。

从他们的视角,确实是希望,我们这种心思的存在,即是「有罪」的。于是,所谓法律,在这些从实证到心证,从表象到本质,从公共行为到个人内心的边界交错中,成为了新时代的猎巫。

Fragile laws, broken laws, outdated laws

By: Elsa Zhou
25 April 2022 at 22:42

The most powerful authoritarian government in the world has locked down its most economic productive city over a month ago. It has since mobilised Shanghai municipal government, Chinese army, local volunteers, and ordered other provinces to send help to Shanghai. Yet, despite all the effort (at least seen on the news), Shanghainese are starving, literally. Many hospitals are closed to non-COVID patients, many with long term diseases are therefore unable to sustain treatment, resulting in unnecessary casualties. Everyday there are reports of citizens, civil servants, medical staff and other people sustaining the fallout. Local government overwhelmed, logistics broken down, people committing suicides, and until very recently, infected children regardless of age being separated from their non-infected parents. It is difficult to state the seriousness of the situation in Shanghai. It is more than dire, it is hopelessness.

The United States is the proceeding global power after the collapse of the United Kingdom. Both countries share the common law system, and has intertwined origins. For those not familiar with the terms ‘civil law’ and ‘common law’, they refer to different systems of laws where the major difference is court judgements in common law jurisdictions typically hold precedent value, meaning case outcomes for similar situations tend to be similar, whereas judgements in civil law jurisdiction typically do not hold precedent value. This means that in civil law, the law is the law as interpreted by different courts each time, while in common law, the law is the law as created and evolved through court judgements. Court cases in common law can be more important than the law itself, as it provides additional meaning. The US Supreme Court famously ruled same-sex marriage to be constitutionally protected when the US constitution said nothing about same-sex marriage.

Common law provides more flexibility for the society and freedom for the individual. While most civil law countries require a mandatory national ID, Hong Kong and Singapore are the only common law ones requiring so. However, as technology and how the world is shaped continues to progress, the common law system in its current form fails to keep up with its time.

Employment laws are unable to address the issues of remote work, since the assumption was employment had to be performed at the work site. Hong Kong recently faced such a dilemma of the validity of treatment prescribed by a physician licensed in Hong Kong while being physically outside of Hong Kong to a patient in Hong Kong. Where do one country end and another began? Once I step on a Cathay flight taking off from New York, Hong Kong laws apply and I can get my wine legally before 21. Laws are created based on assumptions from past experiences, and as such is unable to fulfil their original intentions when the underlying assumption has shifted dramatically.

The fundamental issue hindering arguments for a planned economy is justified in criticism towards the current legal system. Information is asymmetrical for different stakeholders and even if it is perfectly shared, there is latency which means circumstances on the ground would have changed by the time a decision comes from the top, and thus no longer reflects the actual needs. Government and firms are in direct contrast with each other. While government acts with authorisation of law, companies act without prohibition of law.

Despite all the criticisms Chinese legal system gets (often quite rightly so), there are lessons that can be learnt. Chinese cities and counties are empowered to make regulations that have legal force to govern themselves as they see fit. This is contradictory to the usual image that China as a unitary state, which will perhaps be explored in a future article. Back to the point, what China has done is essentially employing different cities to test out different regulations in action, before compiling lessons learnt in all of them and create a single uniform law. This is a very pragmatic approach and allows for a very efficient legal system, one that is both needed to support the tremendous growth and to govern a country of over a billion. Shanghai in 2022 shows what could happen if a government is not as efficient as the market, which is (almost) always. Similar results can be expected from laws that fail to keep up with the times.

In a globalised world dominated by multinational firms, companies choose the government they work with instead of the other way around. Venue shopping on a global scale. It is a world where some companies are more powerful than many countries, and while becoming entirely subordinate to the will of private firms is not something any country would wish for, it is increasingly the reality. While seemingly different on the surface, the government and firms actually have a lot in common. Government is just as concerned about the bottom line as companies are, except the word for it is “GDP”. Shareholders the citizens, board of directors the cabinet, and share price the Human Development Index (HDI). Whatever you call it, the fundamentals do not change. Trust in the future keep shareholders from selling and citizens from emigrating, good management keep employees from quitting and citizens from “laying down” (躺平 tang ping, a Chinese social trend similar to the “anti-work” sentiment), and satisfactory growth keep the seat at the highest office, and revolutions at bay. Dollars keep companies coming and governments running. Firms and governments are not that different after all. As such, it is even more surprising to see the lack of communication and cooperation between them, to the point of viewing each other as enemies. Given interaction is long term, this cannot be simply explained by calling it a Prisoner’s dilemma but rather long term game theory applies, to an extent. The problem is the government’s priority changes every few years once someone new is elected, rendering prior co-ooperation meaningless. Singapore provides clues in the way out, maintaining consistent governing standards over decades. While it is certainly not perfect, it is most definitely better than the United States’ system offers. “Checks and balances”, more like “Clogged and barely functions”.

“Empires … are little more than sandcastles. Only the tides are forever”. — Inspector Kido, Man in the High Castle

Tide has turned. Tide will turn. Tide is turning.

The Bund, Shanghai (Taken in 2018)

Hong Kong: More than just a ‘SAR’

By: Elsa Zhou
12 April 2021 at 12:34

Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of People’s Republic of China. SAR is an administrative division of China, a singular, centralised state.

Behind that sentence, Hong Kong hides its true self of being a quasi-state. To understand what Hong Kong truly is, we must look at what Hong Kong truly regard itself and act as.

Let’s start with the basics. This is the map of Hong Kong, a city with 7.5 million people. It has its own immigration, customs, and basically all other control within its borders. For example, if one is travelling from Shenzhen here, to Hong Kong, during the pandemic, one might be subject to 14 days of quarantine.

Map of Hong Kong with borders

Have you been noticing the change from simply ‘Country’ on many selections to ‘Country/Region’? Yes, it is done to conform to China’s pressure, as they do not like to view Hong Kong as an independent, national entity separate from the rest of China. However, that is (with a few exceptions) the reality. All this time, all the Hong Kong and Chinese government has been doing, is simply concealing the fact by changing words, technicalities, and the fine prints.

Chapter 1: Hong Kong’s domestic matters

Hong Kong, within its own borders, have near full agency. It’s status is conferred by Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution which allows for the establishment of SARs when necessary, with specific laws that apply on a case-by-case basis. For Hong Kong, that law is the Basic Law of Hong Kong, passed by the Chinese Parliament. It is a Chinese domestic law, created because of an international treaty with the UK that serves as the de facto constitution for Hong Kong. Although under Chinese sovereignty (which will be discussed later), Hong Kong is therefore not subject to much of the laws that apply in Beijing, including the Chinese Constitution (in practice).

The Basic Law of Hong Kong is the foundational document for Hong Kong, much like other constitutions. Laws that go against the Basic Law will be declared unconstitutional by Hong Kong courts and made invalid. Basic Law prescribes the ’One country, Two systems’ formula for Hong Kong, allows for continuance of its capitalist system and way of life until at least 2047 as guaranteed by the Sino-British Agreement.

One of the things prescribed is Hong Kong’s citizenship. As part of the word changing, it is not called citizens rather than ‘Permanent Residents’. In actuality, the two statues are very similar. Only Hong Kong permanent residents (HKPR) may vote in elections, regardless of their nationality. A Chinese national without permanent residency have to apply for visas to enter Hong Kong, oh sorry, I meant ‘entry permits’. Few differences still matter when its comes to nationality. Only a HKPR with Chinese nationality as per Chinese nationality laws may obtain a Hong Kong passport which labels the bearer as a Chinese citizen, but it cannot be used at the airport in Beijing as although technically it is a type of Chinese passports, that is only the technicalities. Only a HKPR with Chinese nationality may never lose their HKPR status, a foreign (non-Chinese) HKPR may lose their HKPR after a continuous period of 3 years’ absence from Hong Kong, after which they will be given the ‘right to land’ allowing them essentially all prior rights, just without suffrage. Chinese HKPR and non-Chinese HKPR votes weigh the same, but non-Chinese HKPR have limited seats in Hong Kong’s parliament (‘Legislative Council’). One can argue that this is unfair treatment, but one can also argue that many other countries have protections for their ‘indigenous population’. Chinese Hong Kong residents (whether permanent or not) and non-Chinese HKPR who cannot obtain any other foreign travel document can apply for a ‘Hong Kong Document of Identity for Visa Purposes’, which have less rights than a full Hong Kong passport including visa-free access. However, the bearer of these two documents are considered to be Hongkongers by U.S., with the same nationality code entered on the visa issued (HNK). In effect, Hong Kong’s citizenship scheme gives preferences and protections to Chinese nationals without tipping the balance too much.

As a recent story about how Hong Kong thinks in the ‘city-state’ mentality, it is from neighbouring Shenzhen, where residents angrily discovered that Hong Kong is planning to build a mass cemetry near the border. For Hong Kong, the location is perfect as it is far away from any of its population, but across the river, there is a flourishing business and leisure district. To this protest from Shenzhen residents, Hong Kong’s president/prime minister (‘Chief Executive’) basically just shrugged, and said ‘too bad, that is a they problem’.

Chapter 2: Hong Kong’s foreign relations

Hong Kong has signed a wide range of treaties and conventions, and participates in many international organisations under the name ‘Hong Kong, China’, from the WTO, APEC, IMF, Universal Postal Union and much more. A Hongkonger even once chaired the WHO, however this is not well known as she was officially a member of the Chinese delegation. According to the Hong Kong government, she participates in 39 international organisations that are full sovereign states only, either as less-than-full members or as part of the Chinese delegation, and 54 organizations not limited to soverign states.

As part of international diplomatic practice, Hong Kong maintains an order of precedence. Note the lack of any Chinese government officials on the list, as they are treated as special guests when visiting HKSAR, like any other foreign dignitary. The CIA World Fact book lists the Chinese President Xi Jinping as Hong Kong’s head of state and Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam as Head of Government. In most cases, Head of State is more of a ceremonial role and Head of Government is one that has the real power. For example, the Queen is the Head of State of the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and her other Commonwealth Realms but the actual power is exercised by Prime Ministers, the Heads of Governments. In effect, the CIA considers the Chinese President to be important in Hong Kong’s politics but not exercising much direct influence, which is true.

Various foreign Consulate-Generals are accredited to Hong Kong, and despite their official classification as Constulates, they are in actuality treated as Embassies by many of the sending states. For example, the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong is not subject to the control of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, and report directly to the Department of State like what any other embassy would do.

Hong Kong also has representations outside of its borders, called Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices (HKETO), a name similar to what Taiwan’s foreign representations call themselves, ‘Taipei Economic and Cultural Office’. In reality, HKETO’s and Taiwan’s representation perform like any other embassy or consulates. They communicate with foreign governments, help citizens in need (for example, repatriation flights such as during COVID-19), and issue passports and visas (though only some of the HKETOs perform this function as Hong Kong government decided it was not worth the money). Hong Kong has 5 main offices (with sub-units) in Mainland China, 1 in Taiwan, and 11 elsewhere in the world. They are typically granted diplomatic privileges by special legislation of the host country (as done in Germany) and represents the interest of Hong Kong. Bangkok office has been the latest one opened in 2019, and Hong Kong is prepared to open one in Dubai after talks and signing an agreement with the UAE.

Signing of the Hong Kong-UAE Agreement on Investments

As a counter part of the Hong Kong offices in Mainland China, the Beijing government has several offices in Hong Kong, including the ‘Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ which deals primarily with diplomatic matters that are not within the scope authorised by the Basic Law for Hong Kong, the ‘Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government’ which functions as an sort-of Chinese embassy that communicates with the Hong Kong government, organises receptions for guests, issues certificates with legal force recognising and authenticating Hong Kong issued degrees for use in Mainland China and more. Hong Kong SAR passport is issued by Immigration Department, Hong Kong, but for a proper Chinese passport with the red cover, that is issued to Mainland Chinese citizens by the aforementioned Office of the Commissioner, where one can also apply for Chinese visas among other functions.

I don’t know about you, but that seems to me pretty much like Hong Kong is conducting foreign relations like any other country. Gasp, how can that be possible for a ‘region’?

Chapter 3: Chinese Soverignty

Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong is evident in several matters. The Basic Law allows for unilateral, direct application of Chinese Laws by the Chinese parliament in Hong Kong that affect foreign affairs, national defence or matters not within Hong Kong’s autonomy through amending Annex III, which was used to bring the ‘Hong Kong National Security Law’ into legal force in Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s signing of international agreements must be consented by the Chinese government, and ultimately, Chinese government has the power to unilaterally revoke Hong Kong’s status, perhaps through using the Chinese army stationed in Hong Kong. Much of the potential power is not exercised, as it is not in China’s interest to completely destroy Hong Kong.

Mainland Chinese residents wishing to travel to Hong Kong for tourism do not need a visa from the Hong Kong government, instead ‘entry endorsement’ is given by the Chinese government with legal force not found in Hong Kong’s Immigration Law (‘Immigration Ordinance’), but in the Basic Law itself which provides the constitutional right for Beijing to control the entry of Chinese citizens resident in other parts of China into Hong Kong.

Still, this does not diminish the fact that Hong Kong acts much like its own independent state on the world stage. Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong should be interpreted as control over a foreign state like the U.S. over the 3 countries it is in Free Association with, and New Zealand over its various domains. This is consistent with that fact that Hongkongers, even those of Chinese nationality, are foreign in Mainland China. Not allowed to book into ‘domestic travellers’ only hotels (usually budget hotels), facing huge restrictions on many day-to-day matters such as opening a bank account, obtaining a phone plan, getting the national social insurance and many more. Some of the hurdles comes from the fact that many systems are designed only to support the Chinese national ID and not other documents, and some come from the fact that although Chinese government would like to emphasize that all Hong Kong Chinese compatriots are fully Chinese, and Chinese diplomatic representations have a duty to represent Hong Kong’s interest in the absence of a direct HKETO, often they only pay lip service and heavy suspicion remains. Having a passport stating you as a ‘Chinese national’ is not enough for entry to Beijing, because the passport is in fact a Hong Kong passport that Beijing thinks is just another type of Chinese passport, but for immigration purposes it is suddenly not a Chinese passport anymore. Hongkongers are only claimed as Chinese when it benefits the Chinese government, and ignored when it does not, such as when including the country wide number of COVID-19 cases.

The situation has improved in recent years, as China allowed for Hongkongers with Chinese nationality to obtain ‘Resident IDs’ that are similar to the Chinese national ID, however, differences and hurdles will remain for as long China treats Hongkongers as less-than-full citizens. Only time will tell whether this will ever be possible.

Chapter 4: Fine Prints

Not an Air Force, just the ‘government flying service’. Not a visa, just an ‘entry permit’. Not a consulate, just the ‘Economic and Trade Office’. Not a president, just a ‘Chief Executive’. Not an ambassador, just a ‘director’. Not a member state, just an ‘member economy’.

The list goes on.

Hong Kong is the master at the art of fine prints, using it to portray herself as a subnational part of China. That is true, however this is not the whole picture, far from it.

Hong Kong is a city, an administrative of China with provincial level status. It also is part of the three/four(if you include Taiwan) legal jurisdictions that make up the PRC (Mainland, Hong Kong, Macau), signing not treaties with Mainland China but rather ‘arrangements’. On the world stage, it is a separate legal entity from China in most matters, having its own seat on the table.

The hypocrisy cannot be any more stronger than the fact that Hongkongers can obtain international driving permits because Hong Kong is a party to the Convention on Road Traffic, but not Mainland Chinese because China is not a party. Oh, so can Taiwanese and Macanese citizens.

The legal fine prints build up the illusion that the closest word to describe Hong Kong would be a ‘Special Administrative Region of China’, when the closest word would instead be ‘puppet Chinese city-state’.

The fact is, Hong Kong’s government structure, mentality, society, international relations, laws, finance, and a lot of other matters are just separate from China’s, for the most part albeit similarities that exist because of the shared Chinese heritage. Even the Chinese Nationality Law applied to Hong Kong ‘directly’ through Annex III of the Basic Law was of a different version, but of course it is not called an amendment, just a different ‘interpretation’ issued by the Chinese Parliament.

Cathay Pacific, the de facto flag carrier of Hong Kong, flies no flags of either Hong Kong or China on its planes. Story was that they could not come to a decision about whether to fly the Hong Kong flag or the Chinese flag, or both at the same time, so they decided that doing nothing would be the most correct decision. It is one of the only flag carriers to fly the flag of the company, the other being neighbouring Air Macau.

Hong Kong’s state institutions are, undeniably, separate from the rest of China. With its own currency, border, government, laws, international presence, and basically all the things you would expect from a full sovereign state. In establishing this ‘Special Administrative Region’, China has in effect, gave life to this grand experiment about how far one can push the definition of a ‘country’ to, considering that officially, even despite all the common knowledge suggesting so, Hong Kong is an inalienable, and integral part of the People’s Republic, and all the differences you see here, can be simply explained by ‘One country, two systems’.

As long as everyone is willing to play by the absurdity, China is happy to let Hong Kong be herself, satisfied mostly with just the recognition that Hong Kong is Chinese. As long as SAR is added after Hong Kong to signify the non-sovereign, subnational status, China is willing to let Hong Kong join international organisations and sign international treaties, as long as you call them ‘agreements’. As long as Hong Kong opens consulates in the name of ‘Economic and Trade Offices’, as long as the name ‘Hong Kong, China’, as long as Hong Kong passports label bearer as ‘Chinese’, as long as everyone is buying into the fine prints and not questioning the facade or trying to change the situation, music keeps playing.

Even as China is turning Hong Kong more authoritarian, money will still flow, after all, the world never cared about Singapore’s less-than-democratic regime, only profit.

The horse races on, the dance goes on.

Note: ‘The horse races on, the dance goes on’ is a translation from Paramount Leader Deng Xiaoping’s quote, ‘马照跑,舞照跳’, as a promise to Hong Kong that she will keep her life style and everything will be just as the usual.

Bibliography

Hong Kong’s membership in international organizations limited to sovereign states

Hong Kong’s membership in international organizations not limited to sovereign states

Treaties signed by Hong Kong

Repatriation flights from India

Repatriation flights from Hubei Province, China

Order of Precedence

Signing of Hong Kong — UAE Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement

CIA World Factbook: Hong Kong

German Legislation granting HKETO Berlin full diplomatic privileges

Emergency response operations outside Hong Kong: Emergency Support Unit, Hong Kong Security Bureau

Hong Kong proceeds with building mass cemetery near Shenzhen border

Xi Jinping Exposed

24 October 2022 at 22:35

In this piece for the Council on Foreign Relations, I give my quick take on the recently concluded party congress, questioning whether Xi is really as powerful as people make him out to be, or if his omnipresence is a sign of looming weakness. 

The post Xi Jinping Exposed appeared first on Ian Johnson.

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