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Today — 14 July 2025Main stream

Xi Rumors

14 July 2025 at 21:40

Well, we’ve seen this before…

Lily Ottinger reports:

You’ve probably heard the recent rumors that Xi Jinping is facing the threat of imminent replacement by PLA and party elites. As a longtime observer of internal Russian politics, I’ve become desensitized to this type of speculation — rumors about Putin facing serious illness or internal overthrow first surfaced in 2012, then again in 2015, 2016, 2020, 2022, and 2023. How often has Xi gotten similar treatment? As far as I can tell, this is the third sustained instance of replacement rumors over the course of Xi’s 12-year tenure. A rundown:

September 2022: India Pumps ‘Xi Under House Arrest’

In September 2022, Premier Li Keqiang attended the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly in Xi’s place. This absence was followed by a period of about 10 days where Xi didn’t appear in public, which sparked rumors that he was under house arrest and would be replaced by General Li Qiaoming 李桥铭. This coincided with mass changes to commercial flights through China, with more than 9,000 flights being cancelled on September 21st. Rumors of a coup spread quickly across Indian news media in particular, and an Indian politician with more than 10 million followers tweeted about Xi’s supposed house arrest.

Flights returned to normal by the following Monday, and Xi resumed public appearances not long after. Rather than being under house arrest, it seems Xi was observing the zero-covid quarantine requirement after traveling to Uzbekistan for a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit on September 16th. In December of 2022, Li Qiaoming was promoted to commander of the PLA Ground Force.

August 2024: Xi About to Die?

In August 2024, a Falun Gong-run Chinese media outlet called “Secret China” published a sensational report claiming Xi was gravely ill and that he would step down from his position as General Secretary at the annual Beidaihe leadership retreat, and only retain his position as President of China. The story alleged that party officials had decided to replace Xi with Hu Chunhua 胡春华, citing a cryptic tweet from a princeling. A YouTube video also cited in the report observed that, when Xi had met with the leaders of Vietnam, Italy, and East Timor in July 2024, the placards describing Xi’s position translated to “President of the PRC” instead of “General Secretary” or “Chairman of the Central Military Commission.”

Summer vacation came and went, and Hu Chunhua was not promoted.

May 2025 to Today — Third Time’s Probably not the Charm

This most recent round of rumors began in May, when Xi didn’t appear in public for about two weeks. Like the previous cases, rumors began with commentators in the diaspora — this time it was dissident journalist Cai Shenkun of the Falun Gong-run Epoch Times, citing an open letter detailing 28 of Xi’s policy mistakes and calling for his resignation that was allegedly emailed to Cai in December 2024.

The rumors gained momentum after Li Qiang attended the BRICS summit in Xi’s place on July 6th. Another parallel with previous rumors is that Indian news outlets like the Hindustan Times have been quick to disseminate this speculation for clicks. Yao Cheng, a former lieutenant colonel in the PLA Navy living in exile, alleges that Xi will be forced to retire at the 21st National Congress in October 2027 — so the rumors will probably stick around until then.

Bill is Right

has an excellent riff on the rumors on his latest Sharp China podcast. I (Jordan) couldn’t agree more.

Whatever we talk about here, just remember that when you get into early August and someone writes a story saying Xi has disappeared, it happens every year at this time.

What I will say is, first, we don't know. Chinese elite politics is a black box, so we cannot say with 100% confidence that nothing is going on. That's my initial caveat. However, when you look at the round of rumors and the way I approach them—this is something I've done in my newsletter for a long time.

My master's was in looking at Chinese politics. My master's advisor was at the time one of the US government's top experts on Chinese politics (now retired). I talk to lots of people who spend time focusing on elite Chinese politics. People get things wrong, but I do feel comfortable expressing opinions in this area more than in other areas.

When you see a rumor that Xi is in trouble, there are a few things you should ask. First, what is that being based on? Some of these reports were based on there being no Politburo meeting in May, so therefore Xi is in trouble. Someone says that to you without mentioning that there was also no Politburo meeting announced in May 2023. Actually, during this Party Congress, the number of monthly Politburo meetings that have been missed or not announced is much higher than in previous Party Congresses. If they don't give you that caveat, it tells me they're not actually doing the work of trying to see what is anomalous and what is not.

If someone says Xi Jinping disappeared for 13 days in May and that's a big problem, without saying that he has disappeared for similar periods previously—not around that early August break, but in other parts of the year—it's strange. We don't know why, but it has happened before and then he came back. Again, that's not evidence there is a problem.

Third, if somebody says Xi Jinping looks like he's being mentioned less in People's Daily or state media, that is patently not true. Demonstrably untrue. [See the China Media Project’s coverage on this topic.] Someone who says that is not doing the work. If someone cites a Twitter account or YouTube account, another red flag. That's a problem without understanding their track record of predictions and without checking whether they're linked to Falun Gong accounts. There are dozens of Falun Gong accounts spouting crap about all sorts of things, especially Chinese politics.

For example, there was an op-ed in The Spectator by a professor of Japanese history. The Spectator article, like the New York Post article, got a lot of traction. The guy cited some of the things I talked about without any background, then he cited accounts that were clearly Falun Gong accounts. But people read this—"Oh, it's The Spectator. Oh, it's the New York Post. It must be real." It cycles up and gets amplified.

I understand why a lot of people want to believe it's true. Hopium is a strong drug. The idea that different leadership—this mythical reformer—might come in, like the alleged reformer Wang Yang (poor Wang, he's retired). He's probably not happy that all these rumors about him taking over from Xi keep circulating during his retirement. The idea that Wang Yang is somehow this fantasy that people keep having—that there's just a reformer over there somewhere. As a friend of mine who worked on this stuff for a long time in the government said, "People are always looking for someone to mail the cake to."

I understand why people want to believe this, because the idea that they'll come in and fix the economy, maybe change the approach to Russia, maybe change the approach to trade—it's much easier to hope that's happening than to deal with the reality.

The actuarial tables give Xi a 3% chance of dying or becoming incapacitated this year, and the premium for holding a position for six months on polymarket is around 4%. Even a 2% chance of a coup seems high to me.

For Actual Insight into Xi

Check out our interview with Joseph Torigian on his monumental scholarly achievement: The Party’s Interest Comes First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping, easily a contender for one of the best China books of the decade. Joseph’s goal, in his own words, was to “shine as much light into the darkness of the past as possible” to understand the nature of authoritarian politics, and he succeeds beyond my wildest expectations.

This biography gives me a feel for Chinese politics that I honestly thought I’d never have. It does an incredible job of digging deep to shed light on some of the most consequential moments in CCP history, as well as conveying what it was like to live as a senior official under Mao and Deng. Reading it was a powerful experience at both an intellectual and human level.

We get memorable vignettes, like 15-year-old Xi Zhongxun attempting to assassinate a teacher, or General Peng Dehuai using his shoe to silence Xi Zhongxun’s snoring in their shared bunk.

In this interview, we discuss:

  • What we can learn about authoritarianism, the CCP, and China’s future from studying Xi’s father,

  • Torigian’s methodology for uncovering hidden Party history,

  • How the Party became an existential source of meaning, and how it weaponized suffering to paradoxically deepen political loyalty,

  • The interplay of family, love, and career under the all-encompassing shadow of the Party,

Listen now on iTunes, Spotify, YouTube, or your favorite podcast app. Transcript here if you prefer!


‘Containing Xi’, or refining party rule?

What does the latest politburo meeting reveal about Chinese politics?

Dr is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Glasgow. This piece was originally posted by the Council on Geostrategy.

The Investigator | No. 15/2025

New regulations on central decision making bodies

Speculation about the June politburo meeting readout is feeding rumours of Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s ‘weakening’ hold on power. The readout announced that the politburo had reviewed new ‘Regulations on Party Centre Decision Making, Discussion and Coordinating Body Work’ [‘党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例’].

This speculation hangs on two ideas. The wilder of the two is that some elusive group of actors has decided to establish a new body above Xi. This is based on a misreading of the first line of the readout – a boilerplate introduction to the topic at hand, not a declaration of a new power centre being established. The second is that these regulations are designed to rein in Xi’s power by placing it under institutionalised constraint.

Both readings ignore basic facts and two ongoing, well-documented trends: centralised CCP decision making nudging out the state, and ‘rule-based rule of the party’ [‘依规治党’]. Linking the readout to speculation about Xi’s ‘decline’ misses an opportunity to examine the regulations’ significance for the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) evolving political system. While analysis of Xi’s impact on the system rightly points to power ‘centralisation’ and ‘personalisation’, less is known about how the CCP and its leader use power once it has been centralised. The regulations – not yet released – are likely part of the party centre’s ongoing task of modifying institutions to help it put centralised power into action.

To be clear, the politburo meeting readout contains nothing shocking. The party centre has long been planning to formulate the regulations in question. We know this because they were mentioned in April 2023’s Central Intra-Party Regulations Formulation Work Plan Outline (2023-2027) (hereinafter ‘Party Regulations Formulation Outline’).

What is ‘centralised power’ without rules to use it?

These planned regulations are part of Xi’s longstanding pet project to govern the CCP and the PRC by rules – his macro-plan combines ‘rule-based rule of the party’ and ‘law-based rule of the country.’ On coming to power, Xi spoke of the party’s need for rules to rein in the party’s excesses and avoid the existential threat of a breakdown in the party-people relationship, and he has been making rules ever since.

Xi has made rules about making rules – stipulating how party regulations can be formulated and by whom – and has made rules to put his fellow party members’ authority ‘in a cage’ [‘把权力关在笼子里’]. He has used rules to his advantage, giving himself maximum flexibility for pushing through decisions and to remould the party’s internal workings, creating new incentive structures, and making himself the ‘core’ with whom all must ‘align.’ He has used rules for everything; from dictating how many dishes cadres may serve when entertaining to delineating party powers to manipulate the state.

Xi takes rules, and their use for creating governance mechanisms, seriously. He regards them as integral to ‘modernising’ Chinese governance. In 2019, a Central Committee Plenum document resolved to ‘better translate China’s institutional strengths into national governance efficacy.’ The document called for ‘strengthening the role’ of the bodies involved in the controversial politburo readout, improving mechanisms for ensuring party centre decisions are implemented and ‘strictly enforcing’ the instruction requesting and reporting system – a little-discussed system of longstanding importance to the party’s internal workings which is discussed later in this article.

Xi has used rules not only to maximise his concentration of power, but also to facilitate its use. The Central Military Commission ‘Chairman in Charge’ system [‘中央军委主席负责制’] is a case in point. While analysts stress Xi’s being ‘in charge’ – and his ultimate authority to make decisions – his attempt to create a whole set of rules and mechanisms to facilitate this decision-making role go under the radar. For instance, the ‘three mechanisms’ developed through intra-party rules seek to serve the Chairman’s decision making capabilities.

What are Party Centre DDC bodies?

Party Centre Decision Making, Discussion and Coordination bodies (DDC bodies) form a level of authority which shifts major decision making upwards, away from state institutions. Some were originally ‘Leadership Small Groups’ transformed into commissions under the 2018 institutional reform. Their upgrade sought to ‘strengthen the Party Centre’s centralised, unified leadership over major work.’ Others, such as the Central Science and Technology Commission (CSTC), were established directly as commissions.

Though researchers refer to the new regulations as the ‘regulations on the Work of the Party Central Committees [DDC bodies]’, the document’s official title uses ‘Party Centre’ [‘党中央’], not ‘Central Committee’ [‘中央委员会’]. This reflects the nature of Party Centre DDC bodies: they are beholden to the 24 men of the politburo or the seven men of its Standing Committee (PBSC) and not to the larger Central Committee. Xi himself, as General Secretary, has direct control over the topics of DDC body meetings, either deciding on, or giving the go-ahead to, a meeting.

On the functions of Party Centre DDC bodies, the language from the June politburo readout is almost verbatim that of the aforementioned Party Regulations Formulation Outline. The Outline stated that such regulations are needed to help DDC bodies fulfil their functions of: ‘top-level design, choreographing and coordinating, integrated promotion, and monitoring and urging implementation’ [‘顶层设计, 统筹协调, 整体推进, 督促落实’] of major work. This is precisely the language used in the 2020 Central Committee Work Regulations, which stipulate the Central Committee’s power to create DDC bodies. The politburo readout uses the same ‘4x4’ character expression. This language is also used for the specific DDC bodies. The 2023 institutional reform plan describes the then-new Central Finance Commission’s functions in exactly the same way. The PRC Law on Foreign Relations grants the same functions to the Central Foreign Affairs Commission.

The new regulations will complement or adjust existing rules. Said rules themselves reveal something of these elusive power centres’ workings. Xi’s ten-year rule making spree has reinvigorated the Instruction Requesting and Reporting system [‘请示报告制度’] (IRR). The IRR lets lower ranking bodies request instructions from senior organisations and report back up on implementation. It enables party entities to respond to eventualities on the ground in their locality or policy field, although it can also create logjams.

At least since 2019, DDC bodies – and their leaders individually – have been permitted to play the role of IRR responders. This may be a way of delegating party centre authority while helping facilitate calibration of policies with central requirements. It could also help with the apparent spike in IRR requests resulting from a decade of relentless campaigns, pervasive punishments and strict demands for alignment with party centre policy, which has left officials ‘lying flat’ or looking for other ways to avoid culpability. DDC bodies have been ordered to create detailed and specific rules for implementing IRR in their own fields. This could amount to substantive power delegation to the heads of DDC bodies’ implementing offices.

The respective arrangements of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission (CFAC) and the CSTC serve as useful discussion points. Wang Yi, CFAC Office Head, holds triple roles, also serving as a politburo member and Minister of Foreign Affairs. This links CFAC decisions directly to the principal state implementing agency. With Wang heading both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the CFAC Office, he can implement CFAC decisions through both the MFA and through coordinated action with other CFAC member ministries. Wang’s position as CFAC Office Head may be an authoritative lever to press other agencies to coordinate with the MFA. While the CFAC-MFA setup may be an outlier (due to the demise of Qin Gang, Wang’s predecessor), the CSTC’s arrangements are similar. Yin Hejun, Minister of Science and Technology (and Central Committee member), reportedly doubles up as CSTC Office Head, allowing CSTC decisions to flow directly to the Ministry of Science and Technology and giving Yin the lever of CSTC Office Head to help coordinate the implementation of CSTC decisions.

Xi ‘in decline’ or delegated powers being refined?

Returning to the politburo meeting readout, considering the powerful role of DDC Office Heads it is unsurprising that regulations should require DDC bodies to ‘coordinate, not stand in for, and perform as required, not overstep’ [‘统筹不代替、到位不越位’]. While speculation sees this as a ‘direct criticism of Xi’, it is more likely that the relevant provision seeks to regulate the power delegated by the Party Centre. Notably, Xi has himself used the expression in relation to the Central Comprehensive Law-based-rule Commission.

Overlooking subnational practice misses a chance to reflect on assumptions. Countering the notion that, from the politburo readout, ‘some language could reasonably be read as Xi being shunted aside’, provincial-level party committees are repeating that very same language in a promise to do better. Shanxi, Chongqing and Xinjiang, for example, declared that they will ‘study the spirit’ of Xi’s ‘important [politburo meeting] speech’ and improve the practices of their subnational DDC bodies. They will produce ‘realistic and effective policy measures’ [‘切合实际、行之有效的政策举措’] – a line also in the politburo meeting readout – and better regulate DDC body establishment and operation under their jurisdiction to ‘ensure implementation of Party Centre decisions.’ Provincial-level party committees have the power to make intra-party regulations. It appears communications about the Party Centre Regulations are prompting them to follow suit and make implementing documents to tighten up on local DDC body practice.

The regulations are likely less a signal of Xi’s waning star and more a run-of-the-mill move to hammer out the details of how the CCP uses the power it has centralised under Xi’s first two and a half terms. It may be that the Party Centre (or members thereof) will attempt to have the regulations’ content incorporated into the Party Charter at the 21st National Party Congress in 2027. This would give the CCP ‘constitutional’ credibility to the use of DDC bodies in governance, consolidating their place in the New Era Party bureaucracy.

ChinaTalk is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

我为短剧狂丨记者手记

(本文首发于南方人物周刊)

南方人物周刊记者 韩茹雪

责任编辑:李屾淼

2013年,汤拥华在浙江工商大学任教时,与“钱塘读书会”部分同学合影留念(受访者提供/图)

相关报道详见《一位大学中文系老师爱看短剧

6月末,华东师范大学中文系老师汤拥华的一篇毕业致辞登上热搜,他在致辞中引用了短剧桥段,谈到所谓“文科无用”的困境。“我的痛苦,被听见了”,一些中文系毕业生纷纷留言。

文科困境的探讨,高校老师刷短剧的反差感,要出圈先出梗的传播方式……刷到这则消息时,我的脑海迅速闪过这几个点,立刻报题,准备采

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校对:赵立宇

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Thames Water issues hosepipe ban for one million people across four counties

14 July 2025 at 19:31
Getty Images A close-up of a hand holding the end of a hose and spraying water over plants.Getty Images
People in parts of southern England will be unable to use hosepipes from 22 July

A hosepipe ban affecting 1.1 million people across several postcode areas has been announced by Thames Water.

The water firm said the measure would come into place across Swindon, Gloucestershire, Oxfordshire, Berkshire and Wiltshire on 22 July due to a lack of rain and increasing demand, which had stretched supplies.

It bans the use of a hosepipe for activities such as watering the garden, washing the car or filling a paddling pool.

It comes as the Environment Agency said it had declared a state of prolonged dry weather in large parts of Oxfordshire, Berkshire and Surrey.

Thames Water said the temporary restriction would cover areas with postcodes beginning with OX, GL, SN, RG4, RG8 and RG9.

The ban does not affect businesses where hosepipe use is part of their purpose - for example, garden centres and car washes - but the company said everyone in the region should be "mindful" of water use.

Thames Water An area of water surrounded by reeds, with a gauge in the middle showing the level has fallen below what it should.Thames Water
Water stocks across the Thames Valley are low and are expected to continue falling, Thames Water said

Thames Water said prolonged hot weather meant there was less water available as well as a higher demand, with customers using up to 30% more water when temperatures were above 25C.

Nevil Muncaster, strategic water resources director at Thames Water, said he did not "anticipate the situation will improve any time soon".

"We have to take action now," he said.

"This has been a challenging spring and summer with big spikes in customer demand during hot dry days and very little rainfall to replenish local supplies in the Thames Valley."

He encouraged customers both within and outside the ban area to reduce water use, by doing things like turning taps off while brushing teeth, taking shorter showers and not watering their lawns.

This breaking news story is being updated and more details will be published shortly. Please refresh the page for the fullest version.

You can receive Breaking News on a smartphone or tablet via the BBC News App. You can also follow @BBCBreaking on X to get the latest alerts.

German backpacker lost in outback 'beyond grateful' to be found

14 July 2025 at 16:29
WA Police Caroline Wilga sits in a hospital bed with a teddy on her lap. She has long brown hair and is smiling at the camera. WA Police
Police shared a photo of Caroline Wilga in hospital in Perth, after she was finally found on Friday

A backpacker who survived nearly two weeks lost in Western Australia's outback has said she is "simply beyond grateful to have survived".

Caroline Wilga, a 26-year-old German national, was rescued on Friday after spending 11 freezing nights alone and lost in the bushland.

She survived by drinking from puddles and sheltering in a cave, police said.

In her first public statement since being rescued, Ms Wilga said she had hit her head after losing control of her van, causing her to exit the vehicle in a state of confusion.

She was spotted by a driver and airlifted to a hospital in Perth, where she is recovering.

Ms Wilga thanked the medical staff, German consulate and all the people who had helped search for her, in a statement to Western Australia Police posted on Instagram.

"I want to express a huge thank you from the bottom of my heart – a thank you that truly comes from the depth of my soul," she said.

"Some people might wonder why I even left my car, even though I had water, food, and clothing there," Ms Wilga added.

She said she "lost control of the car and rolled down a slope", hitting her head "significantly" in the subsequent crash.

"As a result of the accident, I left my car in a state of confusion and got lost," she added.

"Previously, I didn't know where my place was in a culture on the other side of the world to my own, but now, I feel a part of it. I am deeply impressed by the courage, helpfulness, and warmth that has been shown to me here.

"Western Australia has taught me what it really means to be part of a true community. Here, humanity, solidarity, and care for one another are what truly matter – and in the end, that's what counts most."

She was found walking barefoot by motorist Tania Henley - whom Ms Wilga described as her "saviour and angel" - more than 30km away from where she had abandoned her van, on a scarcely used track north of Beacon.

WA Police A police handout photo shows a dark coloured van surrounded by green and brown bushland.WA Police
Wilga's abandoned van was found on Thursday in dense bushland, north of Beacon

Ms Henley told Australia's public broadcaster ABC that she saw Ms Wilga waving by the side of the road, and she appeared to be in a "fragile state", suffering from exhaustion, dehydration, insect bites and an injured foot.

"Everything in this bush is very prickly. I just can't believe that she survived. She had no shoes on, she'd wrapped her foot up," Ms Henley said.

Before her rescue, Ms Wilga was last seen at a general store in the town of Beacon, Western Australia, in her van on 29 June.

"I am certain that I survived only thanks to this incredible outpouring of support," she said.

"The thought of all the people who believed in me, searched for me, and kept hoping for me gave me the strength to carry on during my darkest moments," she said.

The rescue was down to "sheer luck", acting police inspector Jessica Securo said in a news conference.

Ex-Tory MP given community order for harassing ex-wife

14 July 2025 at 19:45
Wales News Service Katie Wallis facing the camera as she walks along a street. She is wearing a black dress with a black strap across her neck. She has her hair up. Wales News Service
Wallis was sentenced to a 12-month community order involving 12 days of rehabilitation activity

A former Conservative MP has been given a community order and fine for harassing her ex-wife.

Jamie Wallis, who is now known as Katie Wallis and uses female pronouns, represented Bridgend from 2019 to 2024.

At an earlier hearing, the 41-year-old from Butetown in Cardiff denied harassing Rebecca Wallis, now known as Rebecca Lovell, between 14 February and 21 March.

Wallis was sentenced to a 12-month community order involving 12 days of rehabilitation activity and fined £500 plus £650 costs and a £114 surcharge.

A restraining order was also imposed for 12 months to prevent contact with Rebecca Lovell.

The former MP made unwanted phone calls, sent unwanted messages and a voice note.

Cardiff Magistrates Court heard that the messages contained abusive language while accusing Rebecca Lovell of being "mean" and seeking to find out details about her new relationship.

One message complained about access to Wallis's family, another demanded £350,000 within 15 minutes and wished to ensure that Wallis's former wife and others "never have a happy moment again".

Wallis, who was the first MP to openly begin the process of gender transitioning, previously told the court: "My name is Katie Wallis, but my legal name is Jamie Wallis".

Athena Picture Agency A picture of a transgender woman with brown hair tied back, wearing dark eyeliner, lipstick, large hoop earrings, a white blouse and a blue cardigan, with a red crossbody handbag.Athena Picture Agency
Katie Wallis admited harassing Rebecca Wallis, now known as Rebecca Lovell, earlier this year

District Judge Rhys Williams asked Wallis's barrister how he should address the defendant.

Defending, Narita Bahra KC told the court that Wallis identifies as she, "her dead name is Jamie. Her current name is Katie".

Wallis and the victim were in a relationship for more than 15 years and separated in 2020, with their divorce finalised in 2024.

In a personal impact statement, Rebecca Lovell said the messages left her "drowning in a chaos that was not of my own making" and concerned that Wallis would turn up at her house.

She said she was left wondering if threats of suicide were real.

"I torture myself wondering if I deserve the vile slurs," she said.

She added, "I can't remember a day I haven't cried. The woman I used to be has been destroyed."

Narita Bahra KC told the court that her client was "having profound and emotional difficulties in completing the passing stage" of transitioning to become a woman, but accepts that the behaviour was "wrong".

Ms Bahra said that Wallis was at a "crucial turning point" in the transitioning process and in "profound mental crisis" when the messages were sent and that there was acceptance of wrongdoing and apology in the final message.

Shortly after the final message was sent, Wallis was found by police and sectioned under the mental health act before being arrested and later charged.

Ms Bahra told the court it was "really disappointing that South Wales Police and the Crown Prosecution Service have shown no compassion" by pursuing a prosecution.

She added it was "disillusioning and disappointing that South Wales Police and the CPS demonstrated a lack of understanding" to what she said were the "unique stresses" of transitioning.

史上首例:特朗普将进行第二次英国国事访问

14 July 2025 at 21:17
Louis Oelofse
2025-07-14T12:55:50.572Z
2018年7月13日,英国温莎城堡,美国总统特朗普与英国女王伊丽莎白二世检阅仪仗队

(德国之声中文网)特朗普将于9月对英国进行前所未有的第二次国事访问。

白金汉宫确认,查尔斯国王和卡米拉王后将于9月17日至19日接待这位美国总统。

白金汉宫在一份声明中表示:“国王陛下将于温莎城堡接待特朗普总统及夫人。”

特朗普曾表示,能下榻温莎城堡“真是了不起的事情”。

查尔斯国王曾致信邀请特朗普访问,信件由英国首相斯塔默在2月访问华盛顿时亲自转交。

当时,特朗普称这次邀请是“极大的荣誉”。

查尔斯国王曾致信邀请特朗普访问,信件由英国首相斯塔默在2月访问华盛顿时亲自转交。

斯塔默努力维持与特朗普的关系

此前没有任何一位美国总统被邀请两次对英国进行国事访问。外界普遍认为,这是英国政府有意维持与特朗普关系的一项战略安排

特朗普在2019年首次总统任期内曾对英国进行国事访问,受到伊丽莎白女王接待。

与最近访问英国并在议会发表演讲的法国总统马克龙不同,特朗普此次访问期间不会在议会发表讲话,因为正值议会休会期。

虽然特朗普的访问将包括完整的王室礼仪,但预计也将引发抗议活动,正如2019年那样。

加拿大总理卡尼批评英国发出的这项邀请,称此举削弱了加方在应对特朗普关于吞并加拿大言论时维持团结阵线的努力。

查尔斯国王同时也是加拿大国家元首。他曾于今年5月访问加拿大,并为该国议会开幕。

当时正值特朗普发起对加贸易战并威胁吞并该国之际,外界认为这是英国对加拿大的支持。

DW中文有Instagram!欢迎搜寻dw.chinese,看更多深入浅出的图文与影音报道。

© 2025年德国之声版权声明:本文所有内容受到著作权法保护,如无德国之声特别授权,不得擅自使用。任何不当行为都将导致追偿,并受到刑事追究。

等不到小米 SU7 ?也可以看看这辆 40 万元级的现代 IONIQ 6 N

By: 芥末
14 July 2025 at 21:00

现代汽车在周末的古德伍德速度节上带来了一辆新的高性能的电动汽车——IONIQ 6 N。

这是继 2023 年的IONIQ 5 N 后,现代汽车的第二辆高性能电动产品。

IONIQ 6 N 搭载双电机,可输出 601 匹马力和 740 牛·米的扭矩,其搭载的「N Grin Boost」瞬时增压功能可以在 10 秒内将输出提升至 641 马力和 770 牛·米扭矩,配合「弹射起步」功能,新车可以在 3.2 秒内完成零百加速,最高时速可达 258 公里/小时。

作为对比,保时捷电车 Taycan GTS 的最大马力为 700 匹, 配合起步控制,零百加速为 3.3 秒,小米 SU7 Max 的最大马力为 673 匹,零百加速则做到了 2.78 秒。

现代汽车的工程师们为了提升车辆的操控性能,对 IONIQ 6 N 的悬架结构和底盘都进行了重新设计。IONIQ 6 N 的电子减震控制器集成了传感器,可以根据路面状态和行驶条件在驾驶过程中动态调节阻尼,电控系统中搭载的「漂移优化器」和「扭矩分配」也可以由驾驶者自定义车辆的动力分配模式,在赛道、漂移等场景下为用户提供了更多的驾驶乐趣。同时车主也可以选装 N Performance 个性化选装包来实现更多定制项目。

为了匹配 IONIQ 6 N 的性能输出,现代在新车上配备了前四活塞、后单活塞的制动卡钳,以及专为 6 N 开发的 275/35 R20 倍耐力 P Zero 5 轮胎,车辆尾部也配备了天鹅颈式后扰流板来增加下压力。

这辆 IONIQ 6 N 开起来也有如同油车一样的乐趣,现代在其上面加入了升级后的「N e-Shift」模拟换挡、「N Ambient Shift Light」换挡氛围灯以及「N Active Sound+」主动声浪系统,在用户进行模拟换挡操作的同时,车辆的氛围灯和声浪都会同步发生变化。现代还专门设计了三种声浪选项,分别是更复古的 Lgnition(点火)、更现代的 Evolution(进化),和更为科幻风格的 Lightspeed(光速)。

根据现在官方提供的数据,IONIQ 6 N 将搭载一块 84 度的动力电池,WLTP 续航约为 468 公里,这得益于轿车的样式的造型和更优的风阻系数,相比之下 SUV 造型的 IONIQ 5 N 在相同的电池容量下就只有 356 公里续航。

IONIQ 6 N 延续了普通版I oniq 6的造型基础,但整体风格更具有速度感,现代为新车设计了专属的宽体翼子板、功能性前扰流板、独立设计的进气口以及独特的「天鹅颈」尾翼,车灯则采用了像素风格的LED灯组,并在细节上加入N系列专属元素。配色方面则有黑色、白色、哑光灰以及一款独有的「性能蓝珍珠」配色。

新车的内饰风格则和普通版车型并无二致,整体以黑色为主,搭配了「性能蓝」饰条、氛围灯以及包裹性更强的 Alcantara 运动座椅。

IONIQ 6 N 的价格预计和 IONIQ 5 N 的价格接近,其国外售价为 6.78 万美元(约合 48 万人民币),但现代 IONIQ 系列是少见的在中国市场的售价比韩国本土市场低的车型,目前国内在售的 IONIQ 5 N 终端价格为 38.88 万元。

现在 IONIQ 6 标准版的销量其实平平无奇,在多国市场的的月销量不过 3 位数左右,但现代的工程师明确表示,造这车不为赚钱。

(N 系列)车型本就不是走量的产品,而且我们也触及了我们客户群体和粉丝在价格承受能力方面的极限,但我们仍然决定做。正常情况下,汽车行业首先会评估商业模型、投资与成本,决定是否开发。但在这里,只要有提升性能、提高速度、增强操控性的好点子,公司就说「去做吧」。

或许觉得小米 SU7 太过大众的可以考虑一下 IONIQ 6 N ?就是不知道会不会被认成伊兰特。

#欢迎关注爱范儿官方微信公众号:爱范儿(微信号:ifanr),更多精彩内容第一时间为您奉上。

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关于外部 js 修改 dx-select-box 的值的可行性

By: insanny
14 July 2025 at 18:53
insanny: 请问对于 devExtreme 中的 dx-select-box ,有没有方法通过外部 js (如浏览器的控制台、浏览器插件等)直接修改它的 value ?目前了解到的方案都是
const selectBoxElement = document.querySelector('.dx-selectbox');
const dxSelectBoxInstance = $(selectBoxElement).data('dxSelectBox');
dxSelectBoxInstance.option('value', 'YourDesiredValue');
然而我在目标网站上 dxSelectBoxInstance 返回的是 Null
并且 ng.getComponent 也用不了,probe 返回的也是空,页面上的 html 元素直接显示的就是<dx-select-box>,并不是<div class='dx-selectbox'>

tg 如何保号?

By: Vesc
14 July 2025 at 18:11
Vesc: 1 、五月分在某个接码平台买了个成品号,用了一段时间,半个月发现被登出了,后来通过 2FA 又重新登上了,今天发现又被登出了而且 TFA 也被改了彻底上不去了。
2 、又在接码平台自己注册了一个,目前修改 login email 和 2FA ,能稳定使用吗?
3 、关于接码平台是虚拟号吗? tg 对于虚拟号的风控需要开一个月 premium 保号吗?

阿里云将关闭华东 5(南京)和华东 6(福州)

By: totoro625
14 July 2025 at 18:03
totoro625: 基于基础设施规划的需要,阿里云将关停华东 5 (南京-本地地域)和华东 6 (福州-本地地域),对应地域将于 2025 年 8 月 15 日起停止售卖,同年 9 月 15 日起停止续订,于 2026 年 7 月 14 日 23:59 起将开始停止服务。

简述“本地地域”:本地地域是是公共云的小型化输出,采用单可用区,具有小型化、一致性、低时延和低成本的特点。

坐标江苏,为了防止跨省跨运营商限速,买了 2 台 5 年的南京服务器用作负载均衡,这下惨了,只能迁移到上海

目前:
苏州移动 到 上海阿里云 18.3ms ,到 南京阿里云 8.5ms
镇江联通 到 上海阿里云 11.6ms ,到 南京阿里云 17.1ms
苏州移动 直连 镇江联通 Avg 50ms ,总体 23~230ms ,丢包率 10%

有人记得 iPhone4 时期有一款 app 叫手电通的吗

By: BingoW
14 July 2025 at 17:58
BingoW: 那会有个 app 叫手电通,谐音 手电筒 以为就是照明辅助,老用户知道那时候 iphone 自身是没有手电筒功能的,我就下下来了,然后发现它是一款可以连接手机和电脑的 app,所以叫这个名字。电脑那端也需要下载一个客户端,然后进行联通。联通成功以后,手机可以当做电脑的鼠标、键盘。。最厉害的是手机重力感应可以充当电脑赛车游戏的方向盘。那时候玩的极品飞车 9 ,我在家里找了个圆形的东西(好像是肯德基全家桶的盖子)。把手机贴到中间,然后就真的当游戏方向盘在用。。。

老机器 mac book pro19 款, i7 能否更新到最新系统?

By: brave6
14 July 2025 at 17:35
brave6:

如题,补充信息 内存 16g + i7 + Graphics 630 1536 。

看到同事在 mac 上直连手机,看得心痒痒,奈何老款机器不敢随便升级,所以来问问 V 友有没有用类似机器升级了最新 Sequoia 系统的,卡不卡,体验怎么样?

这台电脑不属于主力机器,只用于登录微信和开会时间远程主力机器使用,如果轻度使用不卡,就准备升级了。

腾讯云最近是在用 AI 爬虫抓取博客数据吗?把我博客搞崩好几天了

By: peterjxl
14 July 2025 at 17:32
peterjxl:

我博客 2022 年就上线了,个人技术博客,访问量一直不大。

但为了以防万一,我还是加了点防护措施,例如流量封顶,带宽封顶等,超过阈值一段时间会暂时下线博客,然后可以自动或手动上线博客

但最近几天,博客访问量突然大了,一天到晚都在崩...

实在忍不住了,就去查了下日志,发现访问最频繁的 IP 都是 175.24.248.xx 开头的,然后查到是腾讯云的 IP

封禁了其中几个,但第二天博客又崩了,然后发现换了 IP ,当还是上面的 IP 段

而且是一天到晚都在访问。现在我已经封了这些 60 多个 IP (请求会返回 403 ),但日志里还是一直在刷请求...

IP 这么多,不太像是个别人的恶意攻击,这是官方在搞什么活动吗? 想起之前看过的新闻:

想请教下是否还有什么法子... 虽然这种 CC 攻击好像是无解的,又不太想上 CloudFlare (有点慢)

以下是截取的 IP:


175.24.248.4
175.24.248.6
175.24.248.15
175.24.248.19
175.24.248.22
175.24.248.29
175.24.248.37
175.24.248.40
175.24.248.53
175.24.248.80
175.24.248.83
175.24.248.84
175.24.248.85
175.24.248.94
......

真的能笑死人。关于宽带被限速 信访以后泉州联通的答复

By: dark495
14 July 2025 at 17:30
dark495:

先说下,本人没有在跑 PCDN ,文件里工信部投诉的理由是真的。

在今年五月份提交信访以后,在 6 月 4 日没有任何通知的情况下莫名其妙的发了个顺丰快递,收到以后是这样的:

这下既当球员又当裁判了?信访局不转到工信部给我直接转到联通公司?

而且这日期,联通刚好在收到信访后拖了一个月(可能是最后时限?)才回复。

然后我坐等右等,还是没在 15 天后收到任何回复。

于是我查了下寄件人的电话,打过去,催他。

几天过后仍未收到,再打电话,已被拉黑。


今天早上 10 点终于看到又有个叫“联通公司”的发件人给我发快递了,可把我期待坏了。

然后刚刚,我收到了这个快递,打开以后是这样的:

差点没把我笑死,槽点多到无力吐槽。


本人实名上网,欢迎各网友、记者等人士任意转载。

这件事我会用我的业余时间杠到底。

腾讯云,业余

By: Shiroka
14 July 2025 at 17:21
Shiroka:

就在刚刚,收到了一条腾讯云发送的短信,内容如下:

 [腾讯云] 尊敬的用户,您好!您的腾讯云账号(账号 ID:xxx ,昵称:xxx )下使用的边缘安全加速平台 EO 产品有 2 个域名未在工信部备案或备案已失效。我们将于 2025-07-15 04:00:00 停止提供域名服务,包括权威解析、加速等,请您尽快完成域名备案,谢谢。域名列表详情可查看站内信:xxx

吓坏了,以为自己域名犯什么错被接入商提交注销备案了,但是在工信部 beian.miit.gov.cn 和备案接入商阿里云查询域名状况,都显示正常。遂开工单询问,也往 EdgeOne 产品微信用户群里发了这个问题,同时疑惑那为什么会发这条短信?看到短信最后 域名列表详情可查看站内信,那我上号看看什么情况。结果不看不知道,一看吓一跳,原来是腾讯云 EdgeOne 边缘函数系统分配的域名被注销备案了,和我自己的域名没有半点关系

原来是虚惊一场。回到工单,我打字回复说看到站内信里的域名列表了,是你们腾讯云自己的域名,和我没关系。但就在这时,售后工程师丢给我一个"接入备案"文档,请看:

与此同时微信用户群也有了回复:

嚯嚯,好一个误报。

AI 时代, GPL 协议是否形同虚设?

By: qdwang
14 July 2025 at 17:21
qdwang:

比如一个算法 X ,由 A 语言实现,协议为 GPL ,在 github 开源。

那在 AI 时代,别人完全可以用强力的 LLM 模型,理解 X 里面的原理,用 B 语言从头实现一个,就不需要遵守 GPL 协议了。

在 AI 时代,是不是开源软件的各种协议,需要修改一下了?

开发了一个管理本地电脑里散乱的 git 项目的工具

By: lockelee
14 July 2025 at 17:10
lockelee:

随着在一个公司待得时间越久,本地的 git 仓库就越来越多,我可能管理比较混乱,散落在~/Desktop 、~/workspace 、~/dev 等各个目录下。想找个项目的时候,经常要翻好几个文件夹,还要回忆项目的确切名字。有时候同一个项目 clone 了好几份,也不知道哪个是最新的。

之前一直用各种方法凑合:有时候在 IDE 的项目管理,有的时候用 shell 一些插件,但总觉得记录这些是一个心智负担。

这次随着换新电脑,想着干脆开发一个 CLI 工具来管理工作空间吧。
Project Man - https://github.com/lockelee1015/project-man

核心思路是:

  1. 按照 域名/group/repo 的固化格式组织仓库结构
  2. 支持模糊搜索,来替代 cd + tab 到处找

规则 > 记忆,只需要记住关键字就可以快速跳转。

举个例子

~/workspace/
├── github.com/rust-lang/rust/
├── github.com/microsoft/vscode/
└── gitlab.com/company/project/

Project Man 提供了以下操作

p add rust-lang/rust         # 自动 clone 到正确位置
p go rust                    # 模糊搜索跳转
p sync                       # 批量更新所有项目
p list                       # 查看所有项目状态

# Search across repositories
p grep "TODO"                # Search all repos
p grep "async" rust          # Search in specific repos

实际效果
自动组织:新项目会按 host/owner/repo 的结构自动放到对应位置
快速导航:p go vs 就能跳到 vscode 项目,不用记完整路径
批量操作:一个命令同步所有项目,或者跨项目搜索代码
Shell 集成:配置后可以直接 cd 到目标目录

如何安装:

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lockelee/project-man/main/scripts/quick-install.sh | bash

整个项目全是 claude code 写的,用 rust 写的,其实我并不会写 rust ,只是知道他很快。实际测试起来确实很快。

欢迎体验反馈。

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