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What happens in the log when an app crashes as it starts up?

In yesterday’s guide to dealing with apps that crash immediately you open them, I carefully avoided mentioning what you might find in the log. This article puts that right.

The list of common causes I gave is:

  • macOS intentionally crashed the app because of an error in code signing, or another serious security failure;
  • the app failed because it was in translocation;
  • the app couldn’t open a damaged or incompatible document;
  • the app had a problem with its Preferences.

Investigating these in the log is among the simplest tasks for those learning to access it, providing the app crashes reliably. Show the seconds value in the menu bar clock, and open the Applications folder containing the app. Select it as the seconds reach about 45, to allow time for its icon to be displayed, then double-click the app to run it as the seconds reach 00, but not a moment earlier. Don’t touch the mouse/trackpad or keyboard for at least 5 seconds, by which time the crash should have occurred and the notification or crash log should have been displayed.

Then open LogUI (or a substitute), and set it to extract and display all the entries for 5 seconds from 00 seconds. If you open a new window in LogUI the start time will be preset to the time you opened the app, all ready to get the log extract.

The double-click is easy to spot in the log, as it’s marked by four almost identical Activity entries with a yellow 🥎 softball emoji, each reading something like
AppKit Finder sendAction:
short entries that are quick to locate. Entries following the fourth of those then report what happened next.

Code signing errors

These are normally easy to recognise, as they start with a call to verify the signature,
00.940943 Finder sendAction:
00.963228 syspolicyd SecTrustEvaluateIfNecessary
00.963982 trustd SecKeyVerifySignature

that’s followed by an error that’s repeated many times,
00.981296 lsd com.apple.securityd MacOS error: -67030

Follow those down a bit further and you’ll see this reported in other subsystems
01.013084 com.apple.launchservices Error -67030 validating the signing information for [private], error=Error Domain=NSOSStatusErrorDomain Code=-67030 "(null)" UserInfo={SecCSArchitecture=arm64}

Normally, this will be checked again by AMFI (Apple Mobile File Integrity)
01.030162 amfid Entering OSX path for /Users/hoakley/Documents/000aa/DelightEd.app/Contents/MacOS/DelightEd
01.031629 amfid SecKeyVerifySignature
01.036291 amfid com.apple.securityd MacOS error: -67030
01.048491 error amfid com.apple.MobileFileIntegrity.framework Code failed basic validity check (error: -67030): Error Domain=NSOSStatusErrorDomain Code=-67030 UserInfo={SecCSArchitecture=[private]}
01.048857 amfid /Users/hoakley/Documents/000aa/DelightEd.app/Contents/MacOS/DelightEd not valid: Error Domain=AppleMobileFileIntegrityError Code=-420 "The signature on the file is invalid" UserInfo={NSURL=file:///Users/hoakley/Documents/
000aa/DelightEd.app/Contents/MacOS/DelightEd, NSLocalizedDescription=The signature on the file is invalid}

That’s confirmed and actioned by the kernel
01.048950 kernel AMFI: code signature validation failed.
01.052968 amfid com.apple.MobileFileIntegrity [private]: Broken signature with Team ID fatal.
01.053043 kernel AMFI: When validating /Users/hoakley/Documents/000aa/DelightEd.app/Contents/MacOS/DelightEd: The code contains a Team ID, but validating its signature failed. Please check your system log.
01.053052 kernel mac_vnode_check_signature: /Users/hoakley/Documents/000aa/DelightEd.app/Contents/MacOS/DelightEd: code signature validation failed fatally: When validating /Users/hoakley/Documents/000aa/DelightEd.app/Contents/MacOS/DelightEd: The code contains a Team ID, but validating its signature failed. Please check your system log.
01.053059 kernel validation of code signature failed through MACF policy: 1
01.053061 kernel check_signature[pid: 2718]: error = 1
01.053066 kernel proc 2718: load code signature error 4 for file "DelightEd"
01.053461 kernel AMFI: hook..execve() killing xpcproxy (pid 2718): Attempt to execute completely unsigned code (must be at least ad-hoc signed).
01.053624 kernel ASP: Sleep interrupted: ref 29, signal 0x100, pid: 2718

with the conclusion
01.053627 kernel ASP: Security policy would not allow process: 2718, /Users/hoakley/Documents/000aa/DelightEd.app/Contents/MacOS/DelightEd

You’re not likely to miss those.

Common error codes from signature validation include:

  • -2147409652 CSSMERR_TP_CERT_REVOKED, the certificate has been revoked
  • -67007 resource envelope is obsolete (version 1 signature)
  • -67008 unsealed contents present in the root directory of an embedded framework
  • -67013 resource envelope is obsolete (custom omit rules)
  • -67021 nested code is modified or invalid
  • -67023 invalid resource directory (directory or signature have been modified)
  • -67030 invalid Info.plist (plist or signature have been modified)
  • -67054 a sealed resource is missing or invalid
  • -67056 code has no resources but signature indicates they must be present
  • -67061 invalid signature (code or signature have been modified)
  • -67062 code object is not signed at all, which is by far the most common.

In this case, I had changed a single character in the app’s Info.plist, which broke its CDHashes, and resulted in the correct error code of -67030.

App translocation

In this case, you’re looking for two related pieces of evidence, that a process mentions the act of translocation, and that the app is run from a translocation location. Again, these normally aren’t hard to find.

Shortly after the double-click,
00.968186 Finder sendAction:
you should see mention of the creation of the translocation directory
01.040587 lsd com.apple.securityd SecTranslocateCreateSecureDirectoryForURL: created /private/var/folders/x4/
x00kny5x0_5dsnmmxhtw6hc80000gn/T/AppTranslocation/B9651238-6B8C-4750-BFAC-E0D1A327768C/d/DelightEd.app

A little further down the log you’ll see the app being referenced in that long path
01.069877 amfid Entering OSX path for /private/var/folders/x4/x00kny5x0_5dsnmmxhtw6hc80000gn/T/AppTranslocation/
B9651238-6B8C-4750-BFAC-E0D1A327768C/d/DelightEd.app/Contents/MacOS/DelightEd
01.090927 com.apple.runningboard _executablePath = /private/var/folders/x4/x00kny5x0_5dsnmmxhtw6hc80000gn/T/AppTranslocation/
B9651238-6B8C-4750-BFAC-E0D1A327768C/d/DelightEd.app/Contents/MacOS/DelightEd

and so on.

If you’re struggling to find those, select the Messages item at the right end of the toolbar in LogUI, type the app name into the search box there and press Return, to filter entries.

Failed to open document

Of the four common causes of early app crashes, these are hardest to find evidence in the log. This is because the only process likely to know what went wrong is the app itself, and few third-party apps write anything useful to the log. You might find a useful entry or two by setting that menu at the right end of LogUI’s toolbar to Processes, entering the app name into the search box, and pressing Return. However, in many cases there will be little or no useful information.

Preference file problems

My previous article referred only to standard preferences that are handled by cfprefsd. Some apps run their own preferences using their own code, and neither cfprefsd nor the defaults command covers them. If they have a problem when accessing those custom files, it’s most unlikely to be recorded in the log.

In other apps, you should look for evidence that the crash happened shortly after the cfprefsd service is connected to the app, to support the standard features.

Starting once again with the double-click
01.579559 Finder sendAction:
it may take some time for the opening stages to complete. You should then see the XPC connection between the app and cfprefsd being set up for both root and the user
01.638428 DelightEd com.apple.xpc [0x102cf6980] activating connection: mach=true listener=false peer=false name=com.apple.cfprefsd.daemon
01.638504 DelightEd com.apple.xpc [0x102cf7960] activating connection: mach=true listener=false peer=false name=com.apple.cfprefsd.agent
01.638563 cfprefsd com.apple.xpc [0xa252bdb00] activating connection: mach=false listener=false peer=true name=com.apple.cfprefsd.daemon.peer[2910].0xa252bdb00
01.638659 cfprefsd com.apple.xpc [0x86f2d3600] activating connection: mach=false listener=false peer=true name=com.apple.cfprefsd.agent.peer[2910].0x86f2d3600

The app will normally crash during or shortly after the loading of preferences, marked by entries like
01.641152 DelightEd Loading Preferences From User CFPrefsD
01.706158 DelightEd Loading Preferences From System CFPrefsD

These too can be found more easily by setting the menu at the right end of LogUI’s toolbar to Processes, entering the app name into the search box, and pressing Return.

Happy hunting!

Tackle QuickLook problems

With an understanding of how QuickLook provides thumbnails and previews, you can be systematic when tackling its problems, although thankfully those are infrequent if not rare.

Generic icon

By far the most common problem with QuickLook thumbnailing is when a file’s specific thumbnail isn’t shown, but a generic icon for that type of file appears instead. This has been particularly common since the release of macOS Sequoia, as that ended support for older third-party generators in qlgenerators. To be able to extend the range of types supported by thumbnailing, third-party generators must now be supplied as appexes stored in an app bundle’s PlugIns folder or similar.

To pin this down, you’ll first need to discover the UTI of the files whose icons can no longer be turned into specific thumbnails. One easy way to do that is in my free UTIutility. Type in the file’s extension, press Return and the app will tell you that file’s UTI and those it conforms to.

utilutil121

You next need to discover which generator handles those UTIs. The official way to do that is using the command
qlmanage -m
but that now only lists qlgenerators supplied in macOS, as qlgenerators. To see listings of others as well, open my free Mints and click on its QuickLook button.

mints1202

For qlgenerators, you’re given the file UTI, the path to the qlgenerator file, and (when available) its version number, e.g.
com.adobe.pdf 👉/System/Library/QuickLook/PDF.qlgenerator (1002.2.3)

App extensions are divided into two, first those providing Previews, and second those for Thumbnails, e.g.
com.apple.applescript.text 👉/Applications/PreviewCode.app/Contents/PlugIns/Code Previewer.appex

If no generator handles the file’s UTI, ascend the list of UTIs it conforms with to discover which generator should attempt to. If you think an old qlgenerator is the problem now, contact the app’s developer and ask whether they intend supporting macOS with an appex replacement.

Occasionally you may come across an extension conflict, in which the same extension is used for another UTI, resulting in the wrong generator trying to create a thumbnail.

The nuclear option for any QuickLook problem is to reset its caches, using the command
qlmanage -r

Although its effects might be to slow thumbnail generation for a while, it’s unlikely to prove any more damaging.

Digging deeper

If you have to go any deeper than that, you’re going to need to capture good log extracts to enable diagnosis. As far as Icon Services, QuickLook and related features are concerned, it’s essential to disable log privacy before going any further, or you’ll be driven crazy by all those messages gutted and rendered meaningless by censorship.

Even then, log entries refer to key items such as files and folders using references that may appear opaque. Some abbreviate file names and directories as ‘B{14}1.jpg’ for BeltedGalloways1.jpg, and ‘t{5}s’ for testims, as well as referring to them by hex numbers like 0xBBDBEFDB0. Another common habit in log entries is to refer to files by their inode number, either as an ino, or in a full URL such as file:///.file/id=6571367.243284. The use of UUIDs is also common, for example as uuid:0AD8986E-6325-4FF1-92FD-9FD3C15D57EA.

Example thumbnail generation

This was initiated by a mouse click, following which a thumbnail isn’t immediately available from cache.

01.008113 Finder sendAction:
01.012218 com.apple.Finder | ThumbnailCache (0xbbe43cfd8, kIconified) -- Retrieve: 'B{14}1.jpg' (0xBBDBEFDB0), Container: 't{5}s' (0xBBD6F1C00), found: no
01.015014 QuickLookThumbnailingDaemon com.apple.quicklook | Enqueuing thumbnail request: <QLTGeneratorThumbnailRequest: <QLThumbnailGenerationRequest:0xc34e526c0 uuid:0AD8986E-6325-4FF1-92FD-9FD3C15D57EA BeltedGalloways1.jpg (fi:<fi:<QLCacheBasicFileIdentifier:0xc35297760 ino:243284> (version: <QLThumbnailVersion m:2019-01-28 12:36:40 +0000 s:656575 vi:{length = 12, bytes = 0x54b603000000000002000000} ino:3b654 g:com.apple.MobileQuickLook-1>)>) (rt:2) {16,16} (icon mode, variant 0) (badge 1) - Not started>, url: (null), item: (null), ht:0 bt:0 (low quality) client:com.apple.finder>
01.015016 QuickLookThumbnailingDaemon Cache Lookup

Following that are entries for memory and disk cache lookup, also resulting in failure, so the thumbnail has to be generated.

01.015626 QuickLookThumbnailingDaemon com.apple.quicklook | Enqueuing thumbnail request: <QLTGeneratorThumbnailRequest: <QLThumbnailGenerationRequest:0xc34e526c0 uuid:0AD8986E-6325-4FF1-92FD-9FD3C15D57EA BeltedGalloways1.jpg (fi:<fi:<QLCacheBasicFileIdentifier:0xc35297760 ino:243284> (version: <QLThumbnailVersion m:2019-01-28 12:36:40 +0000 s:656575 vi:{length = 12, bytes = 0x54b603000000000002000000} ino:3b654 g:com.apple.quicklook.thumbnail.ImageExtension-1>)>) (rt:2) {16,16} (icon mode, variant 0) (badge 1) - Not started>, url: (null), item: (null), ht:0 bt:0 (low quality) client:com.apple.finder>
01.017045 QuickLookThumbnailingDaemon com.apple.quicklook | <QLTGeneratorThumbnailRequest: <QLThumbnailGenerationRequest:0xc34e526c0 uuid:0AD8986E-6325-4FF1-92FD-9FD3C15D57EA BeltedGalloways1.jpg (fi:<fi:<QLCacheBasicFileIdentifier:0xc35297760 ino:243284> (version: <QLThumbnailVersion m:2019-01-28 12:36:40 +0000 s:656575 vi:{length = 12, bytes = 0x54b603000000000002000000} ino:3b654 g:com.apple.quicklook.thumbnail.ImageExtension-1>)>) (rt:2) {16,16} (icon mode, variant 0) (badge 1) - Not started>, url: file:///Users/howardoakley/Documents/testims/BeltedGalloways1.jpg, item: (null), ht:0 bt:0 (low quality) client:com.apple.finder> is downloaded. Trying to generate a thumbnail locally
01.017054 QuickLookThumbnailingDaemon com.apple.quicklook | About to generate a thumbnail locally from URL: file:///Users/howardoakley/Documents/testims/BeltedGalloways1.jpg

This leads to the file’s UTI type being looked up in the dictionary of those known to be handled by bundled qlgenerators. These are the log entries most important to those hunting generator problems.

01.017971 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | No exact match found in type dictionary 0xc352a7ae0 for 'public.jpeg' #UTI
01.018010 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | Getting 5 for 'icon flavor' from UTI 'public.image' #UTI
01.018012 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | Getting 5 for 'icon flavor' from UTI 'public.jpeg' #UTI
01.018765 QuickLookThumbnailingDaemon com.apple.quicklook | Generating thumbnail for <QLThumbnailItem: 0xc351c36c0> (size (16.0, 16.0)) with badge type 1 with extension <QLThumbnailExtension: 0xc354ec540>

That thumbnail is then entered into the store and its index.

01.036504 IconServices com.apple.iconservices | ADDING_NEW_STORE_ENTRY with UUID: FEE02B54-EE08-3F1F-90BD-8A8105536419
01.037902 iconservicesagent com.apple.iconservices | ADDED_INDEX_ITEM: B1F5E967-57DC-3A3E-9459-8DE0C14862C3
01.118704 QuickLookThumbnailingDaemon com.apple.quicklook | completing thumbnail request <QLTGeneratorThumbnailRequest: <QLThumbnailGenerationRequest:0xc34e526c0 uuid:0AD8986E-6325-4FF1-92FD-9FD3C15D57EA BeltedGalloways1.jpg (fi:<fi:<QLCacheBasicFileIdentifier:0xc35297760 ino:243284> (version: <QLThumbnailVersion m:2019-01-28 12:36:40 +0000 s:656575 vi:{length = 12, bytes = 0x54b603000000000002000000} ino:3b654 g:com.apple.quicklook.thumbnail.ImageExtension-1>)>) (rt:2) {16,16} (icon mode, variant 0) (badge 1) - Not started>, url: file:///Users/howardoakley/Documents/testims/BeltedGalloways1.jpg, item: (null), ht:0 bt:0 (low quality) client:com.apple.finder> in addImageData

Full details are given of the thumbnail, here 32 x 32 pixels in size, as it was for a Column view entry.

01.118961 Finder com.apple.quicklook | Received thumbnail for <QLThumbnailGenerationRequest:0xbbbafc280 uuid:0AD8986E-6325-4FF1-92FD-9FD3C15D57EA BeltedGalloways1.jpg (fi:<fi:<QLCacheBasicFileIdentifier:0xbbe83fd80 ino:243284> (version: <QLThumbnailVersion m:2019-01-28 12:36:40 +0000 s:656575 vi:{length = 12, bytes = 0x54b603000000000002000000} ino:3b654 g:com.apple.MobileQuickLook-1>)>) (rt:2) {16,16} (icon mode, variant 0) (badge 1) - Running>: data of length 16384, bitmap format <QLTBitmapFormat 0xbbb8c0000 s=(32, 32) bpc=8 bpp=32 bpr=128 i=8194>, error (null), image <CGImage 0xbbeb25cc0> (DP)
<<CGColorSpace 0x101cf85c0> (kCGColorSpaceICCBased; kCGColorSpaceModelRGB; sRGB IEC61966-2.1)>
headroom = 1.000000
width = 32, height = 32, bpc = 8, bpp = 32, row bytes = 128,
kCGImageAlphaPremultipliedFirst | kCGImageByteOrder32Little | kCGImagePixelFormatPacked
is mask? No, has masking color? No, has soft mask? No, has matte? No, should interpolate? Yes
01.119034 QuickLookThumbnailing com.apple.quicklook | Calling request completionBlock for <QLThumbnailGenerationRequest:0xbbbafc280 uuid:0AD8986E-6325-4FF1-92FD-9FD3C15D57EA BeltedGalloways1.jpg (fi:<fi:<QLCacheBasicFileIdentifier:0xbbe83fd80 ino:243284> (version: <QLThumbnailVersion m:2019-01-28 12:36:40 +0000 s:656575 vi:{length = 12, bytes = 0x54b603000000000002000000} ino:3b654 g:com.apple.MobileQuickLook-1>)>) (rt:2) {16,16} (icon mode, variant 0) (badge 1) - Finished> without error.

01.119873 QuickLookThumbnailing com.apple.quicklook | Thumbnail generation duration of 0.106 for <QLThumbnailGenerationRequest:0xbbbafc280 uuid:0AD8986E-6325-4FF1-92FD-9FD3C15D57EA BeltedGalloways1.jpg (fi:<fi:<QLCacheBasicFileIdentifier:0xbbe83fd80 ino:243284> (version: <QLThumbnailVersion m:2019-01-28 12:36:40 +0000 s:656575 vi:{length = 12, bytes = 0x54b603000000000002000000} ino:3b654 g:com.apple.MobileQuickLook-1>)>) (rt:2) {16,16} (icon mode, variant 0) (badge 1) - Finished>. Most representative thumbnail generated: <QLThumbnailRepresentation:0xbbea1c120 type: Thumbnail; properties=inlinePreviewMode: 1; baseline 9223372036854775807; props = {
}>

01.124730 QuickLookThumbnailingDaemon com.apple.quicklook | Thumbnail extension generated thumbnail for <QLFileThumbnailRequest:0xc352d6210 maximumSize=(16.00, 16.00) minimumSize=(0.00,0.00) scale=2.0 item=<QLThumbnailItem: 0xc351c3940>>: reply = <QLThumbnailReply: 0xc351e4600> type:0, error = (null)
01.124744 QuickLookThumbnailingDaemon com.apple.quicklook | Operation did finish for <QLFileThumbnailRequest:0xc352d6210 maximumSize=(16.00, 16.00) minimumSize=(0.00,0.00) scale=2.0 item=<QLThumbnailItem: 0xc351c3940>>
01.124784 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | Getting 5 for 'icon flavor' from UTI 'public.jpeg' #UTI

Once in the Thumbnail Cache, loading should be very quick, typically around 0.0001 seconds from start to the thumbnail being set as displayable.

Example missing generator

This shows some of the salient log entries made when a file type doesn’t have a generator available, in this case for an IconComposer icon file.

This is most obvious from UTI dictionary lookup

00.690352 QuickLookThumbnailingDaemon com.apple.quicklook | About to generate a thumbnail locally from URL: file:///Users/howardoakley/Documents/mints%20icon/Mints.icon/
00.690897 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | No exact match found in type dictionary 0xb933cfce0 for 'com.apple.iconcomposer.icon' #UTI
00.690957 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | No exact match found in type dictionary 0xb933cfce0 for 'com.apple.package' #UTI
00.691040 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | No exact match found in type dictionary 0xb933cfce0 for 'public.directory' #UTI
00.691092 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | No exact match found in type dictionary 0xb933cfce0 for 'public.item' #UTI
00.691098 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | Caching NSNULL as icon flavor for 'public.item' #UTI
00.691100 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | Caching NSNULL as icon flavor for 'public.directory' #UTI
00.691101 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | Caching NSNULL as icon flavor for 'com.apple.package' #UTI
00.691102 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | Caching NSNULL as icon flavor for 'com.apple.iconcomposer.icon' #UTI
00.691797 QuickLookThumbnailingDaemon com.apple.quicklook | Generating thumbnail for <QLThumbnailItem: 0xb92e10500> (size (16.0, 16.0)) with badge type 1 with extension <QLThumbnailExtension: 0xb934000e0>

The resulting error refers to the missing generator, not the file whose thumbnail is being generated.

00.769110 error QuickLookThumbnailing com.apple.quicklook | Generation error for request <QLFileThumbnailRequest:0x8cb0a8140 maximumSize=(16.00, 16.00) minimumSize=(0.00,0.00) scale=2.0 item=<QLThumbnailItem: 0x8cb014dc0>> : Error Domain=NSCocoaErrorDomain Code=260 "The file couldn’t be opened because it doesn’t exist."

The solution is to generate a placeholder icon as the ‘most representative’.

00.771382 QuickLookThumbnailing com.apple.quicklook | Thumbnail generation duration of 0.093 for <QLThumbnailGenerationRequest:0xbce54aa80 uuid:E33D448A-849E-4CCA-8543-5F6B9DB532D9 Mints.icon (fi:<fi:<QLCacheBasicFileIdentifier:0xbcf48dc60 ino:254169> (version: <QLThumbnailVersion m:2025-06-17 12:42:50 +0000 s:0 vi:{length = 12, bytes = 0xd9e003000000000003000000} ino:3e0d9 g:com.apple.MobileQuickLook-1>)>) (rt:2) {16,16} (icon mode, variant 0) (badge 1) - Finished>. Most representative thumbnail generated: (null)

When that is accessed later for use in the Preview pane, that’s made clear.

02.773702 Finder com.apple.AppKit | ISImage reported a placeholder, image rep is providing a placeholder image for <ISBundleIcon 0xbd0165d10> Bundle URL: file:///System/Library/CoreServices/Finder.app/ type: (null) tag: (null) tag class: (null) digest:96BABFB5-FBB5-0662-25FA-99CA1A147F30

Once the generator has been made available, in this case by running the IconComposer app for the first time, it can be used to generate a thumbnail and preview. Note this requires the appex to be launched first.

02.409348 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | No exact match found in type dictionary 0xbd01fcf00 for 'com.apple.iconcomposer.icon' #UTI
02.409406 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | Getting <QLGenerator Package.qlgenerator> for 'Generator' from UTI 'com.apple.package' #UTI
02.409408 QuickLookSupport com.apple.quicklook | Getting <QLGenerator Package.qlgenerator> for 'Generator' from UTI 'com.apple.iconcomposer.icon' #UTI
02.676198 ExtensionFoundation com.apple.extensionkit | Extension `/Applications/Icon Composer.app/Contents/PlugIns/Icon Composer QuickLook Preview.appex/Contents/MacOS/Icon Composer QuickLook Preview` of type: `` launched.

To see almost all these log entries if you’re using LogUI, fetch all the entries for the period in question, then use its Search feature to display only those with a subsystem of com.apple.quicklook.

Control what gets written to the log

One of the first things that strikes you when you look at a log extract from a Mac, is the number of entries that have some or all of their contents censored with <private>. Another is the sheer number of entries; even when your Mac is doing little, there’s a constant stream of them. This article explains how you can get control of both.

Logging preferences

The keys to controlling what gets written to the log in macOS are property lists stored inside /Library/Preferences/Logging. By default you’re likely to see few files there, which may include a high-level policy in com.apple.system.logging.plist. If present, that’s likely to set just two keys, Enable-Logging to true, and Locked to true as well. But that property list doesn’t tell the whole story.

To discover full top-level policy, you need to enter the command
sudo log config --status
which is likely to return
System mode = INFO

Step one down from there with
sudo log config --status --subsystem com.apple.system.logging
and that might report
INFO PERSIST_DEFAULT
or could extend to include
SIGNPOST_PERSISTED_OFF SIGNPOST_ENABLED_ON SIGNPOST_BACKTRACE_ENABLED_OFF OVERSIZE_ENABLED_OFF
as well.

Now try a more specific subsystem with
sudo log config --status --subsystem com.apple.network
and you’re likely to see something similar, unless there’s a property listed named com.apple.network.plist in the Subsystems folder there, in which case it should reflect the settings in that.

Those settings largely concern two features:

  • Levels of log entry recorded, set as default, info or debug. The first of those includes all entries of default or higher level, the second of info, default or higher, and the third of debug, info, default or higher. Default global level is normally info, so that debug entries don’t appear in the log.
  • Whether the entries are saved to persistent storage (disk), using the same hierarchy of levels.

Thus INFO PERSIST_DEFAULT means that all log entries of info level and above, but not debug, will be collected, and the default setting is used to determine which get written to disk.

Apple explains those basic settings in man log, and its documentation for developers.

Signpost and Oversize settings aren’t explained there, but are in man 5 os_log. Signpost log entries are intended for use by developers to assess performance, and are rarely of any use to others. Oversize log entries can be many pages long, and are stored separately when enabled.

Controlling logging preferences

There are three ways to control logging preferences, which all converge on those same property lists:

  • The log config command, as used above. This is quick and simple, but limited, and perhaps best used to check effective settings for individual subsystems and processes.
  • Write your own property lists and install them in the appropriate folder in /Library/Preferences/Logging. Although this is powerful, as there’s limited guidance on what can be included, you’ll probably want to start from existing property lists. There’s further information in Peter Steinberger’s post and man 5 os_log.
  • Install a custom log profile, which you can also use as a model to develop your own property lists and profiles.

Custom logging preferences take effect almost immediately, and don’t require restarting, but they only apply to log entries written once they have been applied, never retrospectively.

Limiting log entries by level

As the Unified log discards old log entries to constrain the space occupied by the logs, the only way to extend the period covered by stored log entries is to limit the rate at which fresh entries are added to the log. You can do this by careful assessment of which subsystems are writing most entries, and changing their logging preferences.

However, that only applies when there’s an excess of log entries at debug or info levels. When there is, adding or modifying the preferences for that subsystem to store entries at a level of default or info should extend the period they cover. Be cautious, though: that excess of entries could reflect a problem, and by excluding them you may well conceal its cause and extent.

Custom log profiles

The simplest alternative is to install a Configuration Profile containing the saved settings to be applied to the property lists in /Library/Preferences/Logging. I provide a signed profile to remove all that <private> censorship in enablelogprivatedata.

To install the profile unzip the archive into a convenient folder and double-click it. You’ll be prompted to review the profile to install it.

Open System Settings > General & Device Management, and inspect it by double-clicking the profile there.

Click on the Install button to accept and install the profile.

To remove it, select the profile and click the – tool below.

If you watch the contents of com.apple.system.logging.plist in /Library/Preferences/Logging you’ll see that change, with the setting of the key Enable-Private-Data to true. If you then run
sudo log config --status
with that profile installed, it should report something like
System mode = INFO PRIVATE_DATA
to confirm that private data is being shown in log entries, and that’s the best way to gain access to their full contents. Remember to remove the profile as soon as you’re done, or your log will continue to leak sensitive data.

There’s a collection of custom log profiles to gather log extracts about specific features in macOS (and Apple’s other OSes). Although they’re listed here, you can only download them if you have a developer (or equivalent) account with Apple. What’s more, Apple describes these as confidential, and explicitly forbids their use or disclosure without its permission. So much as I’d love to explain the undocumented features they use, I regret that I can’t.

Why you can’t trust Privacy & Security

In this Friday’s magic demonstration, I’m going to show how what you see in Privacy & Security settings can be misleading, when it tells you that an app doesn’t have access to a protected folder, but it really does.

Although it appears you can achieve this using several ordinary apps, to make things simpler and clearer I’ve written a little app for this purpose, Insent, available from here: insent11

I’m working in macOS Tahoe 26.4, but I suspect you should see much the same in any version from macOS 13.5 onwards, as supported by Insent.

For this magic demo, I’m only going to use two of Insent’s six buttons:

  • Open by consent, which results in Insent choosing a random text file from the top level of your Documents folder, and displaying its name and the start of its contents below. As it does this without involving the user in the process, the macOS privacy system TCC requires it to obtain the user’s consent to list and access the contents of that protected folder.
  • Open from folder, which opens an Open and Save Panel where you select a folder. Insent then picks a random text file from the top level of that folder, and displays its name and the start of its contents below. Because you expressed your intent to access that protected folder, TCC considers that is good enough to give access without requiring any consent.

Demonstration

Once you have downloaded Insent, extracted it from its archive, and dragged the app from that folder into one of your Applications folders, follow this sequence of actions:

  1. Open Insent, click on Open by consent, and consent to the prompt to allow it to access your Documents folder. Shortly afterwards, Insent will display the opening of one of the text files in Documents. Quit Insent.
  2. Open Privacy & Security settings, select Files & Folders, and confirm that Insent has been given access to Documents.
  3. Open Insent, click on Open by consent, and confirm it now gains access to a text file without asking for consent. Quit Insent.
  4. Open Privacy & Security settings, select Files & Folders, and disable Documents access in Insent’s entry there using the toggle.
  5. Open Insent, click on Open by consent, and confirm that it can no longer open a text file, but displays [Couldn't get contents of Documents folder].
  6. Click on Open from folder and select your Documents folder there. Confirm that works as expected and displays the name and contents of one of the text files in Documents.
  7. Click on Open by consent, and confirm that now works again.
  8. Confirm that Documents access for Insent is still disabled in Files & Folders.
  9. Whatever you do now, the app retains full access to Documents, no matter what is shown or set in Files & Folders.

Indeed, the only way you can protect your Documents folder from access by Insent is to run the following command in Terminal:
tccutil reset All co.eclecticlight.Insent
then restart your Mac. That should set Insent’s privacy settings back to their default.

You can also demonstrate that this behaviour is specific to one protected folder at a time. If you select a different protected folder like Desktop or Downloads using the Open from folder button, then Insent still won’t be able to list the contents of the Documents folder, as its TCC settings will function as expected.

How does this work?

Insent is an ordinary notarised app, and doesn’t run in a sandbox or pull any clever tricks. When System Integrity Protection (SIP) is enabled some of its operations are sandboxed, though, including attempts to list or access the contents of locations that are protected by TCC.

When you click on its Open by consent button, sandboxd intercepts the File Manager call to list the contents of Documents, as a protected folder. It then requests approval for that from TCC, as seen in the following log entries:
1.204592 Insent sendAction:
1.205160 Insent: trying to list files in ~/Documents
1.205828 sandboxd request approval
1.205919 sandboxd tcc_send_request_authorization() IPC

TCC doesn’t have authorisation for that access by Insent, either by Full Disk Access or specific access to Documents, so it prompts the user for their consent. If that’s given, the following log entries show that being passed back to the sandbox, and the change being notified to com.apple.chrono, followed by Insent actioning the original request:
3.798770 com.apple.sandbox kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder granted by TCC for Insent
3.802225 com.apple.chrono appAuth:co.eclecticlight.Insent] tcc authorization(s) changed
3.809558 Insent: trying to look in ~/Documents for text files
3.809691 Insent: trying to read from: /Users/hoakley/Documents/asHelp.text
3.842101 Insent: read from: /Users/hoakley/Documents/asHelp.text

If you then disable Insent’s access to Documents in Privacy & Security settings, TCC denies access to Documents, and Insent can’t get the list of its contents:
1.093533 com.apple.TCC AUTHREQ_RESULT: msgID=440.109, authValue=0, authReason=4, authVersion=1, desired_auth=0, error=(null),
1.093669 com.apple.sandbox kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder denied by TCC for Insent
1.094007 Insent: couldn't get contents of ~/Documents

If you then access Documents by intent through the Open and Save Panel, sandboxd no longer intercepts the request, and TCC therefore doesn’t grant or deny access:
0.897244 Insent sendAction:
0.897318 Insent: trying to list files in ~/Documents
0.900828 Insent: trying to look in ~/Documents for text files
0.901112 Insent: trying to read from: /Users/hoakley/Documents/T2M2_2026-01-06_13_03_00.text
0.904101 Insent: read from: /Users/hoakley/Documents/T2M2_2026-01-06_13_03_00.text

Thus, access to a protected folder by user intent, such as through the Open and Save Panel, changes the sandboxing applied to the caller by removing its constraint to that specific protected folder. As the sandboxing isn’t controlled by or reflected in Privacy & Security settings, that allows TCC, in Files & Folders, to continue showing access restrictions that aren’t applied because the sandbox isn’t applied.

Conclusion

Access restrictions shown in Privacy & Security settings, specifically those to protected locations in Files & Folders, aren’t an accurate or trustworthy reflection of those that are actually applied. It’s possible for an app to have unrestricted access to one or more protected folders while its listing in Files & Folders shows it being blocked from access, or for it to have no entry at all in that list.

Is this likely to occur?

Most apps that want access to protected folders like Documents appear to seek that during their initialisation, and before any user interaction that could result in intent overriding the need for consent. However, many users report that apps appear to have access to Documents but aren’t listed in Files & Folders, suggesting that at some time that sequence of events does occur.

To be effectively exploited this would need careful sequencing, and for the user to select the protected folder in an Open and Save Panel, so drawing attention to the manoeuvre.

Most concerning is the apparent permanence of the access granted, requiring an arcane command in Terminal and a restart in order to reset the app’s privacy settings. It’s hard to believe that this was intended to trap the user into surrendering control over access to protected locations. But it can do.

I’m very grateful to Richard for drawing my attention to this.

Privacy: Files & Folders or Full Disk Access?

Alongside RunningBoard, TCC and privacy protection are among the greatest contributors to the Unified log, although they’ve been a little less loquacious more recently. This article sheds light on what they do when an app tries to access the contents of a protected folder. Log extracts were obtained from Insent 1.1 running in macOS 26.4 on a Mac mini M4 Pro, and concentrate on what happens when Insent tries to ‘open by consent’, first listing the contents of ~/Documents, then picking a text file at random and displaying some of its contents.

Relevant entries from the log are given in the Appendix at the end of this article.

Accessing ~/Documents by consent

When the Open by consent button is clicked, Insent first tries to obtain a listing of the Documents folder. That request is considered to be sandboxed, so the sandbox service requests authorisation to proceed from TCC.

When it receives that request from sandboxd, TCC first checks whether the requesting app has been granted Full Disk Access, formally the kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles service. An early step in that sequence is to establish the attribution chain, so TCC can check the correct process, in this case Insent’s executable code.

A second check is then started, to determine whether the requesting app has been granted the more restricted service of kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder. Those requests are followed by many validation checks on the Insent executable.

The simplest outcome is that Insent has kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles, in which case access is granted to the sandbox, and the Documents folder is listed as requested.

If Insent doesn’t have that, TCC considers kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder:

  • if that has already been granted, TCC tells the sandbox to grant access;
  • if that has neither been granted nor denied, TCC displays the dialog requesting user consent, and acts accordingly;
  • if that had been granted but has been disabled (denied) in Privacy & Security, TCC denies access without seeking any consent.

This demonstrates an important difference in the behaviour of Full Disk Access (kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles) and locations protected by Files & Folders (here kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder). Disabling Full Disk Access doesn’t deny access, it just doesn’t enable it. Disabling a specific protected location in Files & Folders will deny that app access to that location.

If you want to return an app’s Files & Folders settings to the default, so you will be prompted to consent for access, you therefore need to remove that app’s entry from Files & Folders, and might also need to log out and back in, or restart, to ensure that’s put into effect.

These are summarised in the diagram above. For the sake of simplicity, access granted under SystemPolicyAllFiles isn’t shown separately, but merged with that under SystemPolicyDocumentsFolder.

Interactions between Full Disk Access and individual access in Files & Folders can appear complicated, even random at times, but are actually the result of logical decisions. They are also reflected faithfully in Privacy & Security settings. For example:

  • Remove all settings for Insent from both Files & Folders and Full Disk Access.
  • Open Insent, click on Open by consent, and agree to add the app to Files & Folders with Documents access.
  • Quit Insent, and disable its Documents access in Files & Folders but don’t remove it. Then add Insent to the Full Disk Access list.
  • Confirm that Open by consent still functions correctly, because its Full Disk Access setting overrides Files & Folders, as shown in the latter settings. Quit Insent.
  • Remove Insent from the Full Disk Access list, and it will be listed in Files & Folders with access to Documents disabled once again.

Summary

  • If the app at the head of the attribution chain has been given Full Disk Access, access to list and read files will be given.
  • If not, then location-specific access in Files & Folders will be applied.
  • If there’s no setting for that app and location, the user is asked for consent.
  • If that app has already been given consent for that location, access to list and read files will be given.
  • If that app has consent denied or disabled, access to list and read files will be denied.
  • None of these controls apply to access by user intent in a File Open dialog, or to writing files.

Open and Save Panel access

As I have made clear, when a user expresses their intent to open a file by selecting it using the Open and Save Panel, that doesn’t trigger the same system of access rules. However, the request is still considered by TCC, this time using the Attribution Chain to examine the app rather than that panel service.

When looking briefly at log entries for that sequence, I noticed something odd: instead of the TCC access request being made for a location-related policy such as SystemPolicyDocumentsFolder, it’s recorded as kTCCServiceScreenCapture. Whether that’s a bug or intended behaviour, the request was authorised, and access proceeded.

The first time I saw that, I was so surprised that I repeated the test using Insent to confirm that I wasn’t misunderstanding the log entries. Exactly the same happened a second time, despite Insent having nothing whatsoever to do with making screenshots.

Previously

Consent, intent and privacy
Privacy: protected folders

Appendix: Log Extracts

Each entry is prefaced with the clock time in seconds.

Request, dialog and approval:

In this case, Insent hadn’t made any prior request to access the Documents folder in that session, so had no entry in Privacy & Security settings. When its access dialog was displayed, consent was granted, allowing access to proceed. As with other extracts, this starts with the event marking the button click in Insent.

1.204592 Insent sendAction:
1.205160 Insent: trying to list files in ~/Documents
1.205828 sandboxd request approval
1.205919 sandboxd tcc_send_request_authorization() IPC
1.206291 com.apple.TCC SEND: 0/7 synchronous to com.apple.tccd.system: request: msgID=440.94, function=TCCAccessRequest, service=kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles,
1.207414 com.apple.TCC AttributionChain: accessing={TCCDProcess: identifier=co.eclecticlight.Insent, pid=2232, auid=501, euid=501, binary_path=/Applications/Insent.app/Contents/MacOS/Insent}, requesting={TCCDProcess: identifier=com.apple.sandboxd, pid=440, auid=0, euid=0, binary_path=/usr/libexec/sandboxd},
1.235893 com.apple.TCC SEND: 0/7 synchronous to com.apple.tccd: request: msgID=440.95, function=TCCAccessRequest, service=kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder,

[TCC then makes various checks on Insent]
1.261591 com.apple.TCC AUTHREQ_PROMPTING: msgID=440.95, service=kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder, subject=Sub:{co.eclecticlight.Insent}Resp:{TCCDProcess: identifier=co.eclecticlight.Insent, pid=2232, auid=501, euid=501, binary_path=/Applications/Insent.app/Contents/MacOS/Insent},
1.265001 com.apple.TCC No usage string found (key:NSDocumentsFolderUsageDescription) for client[2232] in bundle:[private]
1.265006 com.apple.TCC display_prompt: called for [private] for service kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder

[The access dialog is displayed, and consent given]
3.798770 com.apple.sandbox kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder granted by TCC for Insent
3.802225 com.apple.chrono appAuth:co.eclecticlight.Insent] tcc authorization(s) changed
3.809558 Insent: trying to look in ~/Documents for text files
3.809691 Insent: trying to read from: /Users/hoakley/Documents/asHelp.text
3.842101 Insent: read from: /Users/hoakley/Documents/asHelp.text

Request after approval:

In this case, Insent had already been granted consent to access the Documents folder, as recorded in Privacy & Security settings.

0.911529 Insent sendAction:
0.912220 Insent: trying to list files in ~/Documents
0.913379 sandboxd request approval
0.913482 sandboxd tcc_send_request_authorization() IPC
0.913953 com.apple.TCC SEND: 0/7 synchronous to com.apple.tccd.system: request: msgID=440.100, function=TCCAccessRequest, service=kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles,
0.915394 com.apple.TCC AttributionChain: accessing={TCCDProcess: identifier=co.eclecticlight.Insent, pid=2255, auid=501, euid=501, binary_path=/Applications/Insent.app/Contents/MacOS/Insent}, requesting={TCCDProcess: identifier=com.apple.sandboxd, pid=440, auid=0, euid=0, binary_path=/usr/libexec/sandboxd},
0.949736 com.apple.TCC SEND: 0/7 synchronous to com.apple.tccd: request: msgID=440.101, function=TCCAccessRequest, service=kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder,

[TCC then makes various checks on Insent]
0.970955 com.apple.TCC AUTHREQ_RESULT: msgID=440.101, authValue=2, authReason=2, authVersion=1, desired_auth=0, error=(null),
0.971072 com.apple.sandbox kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder granted by TCC for Insent
0.973350 Insent: trying to look in ~/Documents for text files
0.973532 Insent: trying to read from: /Users/hoakley/Documents/piklisting.text
1.035508 Insent: read from: /Users/hoakley/Documents/piklisting.text

Request denied:

In this case, Insent had previously been given access to the Documents folder, but that was then disabled.

1.033344 Insent sendAction:
1.034069 Insent: trying to list files in ~/Documents
1.035189 sandboxd request approval
1.035299 sandboxd tcc_send_request_authorization() IPC
1.035820 com.apple.TCC SEND: 0/7 synchronous to com.apple.tccd.system: request: msgID=440.108, function=TCCAccessRequest, service=kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles,
1.037404 com.apple.TCC AttributionChain: accessing={TCCDProcess: identifier=co.eclecticlight.Insent, pid=2303, auid=501, euid=501, binary_path=/Applications/Insent.app/Contents/MacOS/Insent}, requesting={TCCDProcess: identifier=com.apple.sandboxd, pid=440, auid=0, euid=0, binary_path=/usr/libexec/sandboxd},
1.071652 com.apple.TCC SEND: 0/7 synchronous to com.apple.tccd: request: msgID=440.109, function=TCCAccessRequest, service=kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder,

[TCC then makes various checks on Insent]
1.093533 com.apple.TCC AUTHREQ_RESULT: msgID=440.109, authValue=0, authReason=4, authVersion=1, desired_auth=0, error=(null),
1.093669 com.apple.sandbox kTCCServiceSystemPolicyDocumentsFolder denied by TCC for Insent
1.094007 Insent: couldn't get contents of ~/Documents

Open and Save Panel Oddity:

In this case, the Open from folder button in Insent was used to select the Documents folder, ready to allow the app access by intent. This extract shows what happened after the button in the Open and Save Panel was clicked.

8.800555 com.apple.appkit.xpc.openAndSavePanelService trackMouse send action on mouseUp
8.802062 com.apple.appkit.xpc.openAndSavePanelService tcc_send_request_authorization() IPC
8.802140 com.apple.TCC SEND: 0/7 synchronous to com.apple.tccd.system: request: msgID=2259.2, function=TCCAccessRequest, service=kTCCServiceScreenCapture,
8.802469 com.apple.TCC AttributionChain: responsible={TCCDProcess: identifier=co.eclecticlight.Insent, pid=2255, auid=501, euid=501, responsible_path=/Applications/Insent.app/Contents/MacOS/Insent, binary_path=/Applications/Insent.app/Contents/MacOS/Insent}, requesting={TCCDProcess: identifier=com.apple.appkit.xpc.openAndSavePanelService, pid=2259, auid=501, euid=501, binary_path=/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/XPCServices/com.apple.appkit.xpc.openAndSavePanelService.xpc/Contents/MacOS/com.apple.appkit.xpc.openAndSavePanelService},
8.809596 com.apple.TCC Handling access request to kTCCServiceScreenCapture, from Sub:{co.eclecticlight.Insent}Resp:{TCCDProcess: identifier=co.eclecticlight.Insent, pid=2255, auid=501, euid=501, responsible_path=/Applications/Insent.app/Contents/MacOS/Insent, binary_path=/Applications/Insent.app/Contents/MacOS/Insent}, ReqResult(Auth Right: Unknown (None), promptType: 1,DB Action:None, UpdateVerifierData)
8.809609 com.apple.TCC AUTHREQ_RESULT: msgID=2259.2, authValue=1, authReason=5, authVersion=1, desired_auth=0, error=(null),

Privacy: protected folders

On Sunday I introduced some of the principles involved in the protection of folders, to preserve your privacy, and provided a small test app, Insent. This article follows on with additional concepts, details, and a new version of Insent that writes diagnostic information to the log. This article refers to privacy protection as implemented in macOS Tahoe 26.4.

The macOS privacy system is more formally known as Transparency, Consent and Control (TCC), and is built around its manager tccd, working alongside the security system and the sandbox service sandboxd. The last might surprise those who thought that sandboxing was only required for apps provided in the App Store, but this sandbox is different.

How it works

When an app makes certain types of request of the file system, including those seeking a list of files (e.g. with FileManager’s contentsOfDirectory() method), or opening a file for read access, that request is passed to sandboxd for approval. That in turn queries TCC to discover whether that app should be authorised for that access. Depending on the path to be accessed, TCC checks in its database of policy approvals, runs various safety checks on the app’s signature and other properties, then tells sandboxd whether the request should be approved or denied.

As I revealed in the previous article, TCC’s controls over folders only apply to reading their directory and file contents. If an app wants to write a file to one of those protected locations, privacy restrictions don’t apply, only conventional Posix permissions. This is easily verified using the Save buttons on the left side of Insent’s window, which can write test files wherever you as a user have sufficient privileges. This is an important distinction, and a consequence of TCC’s purposes.

Reading directory listings and file contents is also different when it’s a user intent. This is most characteristically performed using the File Open dialog, where only the user gets to see the lists of files, and has complete control over which file is opened. This is handled by a separate XPC process, the Open and Save Panel Service, which has automatic approval. The same mechanism applies to the Open Recent command, drag-and-drop, double-clicking the document, and using the Finder’s Open command.

Attribution

The Open and Save Panel Service is also an example of another fundamental concept in macOS privacy protection, that of the attribution chain.

This is often encountered when considering how privacy protection can be applied to command tools that lack a GUI that could support TCC’s dialogs. Ultimately, each process has a GUI app responsible for it, and it’s that app which TCC uses as the front-end. In the case of most command tools that are run from Terminal, the attribution chain ends in Terminal.

If you want your command tools to have Full Disk Access, you thus add the Terminal app to the list in Privacy & Security settings. The disadvantage of this design is that it gives Full Disk Access to all command tools run in Terminal’s shell, and could get you into trouble if one turns out to be flawed or malicious. This can be exploited by ClickFix attackers, which trick you into pasting malicious commands into Terminal, and is a good reason for not leaving Terminal with Full Disk Access any longer than is necessary.

Daemons or services, whose name normally ends in d, are seldom run from Terminal, and when they require Full Disk Access can be added as individual binaries, although they can’t normally be given access to individual Files & Folders.

Protected folders

I’ve been unable to discover a comprehensive and up-to-date official list of protected folders and locations, but the following appear to be those most frequently used:

  • ~/Documents
  • ~/Downloads
  • ~/Desktop
  • removable volumes
  • iCloud Drive
  • third-party cloud storage
  • network volumes
  • Time Machine backups.

The first three are by far the most common in most Macs, with Removable Volumes close behind. Others are more dependent on your hardware configuration, for example whether you use network shares or third-party cloud services.

Purpose

The overriding principle in privacy protection is to minimise access given to potentially sensitive files.

Apps that are intended to access files anywhere or everywhere, such as backup apps and those used to detect duplicate files, should normally be given Full Disk Access, as should be advised in their documentation. That requires you to put trust in them not to abuse their privilege, and in their supplier to ensure they aren’t the victim of a supply-chain attack. If you have any doubts whatsoever, don’t install that app, and certainly don’t give it Full Disk Access.

Other apps should only be given access to Files & Folders when you’re invited to give your consent in one of TCC’s dialogs, and then only if you consider the app has a sufficiently good reason to be given that access, and can be trusted not to abuse it. All this should be explained in the app’s documentation, and better apps cover it in their onboarding sequence.

The Files & Folders list is different from Full Disk Access. You pick and choose which apps to give Full Disk Access to, and can leave an app listed there but with access disabled, to ensure it will remain blocked. TCC decides which apps are offered for inclusion in the Files & Folders list on the strength of their making a request of the file system that triggers sandboxd to ask TCC if it has been approved for such access. You can’t add apps of your choice, but you can disable an access that has already been granted, and remove that app from the list.

In the next article I’ll show what happens in the log when sandboxd and TCC are in action. This has been made much easier in a new version of Insent which writes detailed entries in the log. If you want to study those, Insent 1.1 is now available from here: insent11
For those who don’t want to dive that deep, version 1.0 is the same in all other respects, and is available from here: insent10

Who called git, and how Claude was caught red-handed

When the same unusual dialog appears twice within a few days for two different people, you begin to suspect a pattern. This article explores a rabbit hole that involves git, the log and the fickleness of AI.

On 8 March, Guy wondered whether an XProtect update earlier this month could have been responsible for a dialog reading The “git” command requires the following command line developer tools. Would you like to install the tools now? As the request seemed legitimate but its cause remained unknown, we mulled a couple of possible culprits, and he went off to investigate.

Five days later, after he had installed the update to SilentKnight 2.13, Greg emailed me and asked whether that might be responsible for exactly the same request appearing on his Mac. This time, Greg had consulted Claude, which asked him to obtain a log extract using the pasted command
log show --start "2026-03-13 07:07:00" --end "2026-03-13 07:10:00" --style compact --info | grep -E "14207|spawn|exec|git|python|ruby|make"

Armed with that extract, Claude suggested that SilentKight had been the trigger for that dialog.

I reassured Greg that, while SilentKnight does rely on some command tools, it only uses those bundled with macOS, and never calls git even when it’s feeling bored. While I was confident that my app couldn’t have been responsible, I wondered if its reliance on making connections to databases in my Github might somehow be confounding this.

While I knew Claude was wrong over its attribution, the log extract it had obtained proved to be conclusive. Within a few minutes of looking through the entries, I had found the first recording the request for command line tools:
30.212 git Command Line Tools installation request from '[private]' (PID 14205), parent process '[private]' (parent PID 14161)
30.212 git Command Line Tools installation request from '[private]' (PID 14206), parent process '[private]' (parent PID 14161)

As ever, the log chose to censor the most important information in those entries, but it’s dumb enough to provide that information elsewhere. All I had to do was look back to discover what had the process ID of 14161, as its parent. Less than 6 seconds earlier is:
24.868 launchd [pid/14161 [Claude]:] uncorking exec source upfront

Just to be sure, I found matching entries for SilentKnight and the system_profiler tool it called after the attempt to run git:
30.153 launchd [pid/14137 [SilentKnight]:] uncorking exec source upfront
30.336 launchd [pid/14139 [system_profiler]:] uncorking exec source upfront

There was one small mystery remaining, though: why did Claude’s log show command also look for process ID 14207? That was the PID of the installondemand process that caused the dialog to be displayed:
30.215 launchd [gui/502/com.apple.dt.CommandLineTools.installondemand [14207]:] xpcproxy spawned with pid 14207

Following its previous denial, when Claude was confronted with my reading of the log, it accepted that its desktop app had triggered this dialog. Its explanation, though, isn’t convincing:
“the Claude desktop app calls git at launch — likely for one of a few mundane reasons like checking for updates, querying version information, or probing the environment. It’s not malicious, but it’s poorly considered behavior for an app that can’t assume developer tools are present on every Mac.”

In fact, it was Guy who had probably found the real reason, that the Claude app has Github as one of its four external connectors. However, that shouldn’t give it cause to try running the git command, resulting in this completely inappropriate request.

Conclusions

  • Claude might know how to use the log show command, but it still can’t understand the contents of the Unified log.
  • If you’re ever prompted to install developer command tools to enable git to be run, suspect Claude.
  • What a fickle and ever-changing thing is an AI.*

I’m very grateful to Greg and Guy for providing the information about this curious problem.

* This is based on a well-known English translation of a line from Virgil’s Aeneid, Book 4: “Varium et mutabile semper femina”, “what a fickle and ever-changing thing is a woman”. While all of us should dispute that, there’s abundant evidence that it’s true of Claude and other AI.

How long does the log keep entries?

One of the most contentious questions arising from yesterday’s critical examination of ChatGPT’s recommendations, is how long does the Unified log keep entries before they’re purged? ChatGPT seemed confident that some at least can be retained for more than a month, even as long as a year. Can they?

Traditional text logs are removed after a fixed period of time. One popular method is to archive the past day’s log in the early hours of each morning, as part of routine housekeeping. Those daily archives are then kept for several days before being deleted during housekeeping. That’s far too simple and restrictive for the Mac’s Unified log.

Apple’s logs, in macOS and all its devices, are stored in proprietary tracev3 files, sorted into three folders:

  • Persist, containing the bulk of log entries, retained to keep their total size to about 525 MB in about 50-55 files;
  • Special, including fault and error categories, whose entries are slowly purged over time until none remain in the oldest log files, so have a variable total size and number.
  • Signpost, used for performance measurements, which also undergo slow purging until they vanish.

One simple way to estimate the period for which log entries are retained is to find the date of creation of the oldest log file in each of those folders. On a Mac mini M4 Pro run largely during the daytime, those dates were

  • Persist, earliest date of creation 7 March 2026 at 16:54
  • Special, 9 February 2026 at 19:41
  • Signpost, 3 March 2026 at 16:41

when checked on 10 March. Those indicate a full log record is available for the previous 3 days, followed by a steady decline with age to the oldest entry 31 days ago. That compares with statistical data available in my app Logistician going back as far as 14 January, although all entries between then and 9 February have now been removed and lost.

Retrieving old log entries

The real test of how many log entries have been retained is to try to retrieve them. Although the oldest Special log file was created on 9 February, the oldest log entry I could retrieve was the start of the boot process on 11 February, in Special log files returning a total of over 44,000 entries for that day. However, no further log entries could be found after those until the morning of 24 February, a gap of over ten days.

This chart shows the numbers of log entries that could be found and read at intervals over previous days. Where a total of 500,000 is shown, that means over 500,000 for that 24 hour period. I checked these using two different methods of access, using the OSLog API in LogUI, and via the log show command in Ulbow. In all cases, log show returned slightly fewer than OSLog.

It’s clear that with only 3 days of full Persist log files, very few entries have been retained from earlier than 7 days ago, and beyond that retention numbers are erratic.

Over the period prior to the oldest Persist file, when entries could only be coming from Special log files, those included both regular and boundary types, and categories were diverse, including fault, error, notice and info, and weren’t confined to the first two of those categories. Most subsystems were represented, but very few entries were made by the kernel. There is thus no obvious pattern to the longer retention of entries in Special files.

Ephemeral entries

Log entries are initially written to memory, before logd writes most of them to permanent storage in tracev3 log files on disk.

mul102LogdFlow

The first substantial purging of entries thus occurs when logd decides which are ephemeral and won’t be retained on disk. This can be seen by following the number of entries in a short period of high activity in the log, over time, and is shown in the chart below for a sample period of 3 seconds.

When fetched from the log within a minute of the entries being written, a total of 22,783 entries were recovered. Five minutes later there were only 82% of those remaining. Attrition of entries then continued more slowly, leaving 80% after 8 hours. Analysis suggests that over this period in which there were about 6,100 log entries per second written to disk, approximately 1,700 log entries per second were only kept in memory and never written to disk. That suggests about 22% were ephemeral, a proportion that’s likely to vary according to the origin and nature of log entries.

Summary

  • A fifth of log entries are likely to be ephemeral, and lost from the log within the first minutes after they’re written.
  • Most retained log entries are written in Persist logs, where tracev3 files are removed by age to keep their total size to just over 500 MB. Those should preserve the bulk of log entries for hours or days after they’re written.
  • Entries stored in Special log files may be retained for significantly longer, here up to a maximum of 29 days. Although those may contain fault and error categories, retention doesn’t follow an obvious pattern, making their period of retention impossible to predict.
  • In practice, the period in which a fairly complete log record can be expected is that applied to Persist files, which varies according to the rate of writing log entries. In most cases now that’s unlikely to be longer than 5 days, and could be less than 12 hours.
  • You can’t draw conclusions from the apparent absence of certain log entries from the log prior to the earliest entries in Persist log files, as it’s likely that those entries will have been removed.
  • Expecting to retrieve log entries from earlier than 5 days ago is almost certain to fail.

Why does AI tell you to use Terminal so much?

There’s a striking difference between troubleshooting recommendations made by AI and those of humans. If you’ve tried using AI to help solve a problem with your Mac, you’ll have seen how heavily it relies on commands typed into Terminal. Look through advice given by humans, though, and you’ll see they rely more on apps with GUI interfaces. Rather than sending you straight to fsck_apfs, for instance, most humans will prefer to direct you to Disk Utility and its First Aid feature.

This is because most popular AI like ChatGPT, Claude and Grok is based on LLMs, Large Language Models, built on tokens for words. The great majority of humans using Macs work primarily in its GUI, using apps rather than Terminal commands. Verbalising the use of GUI apps is relatively difficult, and with the popularity of YouTube rather than written blogs, is becoming a dying art.

Command tools are all very well, but in this context they have disadvantages, among them being:

  • Few understand the commands used, and AI seldom explains those provided unless explicitly asked to do so. This results in the human learning little other than a long list of incomprehensible commands, and acquiring neither understanding nor insight.
  • Commands often lack the safeguards normally built into in apps, so can more readily cause damage or mislead.
  • Commands can readily generate overwhelmingly large output, even when piped to a file for later browsing.
  • Pasting commands into Terminal has become a favourite way to trick the unsuspecting into installing malware.

Even for an advanced user, confident assertions made by an AI can mislead. Here’s an example taken from ChatGPT’s advice on potential detections of malicious software. For this I have set ChatGPT’s output in italics, together with its commands as code. It’s worth noting that each command was explicitly given for the bash command shell, although in macOS Catalina (in 2019) Terminal changed to use zsh rather than bash as its default.

ChatGPT starts this exchange with a teaser that few could resist:
If you want, I can also show you how to tell in 10 seconds whether a Mac actually has malware despite these logs (there are 3 very specific indicators in Console).

Vague predicate

Here’s the most reliable way to see if macOS has ever detected malware on your Mac using Apple’s internal security logs.
1. Check the XProtect malware history
Open Terminal and run:

log show --predicate 'subsystem == "com.apple.XProtectFramework"' --last 30d

This log show command doesn’t access “Apple’s internal security logs”, which don’t exist, but the Unified log. Nor does the recommendation use Console to access the log, as promised. The predicate given is too non-specific to be useful for the stated purpose, and the time period of 30 days is absurdly long and doesn’t match the claimed period either.

On my Mac with the longest log records, its oldest Special tracev3 log file was created on 9 Feb 2026, and now has only 43 KB left from its original size of 11,298 KB, and the next oldest from 10 Feb has 34 KB left from 11,148 KB. On an older Intel Mac, the oldest creation date of a Special log file was 6 March, just 4 days previously, not 30.

When run on the first of those on 10 March, with longer log records, that log show command returns two Fault entries from 11 Feb, and more complete records from Special logs starting on 2 March, but no full log records until 6 March.

The predicate used is too general to select useful entries and is overwhelming, as it returns a total of 1,505 log entries for that command.

Log entries a year old

2. Specifically check for remediation events
To filter just real detections:

log show --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "remediat"' --last 365d
If nothing prints, no malware has been removed in the last year.

ChatGPT here defines “real detections” as those for which remediation was attempted. I know of no evidence from research to support that assumption. Given the limitations in retrieving log entries from 30 days noted above, it seems absurd to assume that any log entries will be retained from over 360 days ago.

It’s malware only if blocked

3. Check Gatekeeper malware blocks
Run:

--predicate 'process == "syspolicyd" AND eventMessage CONTAINS "malware"' --last 365d

ChatGPT has here redefined its original claim to limit it to malware that was blocked by Gatekeeper, and once again assumes it can retrieve log entries from over 360 days ago.

No verification

4. Verify XProtect definitions are current
Run:

system_profiler SPInstallHistoryDataType | grep -i xprotect
You should see recent updates like:
XProtectPlistConfigData
XProtectPayloads
Apple updates these silently in the background.

This is one of its most curious recommendations, as system_profiler is the command line interface to System Information, a familiar and far more accessible app. What that command does is look for the case-insensitive string “xprotect” in the Installations list. Unfortunately, it proves useless, as all you’ll see is a long list containing those lines, without any dates of installation or version numbers. On my older Mac, piping the output to a file writes those two words on 6,528 lines without any other information about those updates.

I know of two ways to determine whether XProtect and XProtect Remediator data are current, one being SilentKnight and the other Skint, both freely available from this site. You could also perhaps construct your own script to check the catalogue on Apple’s software update server against the versions installed on your Mac, and there may well be others. But ChatGPT’s command simply doesn’t do what it claims.

How not to verify system security

Finally, ChatGPT makes another tempting offer:
If you want, I can also show you one macOS command that lists every XProtect Remediator module currently installed (there are about 20–30 of them and most people don’t realize they exist). It’s a good way to verify the system security stack is intact.

This is yet another unnecessary command. To see the scanning modules in XProtect Remediator, all you need do is look inside its bundle at /Library/Apple/System/Library/CoreServices/XProtect.app. The MacOS folder there should currently contain exactly 25 scanning modules, plus the XProtect executable itself. How listing those can possibly verify anything about the “system security stack” and whether it’s “intact” escapes me.

Conclusions

  • Of the five recommended procedures, all were Terminal commands, despite two of them being readily performed in the GUI. AI has an unhealthy preference for using command tools even when an action is more accessible in the GUI.
  • None of the five recommended procedures accomplished what was claimed, and the fourth to “verify XProtect definitions are current” was comically incorrect.
  • Using AI to troubleshoot Mac problems is neither instructive nor does it build understanding.
  • AI is training the unsuspecting to blindly copy and paste Terminal commands, which puts them at risk of being exploited by malicious software.

Previously

Claude diagnoses the log

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