相关阅读：【404文库】曾武律师｜关于曾武律师因关闭休息区信号屏蔽器拟被行政处罚5日的声明

本期“以法度之”话题：私装手机信号屏蔽器，洛阳中院留下3大疑问

褚朝新/文，原发公号“衣者褚”。

最近，洛阳市中级人民法院被一个律师“打脸”了。

据南方周末报道，2024年9月20日，刚在洛阳市中级人民法院开完庭的律师曾武受到当地公安机关的传唤。

洛阳警方传唤曾武律师的理由是：曾武等辩护人发现该法院法庭内安装了信号屏蔽器，当庭向法庭提出异议。休庭期间，曾武等人又看到律师休息区和洗手间内也安装了屏蔽器。在关掉第二个屏蔽器的时候，曾武不慎将屏蔽器碰掉，洛阳中院诉讼服务中心随即报警称曾武故意损毁财物。

曾武被洛阳警方口头告知拟行政拘留5日，而在他关第二个屏蔽器时提醒他“够不着可以用手机去碰开关”的实习律师姬太，已被作出行政拘留5日的处罚，暂缓执行。

曾武等人因碰掉法院内的屏蔽器被行政处罚，其适用法律是否正确，引发了社会广泛的关注与讨论。

有专家指出，《中华人民共和国无线电管理条例》第六条规定得很清楚，“任何单位或者个人不得擅自使用无线电频率，不得对依法开展的无线电业务造成有害干扰”，《条例》第十四条、第二十七条则进一步规定了使用无线电频率、设置无线电台应当取得许可。

那么，洛阳市中级人民法院是否获得批准使用屏蔽器成为律师曾武等是否能被行政处罚的重要前置条件。如果洛阳市中级人民法院获批使用屏蔽器，那律师们不应该去随意干扰法院使用屏蔽器；如果洛阳市中级人民法院没有获得批准而擅自使用了屏蔽器，那法院涉嫌违规使用屏蔽器。

律师卢义杰敏锐地注意到了这个关键点，于是向河南省工信厅申请信息公开，要求查询该厅是否授权批准洛阳市中级人民法院使用屏蔽器。

9月30日，河南省工信厅答复卢义杰，“您申请公开的无线电管理机构同意洛阳市中级人员（民）法院2024年9月20日至12月20日使用无线电频率、手机信号屏蔽器的许可文件不存在”。

很清楚，河南省的无线电管理机构没有发过文件允许洛阳市中级人民法院使用屏蔽器。那么，洛阳市中级人民法院擅自使用屏蔽器违反了《中华人民共和国无线电管理条例》。

该条例第七十三条规定：违反本条例规定，使用无线电发射设备、辐射无线电波的非无线电设备干扰无线电业务正常进行的，由无线电管理机构责令改正，拒不改正的，没收产生有害干扰的设备，并处5万元以上20万元以下的罚款。

所以啊，曾武等人试图关闭洛阳市中级人民法院擅自安装设置的信号屏蔽器，不是蓄意破坏财物，而是在制止洛阳市中级人民法院违反条例的违规行为，不仅不应该受到行政处罚，还应该被奖励和肯定。

卢义杰用申请信息公开的方式揭露了洛阳市中级人民法院违规使用手机信号屏蔽器的行为，干脆、直接、有力，不得不让人给他叫个好。
这已经不是律师卢义杰第一次在公共事件中让人眼前一亮了。

前不久，他还打过甘肃省天水市麦积区烟草局的脸。

麦积区村民阮双全因被控无证倒卖烟草获利两万元，一审以非法经营罪对其判刑五年。该案二审期间，阮双全提起行政诉讼称，麦积区烟草局收回和注销其《烟草专卖零售许可证》的行为，未依法向其送达通知，且未依法告知其享有听证权利，该行政行为无效，其不构成非法经营罪。

2024年6月11日，天水市秦州区法院开庭审理了这起案件。

在行政答辩状当中，麦积区烟草专卖局拿出了“证据”证明其行政行为“认定事实正确、程序合法”：《收回烟草专卖零售许可证通知书》是当时就做出了的，但由于无法联系到阮双全，无法向他直接送达，遂核准经营地址通过张贴通知书的形式向阮双全进行了送达。

为了证实所言不虚，麦积区烟草专卖局还提供了一张通知送达照片，称系“2021年月4日，天水市麦积区烟草专卖局在相关责任人阮双全的烟草专卖零售许可证核准的经营地址，张贴《收回烟草专卖零售许可证通知书》的照片。”这份证据末尾，还盖有麦积区烟草专卖局大红的行政许可专用章。

卢义杰正是阮双全的代理律师，经过他调查发现，麦积区烟草局所谓的2021年已经到店铺门口张贴了通知书纯属伪造的。

卢义杰律师是如何发现并证实烟草局的工作人员伪造证据呢？首先，他发现烟草局所谓2021年送达通知书的照片中店铺门口贴的春联竟与2024店铺门口贴的的一样。难道三年没换春联？这不太符合常识啊。于是，卢义杰等律师动员家属翻遍周边群众朋友圈，果然有人拍到过2021年的店铺门面照片，当年的照片显示当时该店铺门口根本没有贴春联，很容易就戳穿了烟草局伪造证据的假把戏。

为了进一步证明烟草局伪造证据，律师们又查了周边监控，发现2024年5月29日、31日清晨，各有两名工作人员多次在该店铺广告牌、卷帘门等处张贴文书，拍完照又把张贴的文书撕下带走，伪造送达过程。其中，烟草局工作人员2024年5月31日清晨6点拍摄的照片，正是烟草局提交卷宗中的所谓2021年送达的照片。

律师发现，5月31日6时，⻨积区烟草局工作人员到阮双全原经营地址张贴三年前的《收回烟草专卖零售许可证通知书》。

2024年6月2日，上述两人又在凌晨1点7分返回现场，将现场粘贴的春联撕掉了。这意味着，烟草局意识到了2021年该店铺门口应该是没有贴春联的。

6月2日凌晨1时7分，监控拍到麦积区烟草局工作人员到阮双全原经营地址将“恭喜发财”的春联撕下。

为了证实调取的监控视频里停靠在现场的红旗车是烟草局的车、张贴文书并拍照的也是烟草局的人，防止烟草局狡辩说视频里的车、人与其无关，卢义杰特地数次到烟草局“暗访”：在一个雨天，趁着该局的公车没出勤，卢义杰在该局车库“活捉”到了视频中的红旗车，在办公楼“偶遇”视频里张贴文书拍照的人，并拍照留存，一起交给了法庭。

在律师提供的铁证面前，麦积区烟草局出庭人员不得不在庭审中表示：此次“补证”没有法律依据，此举欠妥，向原告致歉，会按照相关规定处理工作人员。

干得漂亮啊，卢律师！

卢义杰律师为何如此擅长打某些违法违规的公职人员的脸呢？

原来啊，卢义杰当律师之前曾是一个优秀的记者，而且是调查记者，前两年转行做了律师。他在办案中用到的取证技巧，其实就是他当年做调查新闻的那一套。

像卢义杰这样从记者转型为优秀的实证派律师的人还有很多，比如同样从记者转型做律师的刘长等，他们过去都是优秀的记者，如今都将自己当年做新闻的调查方法运用到了办案取证的实操中，而且实践证明效果很好、十分有用。

他们，或许给很多还在迷茫的媒体人指明了一条转型转行的新路。

2024年10月11日

The original Macintosh running Classic Mac OS was dependent on a great many components, but the most important of all was its graphics system QuickDraw. Without that, none of the windows, icons and images that were composed into its human interface would have happened. Although almost everything from QuickDraw has now been superseded and removed from modern macOS, you can still open most of its QuickDraw images saved in its custom format, PICT.

QuickDraw

QuickDraw was originally written by Andy Hertzfeld (b 1953) and Bill Atkinson (b 1951), who devised a remarkably innovative raster-based system, and implemented it to perform exceptionally well on the limited hardware available, starting with an 8 MHz 68000 CPU with only 128 KB of memory. It’s based around a logical drawing area called a GrafPort, which can be that within a window, the whole Desktop, or somewhere off-screen.

GrafPort coordinates set their origin at the top left and are signed 16-bit integers, giving a range of -32,767 to +32,767. Coordinates refer not to the pixels within the GrafPort, but to the infinitely thin lines between them. When drawing along a line between two coordinates, the thinnest line shown is a series of pixels below and to the right of the line. Pixels are square, and their default resolution conforms to the printing standard of 72 pixels/points per inch, just over 28 per centimetre. These were essential, to ensure that what you saw on the Mac’s display was what you got from the printer, WYSIWYG.

QuickDraw has commands to support a good range of graphics primitives, but Bill Atkinson’s stroke of genius was the data structure known as a Region, an arbitrary set of pixels that didn’t even have to be contiguous. Although initially constrained to 32 KB of memory, rising later to 64 KB, Regions can be combined with others, differenced, and manipulated in other ways. Their internal structure remains largely opaque, apart from the technical description used by Apple in its patent.

Picture and PICT

The other key data structure in QuickDraw is a Picture, the series of QuickDraw operations called to generate or manipulate images within a GrafPort. Those can be recorded, and played back later to repeat generation of that image, perhaps in a different GrafPort and coordinates. Rather than standardise on a raster graphics file format, QuickDraw saves Pictures in PICT files.

Initial releases of QuickDraw only supported black and white images, although limited colour support was added to work with Apple’s four-colour dot-matrix printer, the ImageWriter II of 1985. For the release of the Macintosh II in 1987, QuickDraw was extended to Color QuickDraw using CGrafPorts with 8-bit video cards. It was later enhanced to support 32 bits per pixel, in what is commonly known as 32-bit QuickDraw. The PICT file format had a similar journey. Originally, it only supported eight colours in PICT 1, then PICT 2 brought 24-bit colour and greyscale.

Examples

Here are some examples of QuickDraw graphics from Mac OS 9 in 2000, each converted from its original PICT screenshot taken 24 years ago.

This is Macromedia (also Aldus) FreeHand, then a competitor to Adobe Illustrator, before it was finally killed by Adobe in 2003.

This is Computer System Odessa’s ConceptDraw, then a new product, and still available for macOS.

This is Strata 3D, a high-end 3D modelling app first released for the Mac in 1988 and still available.

This is a typical role-playing game of the day.

This is X-Plane flight simulator by Austin Meyer of Laminar Research, first launched in 1995, and still going strong with support for Apple silicon Macs.

Quartz

Apple adopted a new graphics system for Mac OS X, although to begin with 32-bit Colour QuickDraw was retained in its Carbon API. Its replacement, Quartz, is built around PDF 1.4, but performed poorly until Quartz 2D Extreme in Mac OS X 10.4 (2005) offloaded its rendering to early GPUs. With that, QuickDraw was deprecated, and support successively removed, although there are still some graphics apps like GraphicConverter that can open and convert PICT files. Preview used to be able to as well, but that too seems to have been removed.

Documentation

You can still read Apple’s detailed guide to QuickDraw, Pictures and PICT files in Imaging with QuickDraw, which also gives you an idea of the depth and quality of Apple’s documentation in the past.

The most powerful authoritarian government in the world has locked down its most economic productive city over a month ago. It has since mobilised Shanghai municipal government, Chinese army, local volunteers, and ordered other provinces to send help to Shanghai. Yet, despite all the effort (at least seen on the news), Shanghainese are starving, literally. Many hospitals are closed to non-COVID patients, many with long term diseases are therefore unable to sustain treatment, resulting in unnecessary casualties. Everyday there are reports of citizens, civil servants, medical staff and other people sustaining the fallout. Local government overwhelmed, logistics broken down, people committing suicides, and until very recently, infected children regardless of age being separated from their non-infected parents. It is difficult to state the seriousness of the situation in Shanghai. It is more than dire, it is hopelessness.

The United States is the proceeding global power after the collapse of the United Kingdom. Both countries share the common law system, and has intertwined origins. For those not familiar with the terms ‘civil law’ and ‘common law’, they refer to different systems of laws where the major difference is court judgements in common law jurisdictions typically hold precedent value, meaning case outcomes for similar situations tend to be similar, whereas judgements in civil law jurisdiction typically do not hold precedent value. This means that in civil law, the law is the law as interpreted by different courts each time, while in common law, the law is the law as created and evolved through court judgements. Court cases in common law can be more important than the law itself, as it provides additional meaning. The US Supreme Court famously ruled same-sex marriage to be constitutionally protected when the US constitution said nothing about same-sex marriage.

Common law provides more flexibility for the society and freedom for the individual. While most civil law countries require a mandatory national ID, Hong Kong and Singapore are the only common law ones requiring so. However, as technology and how the world is shaped continues to progress, the common law system in its current form fails to keep up with its time.

Employment laws are unable to address the issues of remote work, since the assumption was employment had to be performed at the work site. Hong Kong recently faced such a dilemma of the validity of treatment prescribed by a physician licensed in Hong Kong while being physically outside of Hong Kong to a patient in Hong Kong. Where do one country end and another began? Once I step on a Cathay flight taking off from New York, Hong Kong laws apply and I can get my wine legally before 21. Laws are created based on assumptions from past experiences, and as such is unable to fulfil their original intentions when the underlying assumption has shifted dramatically.

The fundamental issue hindering arguments for a planned economy is justified in criticism towards the current legal system. Information is asymmetrical for different stakeholders and even if it is perfectly shared, there is latency which means circumstances on the ground would have changed by the time a decision comes from the top, and thus no longer reflects the actual needs. Government and firms are in direct contrast with each other. While government acts with authorisation of law, companies act without prohibition of law.

Despite all the criticisms Chinese legal system gets (often quite rightly so), there are lessons that can be learnt. Chinese cities and counties are empowered to make regulations that have legal force to govern themselves as they see fit. This is contradictory to the usual image that China as a unitary state, which will perhaps be explored in a future article. Back to the point, what China has done is essentially employing different cities to test out different regulations in action, before compiling lessons learnt in all of them and create a single uniform law. This is a very pragmatic approach and allows for a very efficient legal system, one that is both needed to support the tremendous growth and to govern a country of over a billion. Shanghai in 2022 shows what could happen if a government is not as efficient as the market, which is (almost) always. Similar results can be expected from laws that fail to keep up with the times.

In a globalised world dominated by multinational firms, companies choose the government they work with instead of the other way around. Venue shopping on a global scale. It is a world where some companies are more powerful than many countries, and while becoming entirely subordinate to the will of private firms is not something any country would wish for, it is increasingly the reality. While seemingly different on the surface, the government and firms actually have a lot in common. Government is just as concerned about the bottom line as companies are, except the word for it is “GDP”. Shareholders the citizens, board of directors the cabinet, and share price the Human Development Index (HDI). Whatever you call it, the fundamentals do not change. Trust in the future keep shareholders from selling and citizens from emigrating, good management keep employees from quitting and citizens from “laying down” (躺平 tang ping, a Chinese social trend similar to the “anti-work” sentiment), and satisfactory growth keep the seat at the highest office, and revolutions at bay. Dollars keep companies coming and governments running. Firms and governments are not that different after all. As such, it is even more surprising to see the lack of communication and cooperation between them, to the point of viewing each other as enemies. Given interaction is long term, this cannot be simply explained by calling it a Prisoner’s dilemma but rather long term game theory applies, to an extent. The problem is the government’s priority changes every few years once someone new is elected, rendering prior co-ooperation meaningless. Singapore provides clues in the way out, maintaining consistent governing standards over decades. While it is certainly not perfect, it is most definitely better than the United States’ system offers. “Checks and balances”, more like “Clogged and barely functions”.

“Empires … are little more than sandcastles. Only the tides are forever”. — Inspector Kido, Man in the High Castle

Tide has turned. Tide will turn. Tide is turning.

Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of People’s Republic of China. SAR is an administrative division of China, a singular, centralised state.

Behind that sentence, Hong Kong hides its true self of being a quasi-state. To understand what Hong Kong truly is, we must look at what Hong Kong truly regard itself and act as.

Let’s start with the basics. This is the map of Hong Kong, a city with 7.5 million people. It has its own immigration, customs, and basically all other control within its borders. For example, if one is travelling from Shenzhen here, to Hong Kong, during the pandemic, one might be subject to 14 days of quarantine.

Have you been noticing the change from simply ‘Country’ on many selections to ‘Country/Region’? Yes, it is done to conform to China’s pressure, as they do not like to view Hong Kong as an independent, national entity separate from the rest of China. However, that is (with a few exceptions) the reality. All this time, all the Hong Kong and Chinese government has been doing, is simply concealing the fact by changing words, technicalities, and the fine prints.

Chapter 1: Hong Kong’s domestic matters

Hong Kong, within its own borders, have near full agency. It’s status is conferred by Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution which allows for the establishment of SARs when necessary, with specific laws that apply on a case-by-case basis. For Hong Kong, that law is the Basic Law of Hong Kong, passed by the Chinese Parliament. It is a Chinese domestic law, created because of an international treaty with the UK that serves as the de facto constitution for Hong Kong. Although under Chinese sovereignty (which will be discussed later), Hong Kong is therefore not subject to much of the laws that apply in Beijing, including the Chinese Constitution (in practice).

The Basic Law of Hong Kong is the foundational document for Hong Kong, much like other constitutions. Laws that go against the Basic Law will be declared unconstitutional by Hong Kong courts and made invalid. Basic Law prescribes the ’One country, Two systems’ formula for Hong Kong, allows for continuance of its capitalist system and way of life until at least 2047 as guaranteed by the Sino-British Agreement.

One of the things prescribed is Hong Kong’s citizenship. As part of the word changing, it is not called citizens rather than ‘Permanent Residents’. In actuality, the two statues are very similar. Only Hong Kong permanent residents (HKPR) may vote in elections, regardless of their nationality. A Chinese national without permanent residency have to apply for visas to enter Hong Kong, oh sorry, I meant ‘entry permits’. Few differences still matter when its comes to nationality. Only a HKPR with Chinese nationality as per Chinese nationality laws may obtain a Hong Kong passport which labels the bearer as a Chinese citizen, but it cannot be used at the airport in Beijing as although technically it is a type of Chinese passports, that is only the technicalities. Only a HKPR with Chinese nationality may never lose their HKPR status, a foreign (non-Chinese) HKPR may lose their HKPR after a continuous period of 3 years’ absence from Hong Kong, after which they will be given the ‘right to land’ allowing them essentially all prior rights, just without suffrage. Chinese HKPR and non-Chinese HKPR votes weigh the same, but non-Chinese HKPR have limited seats in Hong Kong’s parliament (‘Legislative Council’). One can argue that this is unfair treatment, but one can also argue that many other countries have protections for their ‘indigenous population’. Chinese Hong Kong residents (whether permanent or not) and non-Chinese HKPR who cannot obtain any other foreign travel document can apply for a ‘Hong Kong Document of Identity for Visa Purposes’, which have less rights than a full Hong Kong passport including visa-free access. However, the bearer of these two documents are considered to be Hongkongers by U.S., with the same nationality code entered on the visa issued (HNK). In effect, Hong Kong’s citizenship scheme gives preferences and protections to Chinese nationals without tipping the balance too much.

As a recent story about how Hong Kong thinks in the ‘city-state’ mentality, it is from neighbouring Shenzhen, where residents angrily discovered that Hong Kong is planning to build a mass cemetry near the border. For Hong Kong, the location is perfect as it is far away from any of its population, but across the river, there is a flourishing business and leisure district. To this protest from Shenzhen residents, Hong Kong’s president/prime minister (‘Chief Executive’) basically just shrugged, and said ‘too bad, that is a they problem’.

Chapter 2: Hong Kong’s foreign relations

Hong Kong has signed a wide range of treaties and conventions, and participates in many international organisations under the name ‘Hong Kong, China’, from the WTO, APEC, IMF, Universal Postal Union and much more. A Hongkonger even once chaired the WHO, however this is not well known as she was officially a member of the Chinese delegation. According to the Hong Kong government, she participates in 39 international organisations that are full sovereign states only, either as less-than-full members or as part of the Chinese delegation, and 54 organizations not limited to soverign states.

As part of international diplomatic practice, Hong Kong maintains an order of precedence. Note the lack of any Chinese government officials on the list, as they are treated as special guests when visiting HKSAR, like any other foreign dignitary. The CIA World Fact book lists the Chinese President Xi Jinping as Hong Kong’s head of state and Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam as Head of Government. In most cases, Head of State is more of a ceremonial role and Head of Government is one that has the real power. For example, the Queen is the Head of State of the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and her other Commonwealth Realms but the actual power is exercised by Prime Ministers, the Heads of Governments. In effect, the CIA considers the Chinese President to be important in Hong Kong’s politics but not exercising much direct influence, which is true.

Various foreign Consulate-Generals are accredited to Hong Kong, and despite their official classification as Constulates, they are in actuality treated as Embassies by many of the sending states. For example, the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong is not subject to the control of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, and report directly to the Department of State like what any other embassy would do.

Hong Kong also has representations outside of its borders, called Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices (HKETO), a name similar to what Taiwan’s foreign representations call themselves, ‘Taipei Economic and Cultural Office’. In reality, HKETO’s and Taiwan’s representation perform like any other embassy or consulates. They communicate with foreign governments, help citizens in need (for example, repatriation flights such as during COVID-19), and issue passports and visas (though only some of the HKETOs perform this function as Hong Kong government decided it was not worth the money). Hong Kong has 5 main offices (with sub-units) in Mainland China, 1 in Taiwan, and 11 elsewhere in the world. They are typically granted diplomatic privileges by special legislation of the host country (as done in Germany) and represents the interest of Hong Kong. Bangkok office has been the latest one opened in 2019, and Hong Kong is prepared to open one in Dubai after talks and signing an agreement with the UAE.

As a counter part of the Hong Kong offices in Mainland China, the Beijing government has several offices in Hong Kong, including the ‘Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ which deals primarily with diplomatic matters that are not within the scope authorised by the Basic Law for Hong Kong, the ‘Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government’ which functions as an sort-of Chinese embassy that communicates with the Hong Kong government, organises receptions for guests, issues certificates with legal force recognising and authenticating Hong Kong issued degrees for use in Mainland China and more. Hong Kong SAR passport is issued by Immigration Department, Hong Kong, but for a proper Chinese passport with the red cover, that is issued to Mainland Chinese citizens by the aforementioned Office of the Commissioner, where one can also apply for Chinese visas among other functions.

I don’t know about you, but that seems to me pretty much like Hong Kong is conducting foreign relations like any other country. Gasp, how can that be possible for a ‘region’?

Chapter 3: Chinese Soverignty

Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong is evident in several matters. The Basic Law allows for unilateral, direct application of Chinese Laws by the Chinese parliament in Hong Kong that affect foreign affairs, national defence or matters not within Hong Kong’s autonomy through amending Annex III, which was used to bring the ‘Hong Kong National Security Law’ into legal force in Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s signing of international agreements must be consented by the Chinese government, and ultimately, Chinese government has the power to unilaterally revoke Hong Kong’s status, perhaps through using the Chinese army stationed in Hong Kong. Much of the potential power is not exercised, as it is not in China’s interest to completely destroy Hong Kong.

Mainland Chinese residents wishing to travel to Hong Kong for tourism do not need a visa from the Hong Kong government, instead ‘entry endorsement’ is given by the Chinese government with legal force not found in Hong Kong’s Immigration Law (‘Immigration Ordinance’), but in the Basic Law itself which provides the constitutional right for Beijing to control the entry of Chinese citizens resident in other parts of China into Hong Kong.

Still, this does not diminish the fact that Hong Kong acts much like its own independent state on the world stage. Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong should be interpreted as control over a foreign state like the U.S. over the 3 countries it is in Free Association with, and New Zealand over its various domains. This is consistent with that fact that Hongkongers, even those of Chinese nationality, are foreign in Mainland China. Not allowed to book into ‘domestic travellers’ only hotels (usually budget hotels), facing huge restrictions on many day-to-day matters such as opening a bank account, obtaining a phone plan, getting the national social insurance and many more. Some of the hurdles comes from the fact that many systems are designed only to support the Chinese national ID and not other documents, and some come from the fact that although Chinese government would like to emphasize that all Hong Kong Chinese compatriots are fully Chinese, and Chinese diplomatic representations have a duty to represent Hong Kong’s interest in the absence of a direct HKETO, often they only pay lip service and heavy suspicion remains. Having a passport stating you as a ‘Chinese national’ is not enough for entry to Beijing, because the passport is in fact a Hong Kong passport that Beijing thinks is just another type of Chinese passport, but for immigration purposes it is suddenly not a Chinese passport anymore. Hongkongers are only claimed as Chinese when it benefits the Chinese government, and ignored when it does not, such as when including the country wide number of COVID-19 cases.

The situation has improved in recent years, as China allowed for Hongkongers with Chinese nationality to obtain ‘Resident IDs’ that are similar to the Chinese national ID, however, differences and hurdles will remain for as long China treats Hongkongers as less-than-full citizens. Only time will tell whether this will ever be possible.

Chapter 4: Fine Prints

Not an Air Force, just the ‘government flying service’. Not a visa, just an ‘entry permit’. Not a consulate, just the ‘Economic and Trade Office’. Not a president, just a ‘Chief Executive’. Not an ambassador, just a ‘director’. Not a member state, just an ‘member economy’.

The list goes on.

Hong Kong is the master at the art of fine prints, using it to portray herself as a subnational part of China. That is true, however this is not the whole picture, far from it.

Hong Kong is a city, an administrative of China with provincial level status. It also is part of the three/four(if you include Taiwan) legal jurisdictions that make up the PRC (Mainland, Hong Kong, Macau), signing not treaties with Mainland China but rather ‘arrangements’. On the world stage, it is a separate legal entity from China in most matters, having its own seat on the table.

The hypocrisy cannot be any more stronger than the fact that Hongkongers can obtain international driving permits because Hong Kong is a party to the Convention on Road Traffic, but not Mainland Chinese because China is not a party. Oh, so can Taiwanese and Macanese citizens.

The legal fine prints build up the illusion that the closest word to describe Hong Kong would be a ‘Special Administrative Region of China’, when the closest word would instead be ‘puppet Chinese city-state’.

The fact is, Hong Kong’s government structure, mentality, society, international relations, laws, finance, and a lot of other matters are just separate from China’s, for the most part albeit similarities that exist because of the shared Chinese heritage. Even the Chinese Nationality Law applied to Hong Kong ‘directly’ through Annex III of the Basic Law was of a different version, but of course it is not called an amendment, just a different ‘interpretation’ issued by the Chinese Parliament.

Cathay Pacific, the de facto flag carrier of Hong Kong, flies no flags of either Hong Kong or China on its planes. Story was that they could not come to a decision about whether to fly the Hong Kong flag or the Chinese flag, or both at the same time, so they decided that doing nothing would be the most correct decision. It is one of the only flag carriers to fly the flag of the company, the other being neighbouring Air Macau.

Hong Kong’s state institutions are, undeniably, separate from the rest of China. With its own currency, border, government, laws, international presence, and basically all the things you would expect from a full sovereign state. In establishing this ‘Special Administrative Region’, China has in effect, gave life to this grand experiment about how far one can push the definition of a ‘country’ to, considering that officially, even despite all the common knowledge suggesting so, Hong Kong is an inalienable, and integral part of the People’s Republic, and all the differences you see here, can be simply explained by ‘One country, two systems’.

As long as everyone is willing to play by the absurdity, China is happy to let Hong Kong be herself, satisfied mostly with just the recognition that Hong Kong is Chinese. As long as SAR is added after Hong Kong to signify the non-sovereign, subnational status, China is willing to let Hong Kong join international organisations and sign international treaties, as long as you call them ‘agreements’. As long as Hong Kong opens consulates in the name of ‘Economic and Trade Offices’, as long as the name ‘Hong Kong, China’, as long as Hong Kong passports label bearer as ‘Chinese’, as long as everyone is buying into the fine prints and not questioning the facade or trying to change the situation, music keeps playing.

Even as China is turning Hong Kong more authoritarian, money will still flow, after all, the world never cared about Singapore’s less-than-democratic regime, only profit.

The horse races on, the dance goes on.

Note: ‘The horse races on, the dance goes on’ is a translation from Paramount Leader Deng Xiaoping’s quote, ‘马照跑，舞照跳’, as a promise to Hong Kong that she will keep her life style and everything will be just as the usual.

Bibliography

Hong Kong’s membership in international organizations limited to sovereign states

Hong Kong’s membership in international organizations not limited to sovereign states

Treaties signed by Hong Kong

Repatriation flights from India

Repatriation flights from Hubei Province, China

Order of Precedence

Signing of Hong Kong — UAE Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement

CIA World Factbook: Hong Kong

German Legislation granting HKETO Berlin full diplomatic privileges

Emergency response operations outside Hong Kong: Emergency Support Unit, Hong Kong Security Bureau

Hong Kong proceeds with building mass cemetery near Shenzhen border

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